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Over  the  past forty  years,  rent  control  has  been a feature  of  housing  in
Ghana. This  study  focusses  on the  housing  market  in  Kumasi,  the  second  largest
city in Ghana.  We examine the characteristics  of the rent control  regime in
force  there,  and  assess  the  costs  and  benefits  of  rent  control,  on  landlords  and
on tenants,  and its  effects  on the  housing  stock.
Rent control has been  successful in ensuring that housing is very
inexpensive  for  most households,  both in  absolute  terms  and in the  proportion
of  income  devoted  to  rent. LanJlords,  who  are  found  to  be little  different  from
many  renters,  have  been  deprived  of  economic  returns  from  their  property. Their
reaction  has been to withdraw  stock  from  renting  to use for their own family
members  and to reduce  maintenance.  There has recently  been an increase in
payment  of rent in  advance  for  new lets,  and  even some  existing  lets.
Rent  control  is  not the  only  constraint  on the  housing  market,  in  Kumasi
or in Ghana.  The paper also describes other supply side and regulatory
constraints;  including  those  affecting  land, finance,  and choice of building
design  and  materials.
Where  net benefits  from  rent  control  exist  they  are found  to  be unrelated
to need,  having  little  distributional  efficiency. There is some tendency  for
lower  income  tenants  to receive  larger  net benefits,  but they  are still small
relative  to  their  cost. The  strongest  pattern  is  that  long  term  tenants  receive
large  benefits  at the  expense  of recent  movers  as  well  as landlords.
Our best estimates are that typical room rents in the tenement  and
indigenous  housing sectors were 250 to 300 cedis in 1986; that long run
equilibrium  rents  of these  *-nits  in the absence  of controls  would  be roughly
twice  that  (median  of 574  cedis);  but that  households  would  demand  more  housing
services  in a well fur.ctioning  market  and  hence live  in a unit  yielding  about
80 percent  more "housing  services"  (i.e.,  with a median rent of roughly  1040
cedis). In other  words  most tenants  pay  less  for their  units (a  gain to them)
but live in smaller  and/or lower quality  units than we estimate  they would
consume  in  a  well  functioning  market  (a  loss  to  them). Not  all  of  the  loss  from
disequilibrium  in consumption  is necessarily  due to rent control, however;
constraints  on land  and finance,  and other  regulations,  play a part.  Overall,
however,  for  many tenants  the  welfare  loss  from  consuming  less  housing  more  or
less  cancels  most of the  benefit  of lower  rents.
A number  of  options  for relaxation/decontrol  are studied  with  the  aid of
a simple  present  value  model.  Along  with decontrol  of new construction  it is
recommended  that floating  up and out of controls  over a period  of about five
years  should  be considered,  along  with  policy  changes  to ensure  ready  supplies
of land,  finance,  and  building  materials.  Such  policies  are essential,  given
that  private  housing  investment  has provided  and  will continue  to  provide  the
great  majority  of rooms  in  Ghanaian  urban  areas.
Finally,  while  we  emphasized  "floating  up  and  out"  for  existing  units  along
with immediate  decontrol  for  new construction  and  upgraded  units,  there  are a
wide range  of options  which  can  be explored  in  Lore  detail  with the  aid  of the
present  value model.  Building  a political  consensus  behind decontrol  is not
independent  of but  is more important  than the technical means chosen for
decontrol  or relaxation.
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xivI.  OVERVIEW
A. Housing and The  Current Macro-Economic Environment
The last twenty five  years  have seen  Ghana  decline from  one of the richest
cou.  :ries in Sub-Saharan  Africa to one in which the infrastructure and capital
stock, including ho;'sing,  are in very poor condition.  During the period 1965
to 1986, real per capita gross national product (GNP) declined at an average
annua' rate of 1.7 percent per year.  Figure 1.1 presents data for levels  from
recent years; Figure 1.2 presents the corresponding changes. 1 ,
Recently, however,  there have been signs of an upturn.  An  ambitious
package of  reforms has been  instigated by  the Provisional National Defence
Council  Government  of Flt-Lt.  Jerry  Rawlings.  The structural  adjustment  program
includes a devaluation and eventual market determination of the exchange rate
for the Cedi (from  C2.75 - US$1 to  C90 in 1986, when we collected the  household
data, and C350 by March 1989) and other policy changes including agricultural
price reforms ar& reductions in government staff levels.  As a result, real GNP
increased  by 5 percent in both 1985 and 1986 (Figures  1.1 and 1.2).
Figure  1.1:  Real  GNP Per  Capita  Figure  1.2:  Change  in  Real  GNP Per  Capita
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Concern remains that housing cclocitions  have deteriorated over the past
decade; improvement in these  conditions is required to ensure that the  bent'fits
of adjustment are widely shared.  As the adjustment in Ghana's economy takes
hold, demand for housing can be expected to increase at least as fast as real
incomes.  One important task for the government is to ensure that its actions
do not impede  or constrain potential suppliers  of housing.  The purpose of this
pdper is to  examine the  constraint  on the  housing sector imposed  by rent control
in the secona largest  city of Ghana,  Kumasi.  This concentration  on rent control
is not intended to imply that it is the only, or most important, constraint.
;./  National accounts and other aggregate  data are from the  World Bank's BESD
database, updated  by written reports.  These data are in turn obtained  by
the Bank from the Government of Ghana.2  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
As will  be discussed  below, other  problems restricting  the supply  of rental (and
owner  occupied) housing  must also be  confronted, such as problems  in land
markets, provision of infrastructure, finance, and other regulations, such as
planning and building regulations.
Shelter is the largest single form of fixed capital investment in most
economies.  In developing countries, the shelter sector usually ranges between
10 and 30  percent of household expenditure  or 6 to 20 percent of Gross National
Product.  Housing ranges from 10 to over 50 percent of gross fixed capital
formation and from 3 to 8 percent of Gross Domestic Product.  The share of
housing investment in GDP r_.ses  as economies develop (see, for example, Mayo,
Malpezzi and Gross, 1986).
In general, these patterns have not been evident in Ghana over the last
15 years.  Figure 1.3 shows that since  1970 the  published numbers indicate  that
the share of housing investment in GNP  has been falling from about 5 percent in
the early 1970s to only about 3 percant in the years since 1980.  However, such
data are only indicative.  Ghosh and  Mohan (1983)  reports that  Ghanaian housing
investment data are  derived  from  data  on cement  imports and  estimates of
population growth,  so,  for example, changes  in housing  investment ziven a
partictular  change  in  populacion  and  level  of  cement imports  will  not  be reflected
in  the data.  On the  other  hand, the trend is still  clear and is  consistent  with
observation and anecdotal evidence  (and survey data presented later in this
paper).
Figure  1.3:  Housing  Investment  and  Capital  Formati.,n
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levels  as  well  as  ratios  are  studied.
Roughly,  real  housing  investment  per  capita,
and real GFCF per capita, were halved during the period.  It is understandable
that when times are hard, people defer housing and other investments in the
struggle to buy food and other current essentials.
The overall investment picture looks better  in the post  1983 period.
However, the recent upturn in investment is largely due to increased public
investment.  Private  investment is  still lagging.  While  official housing
investment  data for the  past several  years are not available,  data presented in
Chapter 6 suggest that  housing investment  has picked up somewhat.
In addition to unfavorable long term trends, Ghana started out from low
levels of investment.  Table 1.1 presents some indicators of access to  housing
infrastructure for Ghana and several other African countries.  Over a quarterOVERVIEW  3
of  urban  households  lack  access  to  piped  water  (house  connections  or  standpipes)
and  over  half  lack  adequate  sanitation.  As in  most  countries,  the  situation  is
worse in rural areas.  In general,  according  to these aggregate  data the
proportion  served  in  urban  areas  has  been static  while  service  in rural  areas
has improved  somewhat. While  international  comparisons  of this  type are  not
precise,  Ghana  appears  to have  made some limited  progress  at a time  when the
services  in  other  African  countries  were  deteriorating  rapidly  (perhaps  because
of faster  urban  growth  in  some  of the  comparator  countries).
Table 1.1:  Housing Infrastructure Indicators, Selected Countried
Pet Urban  Pct Rural  Pct Urban  Pct Rural  Pct Urban
v. Access to  v. Access to  w. Access to  w. Access to  GNP Per  Popu-  Popu-
Water  Water  Sanitation  Sanitation  &apit&  lation  lation
(1970) (1980)  (1970) (1980)  (1980)  (1980)  (1985)  (1985)  (1985)
Benin  94  26  15  20  48  4  S260  4.0  35
Burkina Faso  68  27  31  30  38  5  $150  7.9  8
Burundi  77  90  20  24  40  35  $230  4.7  2
GHANA  73  72  33  47  47  17  $380  12.7  32
Kenya  97  85  15  26  89  19  $290  20.4  20
Lesotho  100  37  11  14  13  14  $470  1.5  17
Mali  29  37  0  6  79  0  $150  7.5  20
Senegal  98  77  25  42  100  2  $370  6.6  36
Sierra Leone  75  50  2  16  31  6  $350  3.7  25
Source:  Habitat Global Report  on Human Settlements, 1987
These low levels  and adverse  trends  have important  implications  for
development  generally  as  well  as for  people's  housing  consumption.  Shelter  is
one  of two  capital  assets  applicable  across  the  entire  income  distribution  and
in every  geographic  location,  rural  and  urban  (the  other  is  human  capital,  in
other  words,  peoples'  skills  and  innate  productivity).  For  many,  particularly
those  with lower  incomes,  housing  is  inseparable  from  other  fixed  capital,  for
example,  shops  and  workrooms.  Also  much  productive  infrastructure  is  shared  by
housing  and other  productive  activities  (for  exaple,  water,  transport,  waste
disposal). In  short,  housing  has  many  spillovers  and  many  forward  and  backward
linkages  with  other  productive  sectors.
It  is  important  that,  as  the  economy  recovers,  policies  encourage  efficient
housing  markets.  Regulatory  reform  can be a very powerful  tool to reduce
unnecessary  costs,  ultimately  improving  affordability.  While  the  focus  of  this
paper  will  be on  effects  and  possible  changes  in  rent  control,  reforms  in  other
areas  will also  be discussed.4  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
B. Summary of Findings
Key Findings and Their Generality
An important  question to ask about any case study of a particular market
is its generality.  Housing markets are, after all, local and diverse, even
within countries.  And a maintained hypothesis of the overall research project
on Rent Control in Developing Countries is that rent control laws and their
enforcement vary from place to place, as do market conditions.  This does not
mean that every time and place  is unique, and that hence  generalization is
impossible, but rather that we should strive to understand which results are
quite generalizable,  and when understanding of the differences between markets
permits a new level of generalization.
A useful  analogy  can  be drawn  with the  previous  research  project  on  Housing
Demand in Developing Countries (see Malpezzi and Mayo, 1985).  That project
demonstrated that previous  rules of  thumb about housing  demand were  often
innacurate, stemming as they did from generalizations  of observed behavior in
a few markets.  But the project went further, constructing simple models which
permitted more accurate prediction (from  more "sophisticated" generalization).
In a similar  spirit, this rent control research  project will produce case
studies of several other markets  (Brazil, Egypt and India), and a synthesis
report  which will discuss  the generalizability  of findings in  more detail.  Here
we point out a few  of the key findings from this  case study along  with comments
about their generalizability:
(a)  Ghanaian  renters  benefit  from  lowered  rents  but live  in  worse  housing
conditions than  we would expect, even given their low incomes.  In
Kumasi, the welfare loss from reduced housing consumption more or
less outweighs the gain from lowered rents.  The nature of  the
offsetting  effects  are  quite  general;  their  rough  equivalence  is  not.
And not all of the reduction  in consumption is due to rent control;
there are other supply side constraints on the housing market.
(b)  Rent  control reduces  the internal rate  of return  to a  typical
investment (a general result)  from about  8 percent  to  zero  (a
specific result).  We constructed a simple model which can be used
to  analyze  controls'  effects  on  profitability  as  well  as
affordability for Kumasi and for other times and places.
(c)  In Kumasi, a significant amount of rental housing, of very  low
quality, was produced under controls.  This was during a time when
zero returns to housing were actually quite attractive relative to
large,  negative  returns  to  many  other  investments. As the  structural
adjustment improves  the return  to competing investments,  especially
financial  ones,  continued  controls  can  be expected  to further  reduce
supply.  This illustrates an important general point, surprisingly
often  neglected:  analysis  of  profitability has  to  take  actual
investment  opportunities into account.OVERVIEW  5
(d)  Systems  which  (like  Kumasi's)  don't  index  rents  to  inflation  or  which
index  incompletely  tend  to  get  worse  over  time. The  "wedge"  between
controlled  and market rents gets larger.  Specific  quantitative
results  reported  in this  paper  are from  1986;  numerical  estimates
of  costs  and  benefits  would  differ  today. The  model  mentioned  above
can be  used  to update the analysis of  controls' effects on
profitability  and affordability,  or can be modified  to fit other
markets.
(e)  Rent  control  can  affect  rents  in  "uncontrolled"  markets,  but  theory
and empirical  evidence  show that the nature of the effect is
ambiguous,  in large  part  because  the  nature  of the "uncontrolled"
sector  varies. In  Kumasi,  we  found  "uncontrolled"  rents  were  lowered
by controls;  in other  markets  (e.g.  Cairo)  they  were  higher. This
will  be explored  further  in the  forthcoming  synthesis  paper.
(f)  The  largest  benefits  from  controls  accrue  to tenants  who  have  lived
in  their  units  for  a long  time. This  is  consistent  with  studies  of
many  other  markets. Lower  income  tenants  do tend  to  receive  larger
benefits;  this  result  varies  with type  of regime  in  other  studies.
Many landlords  are themselves  low income,  and some tenants  are
relatively  well  off,  blunting  rent  control's  redistibutive  effect;
this  is  also  true  in  a number  of other  studies.
(g)  A number  of options  for  decontrol  or relaxation  of controls  exist,
and can  be studied  with the  simple  model  presented  in Chapter  6.
The specific  recommendations  we make regarding  decontrol  are not
immutable. The  principle  that  some  degree  of political  consensus
is  required  for  any  successful  scheme  of  decontrol  seems  obvious  and
quite  general.
Let  us  now  summarize  the  findings  of  this  particular  case  study  more  completely.
The  major  qualitative  findings  of this  paper  are  as follows:
The  basis  for  current  rent  control  in  Ghana  is  the  Rent  Act  of  1963,  which
allows  government  to  set  rents  for  specific  types  of  property  from  time  to  time.
This  has  been done  every  three  to six  years  since  1973;  the increases  allowed
have  been  kept far  below  the  rate  of general  inflation.  Rent  control  has  kept
rents  in  Kumasi  very low.  On average,  rents  are  less  than  2 percent  of total
consumption.  There  can  be  few  households  in  Kumasi  who  cannot  afford  the  monthly
rent  of a room.
While  even  controlled  rents  yielded  some  return  on investment  in  the  first
years  of  controls,  they  have  recently  lost  touch  with  prices  and  incomes  to  such
an extent  that landlords  cannot  hope to recoup  investment  in rental  housing.
However,  there  is some  evidence  that  other  investments  fared  poorly  as well,
especially  financial  investments. Investment  in rental  housing  may have,  at
times,  remained  one  way to  preserve  part  of capital. Although  there  are  major
cultural  incentives  to build  houses  in Kumasi,  very few  households  build  only
for  their  own  occupation.  In  the  last  few  years,  landlords  have  begun  to  demand
payment  of  rent  for  years  in  advance,  creating  considerable  hardship  for  renters
who  must find  many  months  income  in  cash  to  obtain  or hold  on to a room.6  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
The private sector has always provided a majority of the housing in the
city.  Government direct activity has been limited to 4,400 small houses, now
mostly sold  to their occupants.  These  houses have  been very expensive to  build,
and the  government  recognizes that  any solution  to  housing  problems will require
active private investment.
This study demonstrates that rent levels have contributed to the poor
state of housing in Kumasi in 1986, the date of our data collection, and by
extension to 1989.  However there are also severe problems in obtaining the
inputs to  housing - developed land  at affordable  prices,  building materials and
finance.  Improving the functioning of the rental market will  also require
concerted efforts on these other problems.
Housing conditions in Kumasi are bad, even given low incomes.  Occupancy
rates and the percentage of households living in one only room are both high.
There  are fewer  single  person  households than  in the  past, and the  high cost area
is becoming more  like the rest of the city, with respect to household size
distribution, incomes and levels of crowding, than it was  in 1980.  However,
while the building of additional houses have failed to keep up with growth in
the  population, there  have been sufficient  additional  rooms to  maintain the  mean
occupancy rate at a high but steady 3.3 persons per room since 1980.
There has been a reduction in the  proportion of stock available for rental
since 1980.  Landlords have been replacing rent paying tenants with  family
members who live rent-free to  such an extent  that the  percentage of family  house
tenants  has doubled in the 1980 to 1986  period.  There  has, i&^wcvev,  been little
transfer to commercial or other non-residential  uses.
Landlords differ little from renters except in the amount of housing they
are able to consume.  Their incomes  are little  higher than those of renters per
household  and they  are  actually  lower  per  capita  owing  to their  greater  household
size.  However, as owner  households tend  to  occupy a larger number  of rooms than
renters, their occupancy rates tend to  be lower.  They also have better access
to water supply, toilets and other facilities in the house.
There is a generally low expectation of rent levels among both landlords
and renters. Rents are only about half of the market price for which the unit
would rent in tha absence  of rent  control, so low in  fact that they are imposing
considerable welfare costs on society as a whole.  Rent control is inefficient
in the sense that the costs imposed by rent control on landlords are not all
captured  by tenants  as benefits.  This efficiency  loss is severe in  some sectors
of the Kumasi housing market.  Generally, rent control imposes a welfare cost
which exceeds the overall benefit to tenants.
More specific quantitative  results include the following:
Housing Market Conditions
Ninety percent of Kumasi's population rent or live as tenants in family
houses.  Our 1986 household survey showed that typical controlled rents were
less  than  2  percent  of  total consumption.  We  identified  a  subsample  of
"uncontrolled" units  (units whose rents exceed controlled levels) and foundOVERVIEW  7
their  median rent-to-consumption level to  be .05. A simple cross country model
predicted that  the median rent-to-income  level  would  be about .08  in the  absence
of controls.  It appears that the net effect of the biases on "uncontrolled"
rents discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 is to lower "uncontrolled" rents.
Controlled rents are overwhelmingly in the range of 200 to 300 cedis per
month.  The estimates of uncontrolled rents from the cross country model range
from 800 to 1300.  These results are so strong that they could be described as
a 'smoking gun."
Recently more and more households are paying rent in advance.  While the
irridence of advances was spotty in 1986 --  about 14  percent of tenants  paid in
advance --  anecdotal evidence suggests that it is increasing  and that landlords
are even pressuring existing tenants for payment in advance.  Pressure for
advance payments causes  particular hardship given the  difficulty most Ghanaians
have in financing large lump sum payments.
Costs and Benefits of Controls
Using a model which permits comparison of controlled units at controlled
prices (PcQc),  controlled  units  at estimated  market prices (PmQc),  and  estimated
market demand at market prices (PmQm),  we find:
(a)  renters  pay a  fraction  of the  estimated  market  rents  for  their  units.
The actual rent  paid is  only  43 percent  of the  estimated  market rent
in the indigenous sector and 52 percent in the tenement sector.
Furthermore, while  the controlled rents, PcQc, hardly vary,  the
estimated market rents, PmQc, vary with  size ard type of unit.
Market demand, PmQm, varies even more.
(b)  The median cost of the subsidy implied  by these rent reductions is
estimated to be about 274 cedis per month in the tenement and 301
in indigenous sector.  (All amounts in this section are  in 1986
prices).
(c)  But  households would (we  estimate)  spend even  more on  housing in the
absence of controls.  Median estimated  market demand, PmQm, is over
1000  cedis in  both sectors. Consumption  of  housing  services  has  been
greatly reduced under controls.
(d)  Rent control imposes a landlord cost (PmQc-PcQc)  which exceeds the
net benefit to tenants in  both sectors.
(e)  The "transfer  efficiency" (ratio  of  benefits to costs) is  therefore
low.  Under .he most "favorable" assumption of the efficiency of
controls, the efficiency is 40 to 50 percent.  Tenants receive net
benefits which are less than  half the static cost to landlords.  If
the price elasticity is in the order of -0.5,  net benefits to most
tenants are negative; both landlords and (most) tenants are made
worse off by controls.8  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
(f)  While costs and  benefits are large relative to rents paid, they  are
small relative  to income.  The cost  of the subsidy is  usually in  the
order of 2 to 3 percent of consumption.  Net tenant  benefits are, at
best, negligible compared to total consumption.
(g)  These estimates of PmQm are smaller than those taken directly from
the  cross country  model  (above) but  are  of  the  same order  of
magnitude.  This is not surprising since we also used the cross
country  estimates to  'calibrate"  our  estimates  of  uncontrolled rents
due to biases discussed above.  While the exact results here would
change given different cross country estimates,  the qualitative
results presented would not change.
The bottom  line,  then,  is  that rent  control  reduces  the  rents  that
households pay, but the benefit of this rent reduction is more or less offset
by the  welfare loss from  underconsumption  of  housing.  We estimate  that  existing
units  of typical  quality  would  have rented  for  about twice  current  rents in  1986,
but that  households would typically spend  more than three times current rents -
- implying  higher housing consumption -- if supply was elastic.
Nominal prices have risen (roughly doubled) since 1986 while controlled
rents remained fixed.  In  current prices, PmQm and PmQc  would be roughly double
the  above  estimates.  Also  note that  while  controlled  rents are  fixed  at the same
levels for  all cities and towns,  market rents  in  Accra would certainly  be higher
than in Kumasi while those in smaller towns would be less.
Distributional Issues
Benefits are negatively related to  household income, suggesting that  rent
control may be somewhat progressive;  but the benefits are, again, small.  When
the price elasticity of -.5 is  used, only households in the lowest consumption
quartile receive  positive net benefits on average.  Smaller  benefits --  or more
negative benefits  --  for richer tenants come as no surprise since these are
exactly those  households with the largest  a  'fare loss from low consumption of
housing.
Long  term  tenants  have  the  smallest  estimated  disequilibrium  in  consumption
and the largest  benefits. Net benefits are still small compared to consumption.
Note that the largest net costs are to recent movers.  Even larger unmeasured
costs are imposed on households who are constrained from moving at all.
Landlords are not all that much better off than cenants.  The median of
landlord consumption is about 36 percent more tha- the median consumption of
725  controlled  renters (11,563)  and  roughly  the  same  as iO5  uncontrolled  renters.
Thus, while landlords  are richer than tenants "on average" there is quite a lot
of overlap.  A  quarter of controlled renters consume more than  the median
resident landlord; a quarter  of resident landlords  consume less than the  median
tenant.OVERVIEW  9
Housing SuRply
A survey of the number of houses in Kumasi in 1988 supports impressions
formed in 1986 that building had continued only slowly since 1981. Less than
800 houses appear to have been added  between 1982 and 1985 and only 900  between
1986  and  1988, with  the  index for houses  falling further behind  that  of
population.  However, the increase in rooms per house between the 1980 and 1986
samples (supported by no  increase in occupancy rates) gives some grounds to
believe that extensions to existing  houses have allowed the growth in rooms to
keep pace with population growth since 1980.
Many of the  problems following  from  decontrol  could  be avoided  if  the  supply
of new  houses is increased,  especially at the  lower end of the  market.  Analysis
of a number of developing countries by  Ferchiou (1982) has shown that some
downward filtering of housing takes place  but the shortage  of accommodation for
middle income  households tends  to  prevent its  reaching the lowest  income  groups.
Furthermore, the  availability of  low cost, appropriate local materials and
technologies  based on mud construction  allow the  lowest cost  housing to  be  built
new at a price most households can afford.  If relatively low income  households
can be encouraged to  build in local  materials with local technology,  rooms  will
be added  much  more cheaply  than  is  possible  with imported  cement-based  materials.
Rent Control and Profitability
Rent control directly reduces profitability  because it reduces the rents
a  unit  can  command.  But  reduced  rents  also  affect  maintenance  (and
depreciation), taxes and capital gains.  These "indirect" effects can be large
and should  be taken into  account.  We build such a  model in Chapter  6, and study
a series of  hypothetical representative  investments  (using  1986  as the  base year
of investment).
At a real discount rate  of 10  percent, the  present value of the  controlled
unit is about -1.3 million cedis.  If the unit was uncontrolled, the present
value would still  be negative,  but the "loss"  would be smaller - about -260,000
cedis.  We can interpret these numbers as follows.  If investors could receive
a real return of 10 percent on an asset with similar risks, they would prefer
such an investment over rental housing in either case.  But clearly they would
lose less in the absence of controls.
But in  Ghana's disrupted economy there are a limited  range of investments
which  yield 10  percent in  real  terms. Returns to  financial  savings  are, in  fact,
negative.  With how high a rate of return could housing compete?  The internal
rate of return for a controlled unit is estimated at roughly zero.  In other
words,  landlords  could  at  least  preserve  capital  with  housing  if  other
investments were yielding negative returns.  Without controls, housing could
compete for capital  with investments  yielding up to 8 percent.  Controls reduce
the rate of return by about 8 or 9 percentage points.  Such current investment
as exists is  motivated more  by capital gain (or  more accurately  avoiding  capital
loss) and  by nonpecuniary income (status  conferred) than by current income  from
the unit.10  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
If rents for new compound rooms were of the order of 1200 1986 cedis
(compared to median estimates of 1050 cedis from the cost-benefit model) and
afterwards they were indexed to general inflation, we estimate they would be
affordable to the top 40 percent of the income distribution.  If rents for
existing units were to rise to 600 cedis (compared  to  median estimates  of 575),
they would remain affordable to  virtually all income  groups.
Other Market Imperfections
Rent  control  is  not  the  only  problem  in  rental  or  housing markets
generally.  Other problems --  in land, infrastructure, finance, materials --
adversely affect the  market and drive costs up.  They drive costs up higher for
the poor than for others.
Relaxation of rent control is necessary but not sufficient for expanding
the supply of  rental housing.  Relaxation/decontrol must be accompanied by
measures to ensure a rapid supply response to the demand for rental  housing, or
else  rapidly  rising  rents  could  squeeze  existing  tenants  and  jeopardize
decontrol.  Political consensus is, after all, required for successful change.
Of the  major constraints  on  private rental  housing,  many --  land, finance,
infrastructure,  materials,  building codes  and standards  --  are  discussed  briefly
in Chapter 2.  While detailed discussion of each is beyond the scope of this
report, the following points should be noted.  Rental markets suffer from the
same constraints as housing markets generally, but there are also some which
affect  rental  particularly (in  addition  to  the  obvious  problem of  rent  controls).
Among other collateral actions, it  will be necessary:
(a)  To pay particular attention to building codes, land use standards
and other regulations which discriminate against low cost compound
housing.  Land  use  regulations  should  be  modified  to  permit
contruction of compounds in  urban areas.  Building in swish should
be permitted, subject to proper construction techniques.
(b)  Not  to  discriminate  against  rental  in  the  provision  of  serviced  land.
Owner occupancy should not be required for access to land in any
program designed to improve land availability (including  sites and
services).
(c)  Not  to  neglect finance  for  rental  housing.  It  should  be  ensured that
rules  for  lending  do  not  discriminate  (intentionally  or
unintentionally) against rental housing.
These and  other  actions  need to  be taken  as  complements  to  any  decontrol  program.
Let us now turn to the analysis of several alternatives for decontrol.OVER'  IEW  11
Decontrol  ORtions
There  are a number  of options  which  could  be considered  for  removing  or
relaxing  controls. The  main  options  are  as follows:
(a)  Blanket  lifting: all  rent  controls  are  completely  removed  as of  a
certain  date.  This is the  simplest  method,  but is  very difficult
politically  and  may  lead  to  short  rurt  dislocations.
(b)  Decontrol  new construction:  an obvious option  which is being
undertaken  in  India,  Brazil  and  a  number  of  other  markets. But  new
construction  can still be inhibited  unless government  credibly
guarantees  units  will  not  come  under  controls  later.
(c)  Rents can also be immediately  decontrolled  for units  which meet
certain  standards,  either  now  or after  upgrading  (for  example,  for
units which provide acceptable  water  supply and  sanitation).
Standards  would have to be carefully  chosen,  however, to meet
requirements  without  imposing  unneccessary  costs.
(d)  Floating  up and  out:  controls  are  gradually  relaxed,  for  example
rent  rises  are  based  on some  multiple  of CPI  or  wage  index  changes,
until  controls  are  no longer  binding  on  most  units. Then  controls
can  he abolished.  This  method  can  permit  a smoother  adjustment  if
potential  landlords  view  the  gradual  program  as credible.
(e)  Vacancy desontrol:  Units are decontrolled  as they  become
vacant.  This method  has been tried  in some  North  American
markets  but may keep mobility  down,  with possible  adverse
effects  on  housing  and  labor  markets.
(f)  Vacancy  rate  decontrol:  particular  markets  are  decontrolled  as the
vacancy  rate  rises  above  some  threshold. But  while  controls  (and
other  problems)  remain,  vacancy  rates  will  probably  remain  extremely
low. How  can  vacancy  rates  increase  while  controls  remain?
(g)  Rent  level  decontrol:  decontrol  by  market  segment.  Rents  could  be
decontrolled  from  the  top  down  (the  current  system,  with  a  threshold
of 1,000  cedis,  embodies  this to a limited  extent).  But such a
system  can  provide  perverse  incentives  to  raise  rents  above  long  run
equilibrium  levels  in  order  to  escape  controls.
(h)  Contracting  out:  landlord  and tenant  negotiate  a payment  to the
tenant  in  return  for  his giving  up the  right  to controls.
Of course these options  are not all mutually  exclusive.  In many respects
floating  up and out  has some  a priori  appeal  because  the  market  may take  time
to respond,  particularly  given the current  problems  in input  markets,  etc.
Blanket  lifting  carries  the danger  of a sharp  short  run rise in rents  which
would  be reduced  over  time. The  present  value  model  mentioned  above  can  be used
to study  these  alternatives.12  RENT  CONTROL  IN  KUMASI,  GHANA
Blanket  decontrol,  where all controls  a:e lifted  at one cime,  is the
simplest  administratively.  But  some  rents  in  Kumasi  have fallen  so far  behind
market  values  that  rises  could  recult  in  major  dislocations,  especially  if  other
housing  market  imperfections  initially  impede  the  supply  response.
How  bad could  this  be?  Suppose  rents  for  existing  units  rose to (say)
900  cedis  initially  instead  of  600. Assume  that  only  after  five  years  does  the
time  path  of  rents  fall  to  the  long  run  equilibrium  of  600  (in  1986  prices,  i.e.
they  remain  indexed  to  inflation).  We  estimate  that  under  this  scenario,  in  the
first  year the  units  are  still  affordable  to  the  top  four  quintiles  but  not  to
the  lowest.
There  is  always  a  built  in  check  on this  process. Rents  have to  be paid
by someone;  so  units'  rent  can  only  rise  as  high  as the  market  will  bear. Our
initial  "average"  affordability  estimate  was  8  percent  of consumption,  with an
income  elasticity  estimate  of .6. This  yields  a  predicted  average  willingness
to  pay rents  of about  11  percent  for  the  bottom  quintile.  If initial  rents  for
existing  units  rose  by half again  as  much as our  estimate,  this  would  require
the typical  bottom  quintile  household  to devote  15 percent  of their  income  to
housing.  If initially  rents were double our best estimate,  low income
households  would typically  spend  20 percent  until rents came down to their
equilibrium  levels.
Completely  freeing  rents  for  newly constructed  units  can only increase
supply. As noted,  if a household  is given  a choice  between  remaining  in an
existing  unit  and  moving  to  an  expensive  new  unit,  they  cannot  be  made  worse  off
as they  have  the  option  to  remain.
"Luxury"  units  renting  for  over  C1000  are  nominally  exempt  from  controls.
Given inflation  since  the date the ceiling  was set, market  prices  for newly
constructed  rooms  probably  now  exceed  the  C1000  ceiling  for  controls  (at  least
in  Kumasi  and  Accra). But landlords  still  face  the  risk  that  the  schedule  of
controls  will be revalued. Our conjecture  is that credible  decontrol  of new
units  and a firm plan for decontrol  of existing  units  are required  to build
investor  confidence.
Revaluation  whenever  units  turn  over  for  new  tenants  could  exacerbate  the
trend  for  high  advance  payments  and  result  in  an even  less  mobile  rental  sector
than  at present. Renters  in  compound  houses  live  in  closer  proximity  to  other
households  than  most tenancy  groups  in other  countries,  so large  disparaties
between the rents paid by householders  and those paid by their  neighbours
(varying  according  to  length  of  tenancy)  are  likely  to  be  socially  unacceptable.
The  most  effective  method  for  encouraging  new  investment  while  protecting
low  income  renters  may involve  a combination  of  decontrolling  new  construction
with indexation  of existing  units  faster  than  inflation  to enable  "floating  up
and  out"  of controls. The  latter  involves  the  transition  from  controlled  rents
to market  rents  over  a period  of  years.  It is preferable  to set  a final  date
by which  controls  will  be withdrawn  completely  in  order  to convince  landlords
that the controls  which have cost them so much will really  be abolished.
Indexation  could  provide  a formula  for  determining  the  intermediate  rent  levels.
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plus a percentage  of the  previous  year's  rent  until  a set  date  when the  final
increase  to  market  levels  would  be  implemented.  Any  units  reaching  their  market
level  before  this  date  would,  of course,  remain  there. This is  quite  possible
for  many  rooms  in  Kumasi  where  there  are  no  services  and  physical  conditions  are
poor. This  phasing  would  smooth  the  path  of  adjustment  giving  tenants  who  could
not  afford their current room at the market rent time to find suitable
alternatives.
Suppose  (1)  rents  were  completely  indexed  to  inf'lation  and  (2)  real  rents
were phased  in  as follows: real  rents  were  doubled  to 600  in the  first  year,
800 the second,  1000 the  third,  then  finally  freed  to find their  free  market
level. Landlord  profitability  is  roughly  the  same  a  '.  would  be  under  blanket
decontrol  and  so  ultimately  is  affordability.  Ris'  a;0  i &t'certainty  are  reduced
--  provided  the  decontrol  is firm  and  credible.
Such a phase-in  could  prove  more palatable  to tenants.  No system  of
decontrol  is  worth  attempting  which  is  not  politically  feasible  and  sustainable.
Decontrol  followed  by recontrol  does  not  do the  market  nor  any  participant  any
good. Only if  relaxation  is  perceived  as fair  by a substantial  number  of  both
landlords  and  tenants  will it  succeed. Only  if the  government's  commitment  to
the  announced  schedule  is firm  will landlords  supply  more  housing.
It cannot  be denied  that  many households  would  be shocked  to see their
rent  burdens  double  for  existing  units. Yet the  present  system  is  clearly  not
working. Government  can  choose  between:
(a)  Low  rents  accompanied  by  continuing overcrowding,  insanitary
conditions  and  reduced  labor  mobility,  which  will  probably  worsen
as  adjustment  provides  other  investment  opportunities  to  landlords,
and
(b)  Increases  in  rents  which  are  not  popular  with  tenants  but  which  can
mitigate  the problems  above, if combined  with action on other
impediments  to the  supply  of housing.
Alternatives  for decontrol  exist.  While there is certainly  room for
discussion  of  other  alternatives,  results  presented  above  suggest  decontrolling
new construction,  indexing  rents for existing  units to general  prices  and
letting  real  rents  for  existing  units  rise  gradually  has some  appeal.
Once again,  it cannot  be overemphasized  that  whatever  option  is chosen,
actions  must  be taken  to ensure  elasticity  of  housing  supply  so that  increases
in  rents  are  accompanied  by an increase  in  production.  This  requires  that  rent
control  is seen as one part of a housing  strEtegy  which  also aims to release
resources  on the  supply  side - land,  infrastructure,  materials,  and finance  -
so that  supply  and  demand  can  reach  equilibrium  through  increases  in  both the
scale  and  the  variety  of  the  housing  stock  rather  than  through  greatly  increased
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C.  Suggestions for future work
This study presents empirical evidence from one city in Ghana while rent
control is practiced in all the regional capitals.  It is quite possible that
the distortions caused in other cities may be very different from those found
tn  Kumasi.  There may especially  be differences  between the capital,  Accra, and
other  cities  and  between  the larger  cities  and  smaller  towmrs.  There  is
impressionistic  evidence to suggest that the port city of Sekondi-Takoradi is
not growing in parallel with the other cities, probably because of the decline
in its port  functions. Rent control distortions will  differ in differently
(-volviag  housing  markets.  There  is considerable scope  for modelling rent
control in other cities, in Ghana as well as other countries.9V
There could also be much to learn from extended  examination of the Kumasi
data.  Further disaggregation by  geographical area in the city and type of
rental unit (those in self-contained  units and those in rooms).  More detailed
work could be carried out on how controls affect specific aspects of housing
consumption  (crowding, access  to water and sanitation, etc.)  Perhaps most
obviously this paper has focused on controls in the private  rental market;
analysis of public units is also a high future  priority.  Tenure choice models
would also be fruitful.
Policies  adopted  in  developing  countries  aimed  at  increasing  owner
occupation through sites and services and  upgrading  have undoubtedly added much
needed potential for home ownership.  However, it appears that rental remains
an important mode of tenure and an important investment  vehicle and source of
income for a significant  number of the  urban population.  Many countries  hinder
the  growth  of  rental  markets  in  low  income housing  schemes  for  fear  of
exploitative  landlordism.  The  Kumasi  experience  shows  that  small-scale
landlords  may be far from exploitative; indeed renting a few rooms may provide
them  with their  only means of affording  ownership and, therefore, the essential
motivation to add to the housing stock.  Do such small-scale landlords differ
from landlords who make their living out of housing? Do landlords who occupy
part of a house treat tenants differently from landlords who live elsewhere?
How are tenants chosen?  Do ethnic, religious or status considerations affect
households' access to rental housing  in Africa?  What  are the effects when
housing allowances are paid as part of formal sector  wages9
Another interesting  area  for research  is  the  changing  relationship  between
housing and culture.  There are probably many parts of the world where housing
has so many symbolic  meanings that  housing policies which ignore  this will fall
foul  of what might appear to  outsiders at first  sight to  be illogical  reactions
by households.  It might well be that subsidies intended  for housing are spent,
instead, on preparation for death, or that investment in housing in the urban
area where a household lives is foregone in favor of investment in a house in
a home village.  Such issues are central to understanding  housing markets in an
era when governments must rely on private investment.
2.!  In addition to this case study, the  World Bank's research  project on Rent
Control in  Developing Countries (RPO  674-01) is producing  case studies  of
Cairo, Egypt; Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and Bangalore, India.OVERVIEW  ]5
A  further issue which would bear more detailed examination  is the
relationship  between renting and  income generation.  Where the place of
residence  forms  a  major  potential  for  business  activity  --  such  as storage,  or
small  scale  manufacturing  and services,  especially  in cooked  food  preparation
or laundering,  retailing  --  any  inhibitions  on renters  in  comparison  to  owners
may have important  consequences  on the  economy.3'  There  are also links  into
housing  design  here,  where  the layout  of rooms  can  help or hinder  small  scale
enterprise  by owners  and  renters.
A  NOTE ON EXCHANGE  RATES
Ghana's  currency has  had what  Killick  (1978) calls  a  bewilderingly  complex  history.  Until
Independence  in 1957,  the currency uased  in the Gold Coast was the Pound  Sterling  (£).  Until  1965
independent Ghana used the Ghana Pound (6G) with shillings and pence  (d)  as minor unlts.  Their value
was at par with Sterling.  In July 1965 the currency  was decimalized with the Cedi being equal to lOOd
(C2.4 per £ Sterling, C1.17 per USS).  The minor unit was named the Pesewa  (p).
In February 1967 the Cedi was revalued to EG£ 50 (10 old shillings), renamed the New Cedi (NC)
and exchanged for C1.20  internally.  It was valued axternally at US$1.40.  In February 1972 the 'New'
was dropped, and it again became  the Cedi  (C).
Since then various changes ln the official race have taken place as follows:
In July 1967 to  US$0.98:
In December 1971 to US$0.55:
In February 1972 to US$0.78, or US$l - C1.28;
In 1978 to US$1 - C2.75S
Since the PNDC government  came to power in December 1981, the Cedi has been devalued by stages
to US$1 - C90.00 where it stood in April 1986 when the new survey  was carried out.  In September, 1986
a Second Foreign Exchange Market  (SFEM)  was Instigated in  which the Cedi is auctioned each week.  By
Aprll 1988 lts SPEM value was C185 per USS.
Exchange rate conversions, always problematic, are even more difficult under such condition.  In
their revlew of ex:hange rate conventions for their cross country comparisons Malpezzi and Mayo (1985)
noted that in  many LDCs black market exchange rates are also poor guides to equilibrium exchange rates
because of high transactlons costs (including jail), thinness of the market, and the fact that we are
trying  to compare non-traded goods with exchange rate-  !riven  by tradeables  (the internal relative
prlce of tradables and non-tradeables also subject to  *.L.ficant  distortions).  Indeed, Kravis Heston
and Sumers  (1982)  has demonstrated that official (let .-one black market) rates often understate the
foreign currency price of non-tradeables  relative to purchasing power parity  (PPP) rates.  That is,
PPP rates were typically the highest rates  (convertible currency per local currency unit), followed
by official rates, followed by black market  rates.
In general, Malpezzi and Mayo chose official exchange rates for pragmatic reasonsi official rates
were readily available (black  market and PPP rates are not so readily available, and different methods
of constructing them give quite different results).  They included comparisons of  Ghana using 1981 data
(before the PNDC reforms).  Ghana was the one exception in their study, because the official rate of
2.7 cedis to the dollar  was so overvalued relative to both black market and all PPP measures, so an
equLlibriuc rate estimated by (ref) of 60 cedis to the dollar.
Generally  In this report we use local currency amounts and avoid conversion whenever possible.
An Lmportant and necessary exception is when we make comparisons to Malpezzi and Mayo's cross country
model  in  Chapter 6.  In this report rates of US$1 =  C30 are used for 1980 comparLsons: US$1 - C60 for
10811 US$1 - C90 for 1986 comparisons.  The recent devaluations have been accompanied by further falls
in the black market  rate until It stood at about US$1 - C250 ln  April,  1986.
i./  See Kahnert (1987).II. HOUSING MARKETS AND RENT CONTROL IN GHANA
A.  Introduction to Urban Housing in Ghana
Typical Designs
The urban housing stock in Ghana is  dominated  by the traditional  compound
house  which  has  developed,  in  several  stages,  from  relatively  simple
pitched-roofed huts ranged around a courtyard, to an apical form seen in the
relatively sophisticated quadrangle with  cement block  decorations, pillared
verandas and the distinctive  miniature  gable  junction to the  hipped roof. Single
story compounds tend to  be almost square and about 30  meters along each side in
Kumasi.  Typically, ten  to fifteen  rooms  range round three  sides  of the courtyard
facing inward and usually having a veranda on the courtyard side. The main
entrance is usually at the side and takes the  form of a door  which can  be locked
at  night securing  the  whole compound.  The fourth  side  usually  contains  a  bathroom
(simply a room with a small drainage hole at the base of the wall), a kitchen
(a  shelter  open on the  courtyard  side and  used for  storing  utensils)  and  a  bucket
latrine.  Most houses are  now built of cement  blocks rather than the traditional
courses  of rammed earth, known  locally as "swish" or  "atakpame" after  the
Togolese  home-town of the  masons.  Windows are  mainly  wooden louvres  manufactured
locally,  though some  now use glass louvres  in  wood or metal frames. (See  Rutter,
1971; Schreckenbach, 1982; and Tipple, 1987a for further detailed analysis of
house forms in Kumasi).
In the main towns there are a considerable  number of two and three story
compound  houses in  which the  upstairs  rooms open  off continuous  balconies around
the courtyard, reached  by an internal staircase.
In both types of compound houses, households rent rooms, singly or in
pairs, and share what^;ar kitchen, bathroom, toilet and water supply exist in
the  house.
B.  Overview of Ghanaian  Housing Markets
How are the units  just described  typically  produced and distributed, i.e.
what are the important  characteristics  of the  market?  Figure 2.1, from  Mayo et
al. (1986),  presents a simple  schematic  stylized  view of  housing  markets.  Inputs
such as land, labor, finance, materials, and infrastructure are combined by
supply side agents such as developers,  home builders, and landlords to produce
housing services. Homeowners,  and  to  a lesser  degree  renters,  are  also  producers
to the extent they build, maintain and upgrade their houses.  Relative housing
prices inform producers of housing services whether to provide more or less
housing,  and the  relative  prices  of inputs inform  their  suppliers  to  provide  more
or fewer of those inputs to housing production.  Prices, and other aspects of
the process can and are influenced by rent controls and other regulations, as
well as social custom.
How can these components of a stylized  market best be described in Ghana?
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context?  The  next  few  sections  briefly  Figure  2.1:  How Housing  Markets  Work
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then  discussed  in  some  detail.  F  inance  Bulders  - Homeowners
Infrastructure  - c  Landlords  c-  (Income  &
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Demand  Materials  5
Kumasi's  population  has  been
growing at a rate of about 2.9 percent
per annum since 1981.  The most recent
population estimate is about 720,000 for 1988.  However, referring again to
Chapter 1, real incomes have been falling.  As real incomes fell for a decade
and  a  half,  housing  investment  --  as  with  other  investment  --  fell  faster.
Whenever real incomes  fall, investment  is naturally  postponed as people seek to
maintain a minimum level of consumption, especially of food.  Now that real
incomes are again rising and the investment climate is becoming more generally
favorable,  investment  --  including  but not limited  to housing  investment  --  will
pick  up faster  than  incomes,  particularly  if investor  confidence is  restored  that
the reforms associated  with the adjustment are permanent.
Land
The  current  land  delivery  system  is  a  mixture  of  traditional  and  modern
systems; furthermore, there  are significant regional differences in  how  land
markets operate.  A highly simplified  description of current practice in Kumasi
is as follows.  Ownership of almost all land is vested in either the Stool or
the State; in  the  Kumasi area  about 80  percent  of land is  still  under the  control
of the stool.  Various use rights are held by different kinship groups and
individuals,  including  people not of  Asante lineage. These rights  are typically
assigned  by  Asante chiefs  on  behalf  of the  Stool; such  rights  are  granted  to  non-
lineage  members  after  discussion  with  appropriate  members  of  the  Stool  hierarchy,
and ceremonies associated with the granting of rights include the payment of
ceremonial "drink money."  Only recently has drink money become more than a
nominal payment.  Individuals then pay a recurrent ground rent charge, which
remains  nominal.  Ground  rents  are  shared  by  government  and  traditional
authorities.
Land  transactions  will generally  be registered  with both the  Asantehene's
Lands Officer as well as the government's Lands Commission Secretariat.  It
appears  that the system is in transition to a leasehold market of  sorts.
Freehold land  tenure is  still rare in  Kumasi, less  so in  Accra.  Once rights  are
assigned, especially for housing,  it  appears they are rarely traded.  More
specifically, since most land in the city of Kumasi itself was assigned years
ago, relatively little change in land use is observed over time; densities and
land use patterns do not follow  Western patterns.
The traditional land leasing system  operates as follows:  a prospective
house-builder obtains land on lease by approaching the chief in whose care the
land required rests.  A tri-partite agreement is  entered with the chief and theHOUSING MARKETS AND RENT CONTROL IN GHANA  19
Asantehene, who act on behalf of the members (living,  dead and yet to be born)
of the lineage who own the right to use that land.  A 99 year lease is then
obtainable on payment of a tribute to the ancestors - the price of a bottle of
schnapps for libation and an animal for sacrifice - called "drink" - which is
divided between the local chief and the  Asantehene in the proportion of 2 to 1
(see Tipple, 1983 and 1984a for further details).  Payment of drink money to
the local chief does not guarantee eventual success in gaining the lease, nor
is it returnable in the event that the lease is  not awarded.  Furthermore, this
'drink money' traditionally  does not represent  a market price for the lease; no
receipt is expected  or given, it is  merely a courtesy  payment.  In recent  years,
however, the amount demanded in  drink money  has grown to represent  some measure
of value.  In the  high cost part of Ayigya, opposite the University main gate,
a plot which attracted drink money of C2000 ($730)  in 1980 would require about
C320,000 ($3,600)  in  1986 (personal  communication,  S.B.  Amissah, Director  of the
Land Administration  Research Centre,  Kumasi), an amount  equivalent to 20 months
median consumption of owner  households.  Asabere (1981) found that non-Asantes
had to pay almost twice as much drink money as Asantes and that their payments
were more related to plot size than those of Asantes.
The traditional leasing  system is  still virtually intact in  Kumasi.  When
land is required, even government agencies  pay at least lip- service to the
traditional  methods of leasing land.  There are over 100 chiefs in the city  who
have the right to allocate land for housing in Kumasi City Council's area and
who, often regardless  of official "sector layouts"  made for peripheral areas of
the city,  continue to plan  the form of  their settlements (Stanley, 1975),
allocate land, and allow the construction of houses in traditional mud-based
materials.
Traditional  house  forms,  built  on  traditionally  leased  land,  allow
relatively low income householders to build for themselves and with rooms to
rent  to  outsiders.  Until  the  early  1970s,  this  was  still  profitable.
Schildkrout (1978, p.113), writing of her experience in 1969, states,
"Houses represent a reliable and important source of income, a safer form of
investment than transport... "
The leasing system in  Kumasi is generally  applicable to tae forest region
of Ghana.  Similar systems are followed in the North, but in the coastal plain
and Volta region, patrilineal families  without a paramount leader as strong as
Asantehene operate  the system  in a more  chaotic fashion causing many more
problems of clouded titles.  Accra has more fee simple ownership than other
areas, but title disputes are quite common.  The new Land Title Registration
Law, 1986 (PNDC  Law 152), should succeed  in  reducing  such problems  over the next
few years.  However, the land system is probably best described as in flux.
Asabere (1981) and Tipple (1987)  provide additional  background.20  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
Infrastructure
The  government  has  identified  inadequate  urban  infrastructure  as  a  serious
constraint  on  housing  and  on  the  economy  generally.  Roads  are  poorly  maintained,
sanitation  is  often  rudimentary,  water  and  power  supplies  are  often  intermittent.
Water and sanitation  conditions  will be discussed  in more detail  as part of
housing  conditions  below. A  few  indicative  measures: in  Kumasi  only  20  percent
of the road network is currently  rated serviceable;ll  there are still an
estimated  4000  bucket  latrines  serving  many  thousands  of city  residents;2/  and
poor infrastructure  affects  other  productive  sectors  as  well as  housing,  e.g.
thousands  of  small  scale  enterprises  have  crowded  into  marginal,  flood  prone  land
with few  Infrastructure  services,  reducing  their  potential  productivity.
Finance
The central  problem  faced  by the  housing  financs  system  in  Ghana  is the
need  for  a  stable  macroeconomic  environment.  Chapter  1  documented  that  the  past
decade  and a half has  witnessed  extreme  instability  in incomes  and the  price
level. Under  such  conditions  the  financial  system  has  deteriorated  markedly.
Figure  2.3 shows  that real interest  rates  on financial  assets  were sharply
negative  during  much  of the  period.
Figure  2.2:  Nomiinal  Interest  Rates  Figure  2.3:  Real  Interest  Rates
2  5g
20  0  --  ----  --  - - orn  - e  L  /ate  -100  |  -Deo  - Lte  .9(P%°D#1tr)
'S~~~~~~~  ~~~~  Lodii  (Pr:::::p1  -ltA  I) ,%  ...  ......-100e...V.
70  72  74  76  78  80  82  84  86  88  70  7?  74  76  78  80  82  84  86  88
In addition, during the political turmoil surrounding  a  change of
government  in  1979,  households  with  savings  aibove  modest  cutoffs  found  themselves
vetted  and  in some  cases  their  savings  confiscated  (resLitution  was later  made
in many cases).  Ghanaians  have fled the financial  system  as real financial
returns  plummeted  and  perceived  risks  increased.  As real  incomes  fell  (Figure
1/  Extensive  improvements  in  Kumasi's  road  network  are  currently  underway.
_/  Bucket  latrines  are particularly  poor systems  of urban  sanitation. An
improved  low  cost  system,  the  Kumasi  Ventilated  Improved  Pit  Latrine  (KVIP)
was invented  in  Kumasi,  and  is  now in  use  world  wide.HOUSING MARKETS AND RENT CONTROL IN GHANA  21
1.1),  savings  in  financial  form  fell  even  faster  (Fig.  2.4)  until  these
represented  only about 3  percent  of  GNP.  Even the  ratio  of currency to  GNP fell,
as the economy headed towards demonetization.  Under such conditions it is
hardly possible to design a system which will mobilize resources for lending
long.31
Figure  2.4::  Measu-es  of  Financial  Depth
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this situation.But the shortcomings of
the current financial system and recent
conditions  have also retarded  the  development  of the  financial  sector  generally.
The first  step in  reform  is  to  continue  the  adjustment  and  provide a stable
macroeconomic  environment  conducive  to  long  term  savings  and  investment. Second,
improvements  can  be sought in the housing finance system itself to  make it self
financing and contribute to development of Ghana's overall financial system.V
Current Housing Finance Institutions
Overall financial policy, including housing finance policy, comes under
the regulatory  authority of the  Bank of Ghana.  The First Ghana  Building Society
and, to a lesser extent, commercial banks, extend retail loans.  The Social
Security and National Insurance Trust has in the past financed and built some
flats  but may take on a wholesale role in the future.  The Bank for Housing and
Construction  has played wholesale and retail roles.  The main institutions  will
be described briefly here.
The Bank for Housing and Construction.  BHC  is a publicly  owned bank
founded in 1972  to foster  the development of  the housing  and construction
i./  As discussed below, the design of financial instruments  plays a key role
in setting up a system that can deal with some uncertainty.  But when
prices and real incomes are as volatile as Ghana's were during the 70s
and  early 80s,  even  fully  indexed  systems  will experience  disintermediation
and defaults.
i/  An overview of housing finance systems and their potential role in the
development of financial markets can be found in Renaud (1984).22  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
industries.  Most (80  percent) of BHC's current lending is for the construction
industry  although, as will be seen in the discussion  of the housing fund below,
BHC may take on more responsibilities for  end user and other  housing finance in
the fut-ire, Among other issues which would have to be addressed for BHC in
particular  as  well  as  the  system  in  general  are  the  improving mortgage
origination and servicing,  new instruments,  improving the  resource mobilization
side  of  housing finance,  the  need to separate  commercial  and development  banking
functions, and ways to improve appraisal  practices.
First  Ghana Building Society.  FGBS dates from 1956.  Formed in response
to a U.N. mission's recommendation about the need for a specialized housing
finance 'nstitution,  FGBS is currently  almost  moribund.  Negative real interest
rates ensure that deposits are not a significant proportion of the sources of
funds for FGBS.  Government provides the bulk of capital (recently about C217
million).  A total of only 779 loans are presently outstanding, valued at C143
million.  While detailed records were not readily available, it  appears that  as
few  as four loans  have  been made in  some  past  years, and  by any  measure few loans
are currently  being made.
Depositors are paid 6-9 percent (compared  to commercial banks which pay
15 percent).  Loans are at variable rates (presently 20 percent).  Loan terms
vary  between 1-30  years depending  on  the  age of  the  person (FGBS's  policy is  that
loans  should  be  amortized  before the  borrower  reaches  retirement  age). A maximum
loan  of C500,000 is  allowed  up to a  maximum  of 80%  of  building value.  Generally,
payments records on loans are reportedly good and there have been no recent
foreclosures.  But in the current macroeconomic environment FGBS is obviously
and severely constrained by their deposit and lending policies.
Social Security and National Insurance  Trust.  SSNIT is a provident fund
which is  currently in the  process of converting to a pension scheme.3 1 Begun in
1965, the Trust's status as a provident fund was always meant as a temporary
expedient, but conversion was delayed by political issues.  However, given the
fixed defined benefits and high recent inflation, the value of provident fund
L/  Briefly, a provident fund is a mandatory  savings scheme  for workers which
pays a  lump sum distribution under certain predefined conditions.  A
pension fund pays out periodically, based on actuarial estimates of a
participant's expected lifetime.  Either kind of system can be  funded
actuarially, or pay-as-you-go.  When participation is mandatory, any of
these systems can be analyzed as a tax, although the degree of implicit
taxation depends  on  the way  the  benefit  is  defined and  calculated.
Detailed discussions are beyond the scope of this report; see Wallich
(1983)  for more details.  For more information about the Ghanaian system
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distributions  has dwindled to  the  point  where  a consensus  was reached  on the  need
for reform.6 1
As SSNIT attempts to convert to an actuarially based pension fund, it
requires long term iv.jrestment  vehicles  which can preserve the  real value of its
participants capital.  There is a confluence of interest between SSNIT's need
for long term assets and the need to mobilize more long term funds for  housing
finance.  As  is well known to those involved, the details of how funds are
channeled will make a critical difference in the viability of the pension fund
(and  hence of the supply of loanable funds).
In the past, SSNIT has also played a role in the direct construction of
apartments, but their management believes this has not worked out.  They are
currently completing  unfinished units and selling  off the inventory,  so  we will
not discuss them further  here.
Other Financial  Intermediaries Commer.ial  banks,  credit  unions, insurance
companies, etc. don't currently lend much for  housing.  This is not surprising
given the risks of lending long in such a volatile economy.  Less than 5% of
their  total  loan portfolio  invested  in housing.  Generally  the banks  are
reluctant  to  finance  housing  projects  as their  deposits  are short  term  and  unless
there is access to long term funds they will not lend long term.  The Central
Bank sets credit ceilings for the  banks; these are absolute and not related as
a percentage of deposits. These limits are reviewed quarterly and there seems
to  be little incentive  for the  banks to  increase  deposits  by encouraging  savings.
Little is known about Informal Sector Housing Finance in Ghana.  Again,
the  prevalence of unfinished  dwellings  suggests  that  during the  economic  climate
of the past two decades this system did not function particularly effectively,
at least in financing  housing.
In summary, under present policies  the formal housing  finance system
contributes little to either financial intermediation or the housing sector.
In  general  Ghana's  other  primary housing  finance  institutions need  to be
developed and strengthened.  Major changes would be  necessary, not only  in
policies (such as interest rates paid to depositors, lending policies) but in
the  institutions' cultures.  Cutting dependence  on  government  funding and
changing the incentives faced by its management are necessary step to effect
such a shift.  Access to other sources of funds, including secondary mortgage
facility could help, but the most important resource mobilization issue is to
raise deposit interest rates to more competitive levels.  In the absence of
other policy changes, preferential access to a proposed housing  fund would
probably have little effect.
Of particular interest to the present study is the fact that of the very
few forma] housing finance loans made, virtually none appear to have been made
for rental housing.  This outcome may be due to one or more of three causes.
First, specialized lenders may be more ready to lend to households purchasing
k/  According to SSNIT's  Proposals  for  Conversion  of Social  Security  Provident
Fund, in 1986 average retirement  benefits amounted to only  11,000  Cedis.24  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
Western  style single family houses  for  their own use because of  formal or
informal  policies restricting such lending  on social  or other grounds,  Whether
or not this is the case, rent controls and associated regulations reduce the
collateral  value of rental  housing and  increase landlords  and lenders'  perceived
risk.  Finally, as  we saw above the financial system in Ghana has not performed
well during the turbulent 70s.  We will return to these issues in the final
chapters of this report.
The Regulatory Framework
A number of regulatory  issues  arise in  addition to those  already  described
and rent controls (discussed  below).  For example, Ghanaian  building codes date
f:rom  the colonial period and are based on British practice.  In practice codes
have been interpreted  as proscribing traditional  materials ("swish,"  compacted
ea-th faced with plaster) within the city limits, despite their low cost and
durability.  Swish houses, if  properly maintained,  will last a century or  more.
Other building  and  land use  regulations, not  detailed here,  are  generally
restrictive  and  not  consistent  with  traditional  housing  construction,
particularly compound  houses.  For example,  within the city of Kumasi, planning
codes  prescribe  a  plot coverage  of one-third,  suitable  for  a  Western style  single
family house but not for a compound.
The traditional  method of construction uses O.5m. high courses of rammed
laterite, known as swish or atakpame, with a thin plaster coating inside and
out, and walls of corrugated iron or aluminum sheeting on roughly sawn rafters.
Louvered windows and doors are made from local  wood in  wooden frames.  The cost
of building, based on an experimental four roomed design originating at the
University of Science and Technology, can be estimated for December 1985 as at
least Cll,OOO per square meter.  Thus a 12 sq. m. room would cost in excess of
C130,000  ($1,444)  This  amount  represents  10.4  months  median  household
consumption or 58 months minimum wage.
We will return to some of these issues in the last Chapter.  However the
main purpose of the present paper is an analysis of rent controls, to which we
now turn.
C.  Chronology of Rent Control in Ghana
Rent Control before 1963
As with many other countries (UN, 1979), rent cer,crols  started in Ghana
during the Second World War when the Gold Coast began to suffer the effects of
inflation.  In response to this, the Defence (Rent  Restriccion) Regulations of
1942 made  it an  offence  for  anyone to  increase rents above  those of  3rd
September, 1939 except where an assessment  had been made by a Rent Assessment
Committee.  Further,  no- one could  be evicted except  by Court  Order (Gold  Coast,
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Similar regulations in 1943 required the  ^ent Assessment Committee to fix
a fair and reasonable rent for any class of premises and introduced  the concept
of a "Standard  Rent" for  various types of properties.  These early, and rather
hurried, pieces of legislation  have set a pattern for rent control ever since:
rents  are fixed at specific levels  for the  most common  types of  property and any
other accommodation can be let at a rent assessed  by a body appointed to do so
or, in some cases, by agreement between tenant and landlord.
The Mate-Kole Committee appointed to enquire into rentals (Gold Coast,
1951a) indicated  that the  rent controls  were being flouted  by landlords  who were
frustrated at the unrealism of  "standard rents" which were mainly  fixed at
September 1939 levels.  The Report therefore declared that the standard rents
were quite uneconomical in post-war times and should be re-assessed according
to valuations used for property rates assessment.  Furthermore, rents should
include a rate payment over and above the controlled rent.
Throughout  the  Mate  Kole  report,  the  landlords  were  not  cast  a.
dyed-in-the-wool  villains. While their  efforts  to  avoid some  aspects  of controls
were condemned, it is evident  that the  Committee  appreciated their  problem.  The
housing shortage  was acute in  the  big cities,  building  materials  were scarce  and
expensive --  200 or 300 per cent more costly than in 1939 --  and tenants were
generally  badly informed  of their rights  and, thus,  easy  prey. It  was recognized
that  scarcity in  any commodity  bred black-marketeering. The crux of the  problem
was seen to be shortage of supply. This was being manifested in the letting of
latrines and kitchens as  living rooms,  increasing occupancy rates, and the
inability of tenants to resist paying rents which were illegal.  The committee
was clear that rent control alone could do no good without an increase in the
supply of houses.
At this time, government's stated policy contained probably the greatest
element  of  direct government  involvement in house  provision  and  the  least
reliance on private investment  of any period before or since.  Estate building
on sites recommended in the 1945 draft plan for  Kumasi (Fry  and Drew, 1945) was
in full swing.  Kumasi had 4,035 houses in 1948 (Gold Coast, 1948) and the
building programme lasting from 1945 to 1955 added approximately 2,500 small
dwellings.7 1 The major thrust of the 1951 Development  Plan  was building estates
of small dwellings for  workers and encouraging  people to  build their own single
household dwellings.  Thus a  policy  which prevented landlords  making  much profit
from house-letting may be understandable at the time if a little shortsighted
in the light  of a long-standing  housing shortage (Gold  Coast, 1951a and 1951b).
It  can be  seen below, however,  that  later rent  legislation has  failed to
significantly  change  this  stance  even  though  later  government  policy  had to  admit
Z/  In this paper a dwelling is a residential structure intended to be used
by one household and which has  its own means of access.  A house is a
residential structure intended for more than one household in which all
or some of the households share a common access.  This distinction has
been made because, when households occupy their accommodation on a room
by room basis in compound houses, the dwelling becomes an unusable term
except in buildings intended  as single household units.26  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
to the heavy reliance on private investment by landlords (Ghana, 1959, 1964,
1968, 1970, 1971, 1975 and 1977) and did little to reduce it.
The 1952 Rent Control Ordinance (no.2  of 1952), which followed the Mate
Kole  Report,  modified "standard  rent" to that  rent  which was paid on 1  January,
1948  or such as had been fixed  by rent control,  and  withdrew the  £100 p.a. limit
so that rent control applied to all residential property.  The 1952 Ordinance
tidied  up the law on rent in  advance,  evictions, etc.,  but did not depart in  any
major way from the idea, implicit in previous enactments, that rent should be
static except under circumstances special enough to merit the attention of a
Committee.  The Rent Control (Amendment)  Act, 1960,  amended the  "standard  rents"
to those charged on 1 July, 1960.
Rent Control between 1963 and 1979
The Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220)  has formed the basis of rent control for the
last  23  years  being only  modified  by later  legislation,  not  repealed.  It  contains
provisions not only for setting rents but also for ordering the relationship
between landlord and tenant:  which have been modified separately in succeeding
legislation.  A summary of the provisions and their modifications can be seen
in  Table 2.1.  In this section,  a summary  of controlled  rents  will be presented.
There will then be a discussion of the provisions of the law as  they affect
landlord-tenant  relations and houses built by government agencies.
Under the 1963  Rent Act, the "standard  rent" (ie, that  paid in 1948),  was
renamed the "recoverable rent" and incorporated as the basis of rents to be
recovered by landlords.  Where propert-'  was new since 1960, or material changes
had been made to the premises, or there  was cause for dispute, rents were to  be
fixed by the Rent Officer taking into account the following:
(a)  rateable value,
(b)  land value,
(c)  the rates payable,
(d)  recoverable  rent assessed for similar  premises  where they  have been
assessed by the minister (see  below),
(e)  estimated cost of repairs or maintenance,Table 2.1:  Rent Control  Measures,  1963 to 1987  0
Maszim  advances
Rent levels  Property'  (monthly'  Valid reasons  Subletting
Shared (1)  Exclusive  Excluded  tenancies)  for eviction  Govt.
1963  'Recoverable  rent' based on 191.8  None  1  month  ILandlord  could  Illegal  U
Act 220  levels,  new rent. fixed according  evict  on grounds
to standard  of property'  (see  note 2)  in  note 3
1973  C3.50-7.50lrocm  by'  negotiation  Income  above  no chAnge  no change  Allowable  on
NRCD 158  Cil,o00lanuterms  set  out
in  note  4
1979  C20/room  27p  - 34p/sq.ft.  None  no change  no  change  Profit  margin
AFRCD 5  or by'  negotiation  raised  to  251 
1982  C20iroo  by' negotiation  None  no  change  N4one  unlesa  land-  No  profit  allowed.0
PNIDC 5  C50Irocn  I. hall  Lord  had  supplied  ILlegal  sub-Letting
rent  card  leads  to  forfeiture
1986  C200-300/room  by'  negotiation  Rent above  no change  None until  March  251  profit
PNDCL 138  C300-400Iroom.  C1,0001month  1987  unless  needed  restored
L. LI  1318  hall  for  owner's  rela-
tive..  No  change
thereafter>
Notes-
1.  Variations  are  according  to  materials  used  in  the  walls  (see  text).
2.  Where property  was  new  since  1960.  or  material  changes  had  been  made  to  the  premLses,  or  there  was  cause  for  dispute,  rents  were  to  be  fixed  by  the  Rent
Officer  taking  Into  account  the  following:  (a)  rateable  value,  (b)  land  value.  (c)  the  rates  payable,  Cd)  recoverable  renkt  assessed  for  similar  premiacs
where they'  have  been  assessed  by'  the  minister  (see  below),  (e)  estimated  cost  of  repairs  or  maintenance,  (f)  amount  of  rent  for  like  premises,  (g)  current
rate  of  Interest  charged  by  the  %hana  Comuercial  Bank  for  overdrafts,  (h)  obligations  of  landlord,  tenant  or  other  interested  parties  under  the  lease,
(i)  justice  and  merits  of  each  case  (Section  14).
3.  Until  and  inc)uding  the  1963  Rent  Act,  the  grounds  on  vhich  tenants  could  be  evicted  were  broadly'  as  follows:
(a)  on~e mot's  rent  tLrrears,  (b)  Any' other  of  the  tenant's  obligations3  being  negLected,  (c)  The  tenant  or  anyone  Ilving  vith  him  causing  a  nuisance,
(d)  A conviction  for  using  the  premises  for  immoral  or  illegal  uses,  Ce)  Waste  or  dAmage  of  the  premises  by' a  tenant,  (f)  The  tenant  having  given  written
notice  to  quit  and  the  landlord  having  acted  upon  it  by' selling  or  letting,  (g)  Where  the  premises  are  reasonably'  required  by'  the  landlord  for  occupation
by'  himself,  his  family,  or  his  employees  (if  used  to  house  employees),  Ch)  Where  the  lease  has  expired  and  six  conths'  notice  has  been  given  by'  tha
landlord,  (i)  Where  the  Lease  has  expired  and  the  l=anlord  intends  to:  Ci)  pull  down  premises  and  construct  new  ones.  (ii)  remodel  in  a  way' which  requires
them  to  be  vacant,  (Lii)  carry'  out  redevelopment  which  requires  them  to  be  vacant  (j)  Where  the  lease  Is  tied  to  employment  which  has  ceased.  (k)  Where
the  l and lord  returns  from  away' and  requires  the  premises  to  live  in.
1..  By Section  7,  occupants  of  houses  built  by  TDC,  SUC,  or  any'  goverment  agency'  should  not  char;e,  demand,  or  receive  on  subletting,  a  monthly  rent  in  excess
of  an  aggregate  of:  (a)  the  installment  payable  monthly  to  TDC,  SEC,  tet.,  (b)  the  equivalent  of  property  rates  pay'able%  and  (c)  201  of  the  total  of  a
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(f)  amount of rent for like premises,
(g)  current rate of interest charged by the Ghana Commercial Bank for
overdrafts,
(h)  obligations of landlord, tenant or other interested parties under
the lease,
(i)  justice and merits of each case.
These appear to  be a reasonable  basis for assessing  standard rents for  any
premises  and for differentiating between premises which  represent different
quantities of housing benefits.  However, they contained no provisions for
assessing the ability of tenants to afford rental payments, and only consider
part of landlords' opportunity cost.
In addition to case by case assessment, the Minister has the power to
assess rents for particular types of property and publish them in an Executive
Instrument.  This has been done from time to time for rooms occupied singly or
in pairs  with  access  to  shared services.  As  rooms  with  shared  services
constitute the majority of all property in cities like Kumasi, rents assessed
this  way have been a dominant factor in rent control for 20 years. Rooms with
only some  services shared,  or  with none  at all,  are treated  as if they  had shared
services.  The levels set in 1973 are shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2:  Prescribed rents for certain premises, 1973
Premises (room type and size)  Monthly rent payable
Sanderete  12ft x 12ft  C7.50
or landcrete  12ft x  lOft  C6.50
loft x lOft  C5.50
Wooden, swish  12ft x lOft  C4.50
or iron sheet  lOft x loft  C3.50
Source:  Rent  (Amendment) Decree, 1973 (NRCD 158), Schedule  1.
The rents handed down in this  way have owed little to any of the matters
listed above; they appear to have been arrived at more from considerations of
what people can afford to pay than from any assessment of the property itself.
It is  noticeable that there  is  no mention in  the schedules  of  whether the tenants
actually have access to water supply, toilet or electricity in the house, how
many others they share them with, or whether the roof is waterproof, a ceiling
is present, or mosquito proofing is provided.
It  is  evident that,  where rents  are  assessed individually  or collectively,
they  tend to  remain frozen  until  new legislation  or assessments  are  made (United
Nations, 1979).  This  has been true in  practice,  and indeed  in intention,  in  Ghana
at least  until 1980 (see  below for  data on informal  rent rises since that  date).
Part four  of the  Rent  Act, 1963,  states  that  no  reassessment  shall  be entertained
unless  circumstances  affecting  the  question  of  rent  have  materially altered  since
the  last assessment, or  that the previous assessment was made  on erroneous
evidence.HOUSING  MARKETS  AND  RENT  CONTROL  IN  GHANA  29
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Despite  the inflexible  nature  of rent  control  when ruled  by ministerial
decree,  and  their  consistently  low  level,  rents  in  Kumasi  appear  to  have  remained
within  the  levels  set  by the  government  and  the  Rent  Control  Officers  during  the
early 80s (Tipple,  1988).  At the same time, rooms  with exclusive  use of
sanitation  and  water  supply  have  commanded  higher  rents. During  the  1960s  and
1970s the official  Development  Plans noted the need to encourage  private
investment  while  directly  building  some  houses  for  specific  groups  of people.
But  as the  Consumer  Price  Index  rose  markedly,  controlled  rents  lagged  behind,
with only  a 19%  rise  between  1963  and  1975  (see  Figure  2.5).
Rent Control  post-1979
The  Armed  Forces  Revolutionary  Council  (AFRC)  government  of Flt-Lt  Jerry
J. Rawlings  which  ruled  from  June to September,  1979,  imposed  new  rent levels
as set  out in  Table  2.3.  It should  be noted  that  no distinction  was made for
the  materials  used  in  construction  nor  for  the  various  levels  of  servicing  which
constitute  "shared  amenities."
The 1980  survey  of  Kumasi,  conducted  within  months  of  AFRC  Decree  5 (see
Tipple,  1984a),  found  mean and  median  monthly  rents  per  room of C22  and  C20.530  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
city  wide;  reflecting  not  only  the  controlled  rents  but  also  the  prevalence  of
households  occupying  on  y one  room. As these  represented  the  price  equivalent
of  one  yam  or two  loaves  of  bread,  or  about  70  cents  (US),  it  will  be seen  that
rental  levels  were  very  low. Means  for  just  the  low  cost  areas  were  even  lower.
Government  built  areas  had  a mean  and  median  of  only  C11.5  and  C9.5  despite  the
fact  that  many  rooms  were  sublet  privately.  However,  wages  were  also  very low.
Controlled  rent  for  one  12'  x 10'  room  in  sandcrete  with  shared  facilities  (C20)
took  5  days  to  earn  at the  minimum  wage  of  C4 per  day.  The  1973  equivalent  rent
(C6.5)  took  6.5  days  to  earn  at the  then  Cl  per  day.  While  the  minimum  wage is
at best a crude indicator  of actual  wages  paid, in the early  80s it was the
benchmark  wage for  many daily-paid  workers.
Table 2.3:  Controlled rents July 1979 (AFRCD 5, 1979)
Location  Rent
Type of accommodation and site.  (where specified)  Imonth
1. 1 room with shared amenitles (ie. under  Regional Cap-
multl-occupation) of size 12 ft x  10 ft.  itals and Tema  C20
Elsewhere  C16
Where size is not specified.  Regional Cap-
itals  and Tema  16p/sqft
Elsewhere  12p/sqft
2. 2 roomed self contained semi-detached  C150
house,  like SHC type SH(1).  or
27p/sqft
----------------------------------------------------------------- __--
3. 3  roomed  self  contained  semi-detached  C175
house,  like SHC type SH(2).  or
30p/sqft
4. 3 roomed self contained detached  C200
house,  like SHC type SH(3).  or
34p/sqft
----------------------------------------------------------------- __--
5. Other  self  contained  houses  By  neg-
of more than 3 rooms.  otiation
According  to the above  data on Kumasi,  most accommodation  with shared
amenities  was  charged  for  at a level  close  to the  controlled  rents  before  PNDC
Law 5 was promulgated. Over  90% of all  households  in the low  income  housing
areas  paid  less  than  C25  per  room.
When Flt-Lt.  Rawlings  resumed  power in December  1981 his Provisional
National  Defence  Council  (PNDC)  Government  started  out  with the intention  of
providing  large  quantities  of "workers'  housing"  to  solve  the  housing  problem.
It  again  tightened  up rent  control  (Table  2.4). All  rents  were to  be halved  or
reduced  to C20  per  month  for  single  roomed  accommodation  and  C50  per  month  for
"chamber  and  hall" (i.e.,  a suite  of two  rooms). If rents  were  already  lower
than  this  they  were to stay  at their  December  31st,  1981  level. Furthermore,
no rents  could  be increased  until  March 6, 1983 (PNDC  Law 5, 1982).  These
regulations  did  not apply to self-contained  premises  or where existing  rents
exceeded  ClOOO  per  month.  In  the  latter  case,  landlords  had  to  pay  fifty  percent
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rents  or failed to  pay the  50%  tax  would forfeit  his premises to  the state.  These
provisions underline the  basically anti- landlord  stance of the PNDC government
at the time of this legislation - three months after the cour which ousted the
Limann government during which investment in large  houses had been rife amongst
the elite. New properties let after 31st December, 1981,  were to be assessed  by
the Rent Officer under the Rent Act, 1963.
Table 2.4:  Rental levels under PNDC Law 5, 1982.
Recoverable  No. of days  Rent per
Type of Accommodation  Rent/month  of basic  square foot
and size of room.  (Cedis).  wage (1)  (Cedis)(2)
1. Single-roomed accommodation
with shared amenities
(Le. un' r  multiple occupation)  20  1.7  0.2
2. Two-roomed  accommodatLon
with shared amenities of the
type generally referred to as
"chamber and hall'  50  4.2  0.2
Notes:  1. At C12 per day Introduced in 1982.
2.  Assuming  120 square feet per room.
Before any  investment in workers' housing could be made,  this firmly
anti-landlord stance  mellowed into a proposed  housing policy  which, among other
objectives, sought to improve incentives for investment in housing through a
National Housing Fund. However, in January 1986 the PNDC once again reinforced
rent controls by the Rent Control Law, 1986, (PNDC Law 138 as modified by LI
1318).  Rental levels were set out in the First Schedule but were immediately
modified upwards by Legislative Instrument 1318 -o  those shown in Table 2.5.
Table 2.5:  Rental levels under L.I. 1318. January, 1986.
Recoverable  No. of days  Rent per
Type  of  Accommodation  Rent/month  of  minimum  square  foot
and  size  of  room.  (Cedis).  daily  wage.  (Cedis)
1.  Single-roomed  accommodation
with  shared  amenlties
(Le. under  multiple  occupation)
of  a  slze  say  12'  x  10':  (1)
(a)  Sandcrete  ...  ...  ...  300  3.3  2.5
(b)  Landerete  ...  ...  ...  250  2.8  2.1
(c)  Swish  ...  ...  ...  200  2.2  1.7
2.  Teo-roomed  accommodation
with  shared  amenities  of  the
type  generally  referred  to  as
'chamiber  and  hall'  of  say
12'  x  10  per  room:
(a)  Sandcrete  ...  ...  ...  400  4.4  1.7
(b)  Landcrete  ...  ...  ...  350  3.9  1.5
(c)  Swish  ...  300  3.3  1.3
-ote-1--remises-f--  th-r-  izes-  ar--  assessd-  usi---  he-  amoun-  per-s--re--o-t
Note 1:  Premises of other sizes arti  assessed using the amountt  per square foot.32  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
Between March, 1983 and 1986, rents in the cities crept up  following
inflation and the reducing value of the Cedi which was devalued from 2.75 per
US$1 to 25 and then, by stages, to 90 per US$ by December 1985.  Despite the
possibility  of forfeiture  to  the  state  for  charging  higher than  controlled  rents,
only 30% of all households surveyed in 1986 were paying less than C50 in rent
before the last rent increase  in 1986.  About 17% each  were paying C100  and C150.
Furthermore, large rent advances of 12, 24, or even 60 times the monthly rent
were being demanded of new tenants.  These data suggest that resources for
enforcement have been inadequate to deal with the disparity between rents and
other prices at times  when the gap is  most acute.  (In  March 1988, the  case load
of the Rent and Housing Committee was about 100 cases per week.)
Thus, despite the evidently large increase from the 1982 level, the new
rents were, in fact, little or no higher in real terms.  Although both wages and
rents have increased, they have failed to keep pace with the massive inflation
which has dogged  the  Ghanaian  economy  since the  mid 1970s. While controlled  rent
for one room in sandcrete  had an index  about one sixth of the CPI in 1976 (1963
- 100), by 1985 the tight controls of the AFRC and PNDC had reduced it to one
136th of the CPI (see Figure 2.5). Neither have rents kept pace with the cost
of building. The Index of Prime Building Costs is  the only measure published by
the government by  which  to judge  the cost of building but  it  is probably
considerably lower than the real cost to the public; even so it is well above
the index for rent for one room.
By the end of 1985, just before PNDC Law 138, controlled rents had lost
touch  with the CPI to such an extent that they represented  only 0.07% of their
1963 index.  Figures 2.5 shows how rents have related to price indexes since
1970.
Recent developments. 1986 to 1988
Since the 1986 survey through which data for this paper were collected,
there have been significant changes in rents paid despite no change in the
controlled rental levels.  In the 1986 data, there were obvious signs of rent
increases ahead of PNDC Law 5, 1986.  These affected new tenants more quickly
than  existing tenants,  but  many  households  were  unaffected  by them.  The increases
in early 1986 appear to have satisfied landlords  at least for six  months or so
and there appears to  be no cogent argument against the credibility of our 1986
data as representing  April to  June, 1986,  when they  were collected.  Since late
1986, however,  there has been a  continuation of the upward  trend in rer,ts
especially for new tenants and in self-contained accommodation.  While it is
likely  that  many  households still  pay the  controlled  rent,  albeit in  capital sums
in  advance (see  below), there  are  also  many  households  who are  paying  up to three
times controlled rent.  The shortage of rooms is now felt so intensely that
renters  are  willing to agree to  C600 or C800  per month for  a room  without demur.
Existing tenants are also willing to pay extra rent in order to maintain their
tenancies in  an increasingly  constrained supplv.  Furthermore, the rent control
administrators in the  Rent and  Housing Committee  have no involvement  in this if
no complaint is made.
In  the  following  sections,  the  various  aspects  of  landlord-tenant
relationships and the treatment of government-built  housing will be examined.HOUSING MARKETS  AND RENT CONTROL IN  GHANA  33
D.  Current  Status  of  Controls
Coverage
Initially rent control only applied to housing occupied by low- income
households. Anyone who could afford to pay £100 per annum rent during World War
II was  regarded as  too well  off to need protection  (Gold Coast,  1951a and
Legislative  Council Debates  No.2 of 1949,  p.68).  The 1952  Ordinance removed this
upper limit but excluded any government housing or housing used by government
officers  as  a  consequence  of  their  employment.  These  have  been  excluded
throughout  the legislation  since that date.  The 1963  Act also  had no upper limit
to controlled premises.
Where premises have been liable to control  but fall outside the limits of
the  collective treatment  applied to  rooms  with shared  amenities, the  recoverable
rent  has been assessed on an individual  basis. United Nations (1979)  points out
that, where this happens, the extent of coverage is generally lower than that
obtained by across-the- board measures but the rents assessed generally come
closer to the true value of each property.
The Rent (Amendment)  Decree, 1973 stipulated rents for single rooms but
excluded from  control any single room occupied  by a tenant  whose income  exceeds
Cl,OOO per annum.  At that time, minimum wage was Cl.OO per day but mean wage
rates for Africans in reporting industrial establishments was C950 per annum
(Ghana  Economic  Survey, 1972-4,  p.125).  Thus, anyone  on  more than  mean industrial
wage but living in one room was liable to be outside the protection of rent
control.
The 1979 and 1982 legislation removed any limit to controls but the 1986
Rent Control Law again removed premises at the top end of the  market, this time
with rents above Cl,OOO per month. This is again quite low --  being only 3.3
times  the rent  for a  sandcrete  room  but only 7%  of  households  paid Cl,OOO  or  more
per month in 1986.  At this level, the tenant  pays whatever rent is estimated to
be recoverable buit  the landlord should pay half as tax to the state.
There has never been any differentiation  between sitting tenants and new
tenants in the application of rent controls; neither has there ever been any
exemption of  new propertieE.  Although landlords  have  been able to  remove tenants
to restore, renovate or improve  properties, there  has never been any incentive
given, such as removal from rent control, unless the renovations removed the
premises from the range in  which controls operated at the time.
Advances and side payments
In countries  where rent control is  imposed,  the demanding  of  side  payments
by landlords is very common. It provides a simple way for landlords to make up
the difference in income  between market rent and controlled rent, through once
and for all payments at the beginning of a tenancy or through periodic extra
payments in  cash or in  kind.  As the  Mate Kole Report (Gold  Coast, 1951a)  pointed
out,  some  landlords, notably  in Kumasi, began  taking  advantage of wartime
conditions to  demand  up to  one  year's rent  in  advance from  would-be tenants.  ThiL34  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
"social evil' was prevented by the 1947 Ordinance, amended in 1949, making
illegal the demanding of more  than one month's rent  in advance of monthly
tenancies  or three months' in the case of longer tenancies.
Under the Rent Control Ordinance of 1952, it was an offence to demand or
receive  key money.  The 1963  Act limited  rent in advance to  one month in  monthly
tenancies and six months in longer tenancies.  No legislation since enacted has
changed the illegality of accepting or demanding advances.
With very low rents, it might be expected that recent empirical evidence
would show side payments being made to landlords to secure accommodation. In
Cairo,  Mayo et  al (1982)  found that,  even in  a tightly  controlled  rental market,
new  building  was still  attracting investment  because,  inter  alia, landlords  could
demand a large initial  payment  from prospective tenants. Thus, although rents
remained low, the price  tenants paid for housing  (monthly rent plus initial
payment) remained reasonably attractive to Anvestors.
In  1981,  following  sufficient  preliminary  analysis  of the  1980  data to  show
how low reported rents were in Kumasi, a survey was done, under the author's
guidance, as a final year project by a student of planning. She interviewed
junior staff in three departments at the UJniversity  of Science and Technology
who  were  not living  in  university  accommodation.  As the  interviews  were conducted
at the  work-place, possible  bias from  the  proximity of the  landlord  was removed.
The respondents were asked about their rent, the utilities to which they had
access, and what side payments, gifts, advances, services, etc., they made to
the  landlord. It  was found that  they did indeed  only  pay controlled rent and the
proportion of rates and utilities charges for which they were legally liable
(Edoo, 1982).
The 1986 survey and more recent observation and interviews with renters
and officers involved in rent control show that there has been a rapid increase
in the incidence of landlords demanding rent in advance.  This was relatively
rare before 1982 but, in 1988, almost all landlords demand rent in advrnce,
sometimes for 5  years.  The reason a landlord  gives for  demanding an advance is
usually that he needs to carry out renovations and repairs.  It  is likely,
however, that he is aware that he is making a gain by securing the rent as a
capital sum rather than receiving it over a long period of time.
Rapid inflation  renders fixed  payments in  the future  less  valuable.  While
advances are becoming universal for new  tenancies in Kumasi,  there is also
evidence that sitting tenants are being asked for rent advances (usually  of at
least one years'  rent).  Such demands are being  accompanied by  threats of
eviction if payment is not made. Inevitably, if eviction occurs, grounds are
given  which are  within the law (see  notes on Table 2.1) --  usually that  the room
is required for a relative.  Many of the 100 cases per week brought before the
Kumasi  Rent and  Housing  Committee  in 1987-88  are from  tenants  aggrieved  at  being
evicted in this manner but there is little that can be done to redress their
grievance if a relative of the landlord testifies to needing the room.
Contrary to  our  previous  understanding  of  the  advance  system (Tipple  1986),
the  payment is  offset  against rents  due,  at the  controlled  rent  per  month.  Thus,
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no rent for 67 months unless the rent increases in the meantime.  Furthermore,
if he leaves the room  before the advance is extinguished, the  balance is due to
him.
Eviction
Until and including  the 1963  Rent Act, che grounds  on which tenants could
be evicted were as set out in  the notes on  Table 2.1.  Broadly they include  rent
arrears;  tenants'  neglecting their obligations,  causing a nuisance, abusing or
damaging the premises; or  expiration of the lease.  A landlord can also evict
a tenant where the premises are reasonably required for occupation by himself,
his family, or his employees (if  they are used to house employees).
These can be seen to provide a balance between secure tenure for tenants
who behave according to the terms of the lease and the ability of an aggrieved
landlord to evict bad tenants.  The strength of commitments to the extended
family is reflected in the legal provision allowing a landlord to recover his
or her premises in case of family need. However, for a year after PNDC Law 5.
1982,  no complaints  against tenants  would  be heard  unless  a landlord  had complied
with all the regulations concerning  providing rent cards to tenants and details
of all tenancies and rents to the rent officer.
Under the 1986 Rent Control Law, landlords were  again prevented from
evicting for o..e  year except where the landlord established that the premises
were reasonably  required for  use  by himself,  his family,  or persons in  his  whole
time employment for residential use, or by himself for  business purposes. Once
again, this could only be entertained if  the landlord  has issued rent cards and
tenancy details to the Rent and Housing Committee. While Section 19 modified
existing legislation to give effect to the new law,  nothing in it prevented the
other  conditions  for eviction contained  in the Rent Act,  1963, from being
relevant again after 6th March, 1987.  Indeed, there has been an increase in
evictions by landlords since that date.  It is now common to hear of  households
being evicted, ostensibly to make way for family members, or being threatened
with eviction as a lever to  extract advances. The considerable  growth in family
house tenancy  between 1980  and 1986 is  discussed  in chapter  three;  under current
conditions there is likely to be continued inroads  made into the rented market
in this way as landlords grow increasingly  discontented  with rental levels.
Treatment of houses in government estates
Tenants of houses owned by government or its agencies, chiefly the State
Housing Corporation (SHC),  and  Tema  Development  Corporation  (TDC),  have normally
paid rents fixed from time to time  by the  owning authority.  Houses built before
Independence are predominantly rows of single rooms with detached kitchens in
blocks, public standpipe  water supply,  and public latrines.  There are also some
detached and semi- detached 2 and 3 roomed bungalows with attached kitchen,
bathroom and toilet.  Post-independence dwellings are mainly  self contained
bungalows with two, three, or more bedrooms.
The 1952 Rent Act excluded government owned housing from its provisions.
From  1959,  tenants  were encouraged  to  buy  their  dwellings  on  hire-purchase  terms.36  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
Since this time,  many of those  which  have been purchased  have also  been extended
to  provide  rooms for  rent. In  consequence,  there  has been a  growth in  legislation
on  rents for  private lettings  in  government  housing.  The 1963  Rent  Act  prohibited
sub-letting without the permission of the landlord. Thus the letting of parts
of government owned housing was  illegal. However, the act did not apply to
"premises  of which a public officer is  a tenant  by reason of his employment  and
of which premises the Government is the landlord;" (Sl(2)(a)).
For many years, tenants of houses owned by State Housing Corporation or
other government agencies  have been profiting from the  very low rents by moving
out and letting the whole of their dwelling to another household for a higher
rent than they have to pay, or by subletting part of their house to another
household  for  more than  a fair  proportion  of their  total  rent.  Sometimes  the  room
rented has not been intended for habitation. As long ago as 1968, 93% of the
detached  kitchens in  Asawasi were sublet to other  households. While the tenants
were paying between C1.3 and C1.8 for their dwellings, the subtenants paid
between Cl.5 and C2 for the kitchen (BRRI,  1970, pp.16 & 17).
In 1973, the Rent (Amendment)  Decree sought to control this. By Section
7, occupants of houses built by TDC, SHC, or any government agency should not
charge,  demand, or  receive on  subletting, a  monthly  rent  in excess  of an
aggregate of:
(a) the installment  payable per month to TDC, SHC, etc.;
(b) the equivalent of property rates payable; and
(c) 20% of the total of a and b.
In  older properties, the  resulting  rents  to sub-tenants  would  be very low.
They would, however,  guarantee the owner a  20% profit on  the transaction,
something  that controlled rents  in the privately  owned stock never  openly
attempted to do. As the prices charged for the dwellings were subsidized, and
there was sufficient land for  extension, those fortunate  enough to  possess such
a house were thrica blessed.
However,  in  newer  estates,  while  rents  were  C10  per  month,  the
hire-purchase payments were fixed considerably higher. Schmitter (1979) shows
that  purchasers paid anywhere  between C39 and  C81 per month for  ownership  within
10 to 25 years.
The provisions  of the  1973  decree  were further improved  in 1974  by the  Rent
(Amendment) Decree  (NRC Decree 250). By  it, where a dwelling acquired from
government had been extended or improved, a reasonable increase in rent was to
be allowed. Disagreements or doubts could be referred to the Rent Magistrate.
In 1979, the "Ghanaian Times" (25th July) carried a  list of rents of
representative SHC properties. It showed that, though  under review, rents were
still  very low.  A single roomed dwelling in  North Suntresu  was still only Cl.9;
a pair of rooms, C2.9; and a two roomed semi- detached bungalow with its own
water and toilet was only C5.1 per month. More modern accommodation in a two
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The review mentioned in the Times had become law a few days before --  on
21st July. The Rent (Amendment)  Decree, 1979, (AFRC  Decree 5)  more than  doubled
the rents for  self-contained government  housing.  As shown in  table 2.3, the  self
contained premises were to rent for  between 27 and 34p per square foot; thus a
two roomed type would rise from C50 to C150, and three room types from C75 to
C175 for the semi-detached and to C200 for the detached bungalow.  While the
effect of this  may seem unfairly  negative for  government tenants  who enjoyed the
lowest rents per room in the city, it  must be noted that many legal tenants on
SHC estates were, in fact,  non-resident and extracting rents from sub- tenants
(see  below).  Furthermore,  most  government  housing  in  Kumasi  is  not
self-contained  and, therefore,  comes  under 1 in  Table 2.3 (1  and 2 in  Table 2.4).
The decree also increased  the profit margin on rooms in government  built
houses to 25%.  However, the State Housing and Tema Development Corporations
(Ownership  of Houses) Decree, 1979 (AFRC  Decree 61), required that the profits
available to owners of  former government housing were  to be  redistributed.
Besides limiting  ownership to  one  house per  applicant and  only allowing  employed
people to own them, this decree prohibited the subletting of former SHC and TDC
property  without  written  permission.  Anyone  already  a  sub-tenant,  should  pay  rent
to the SHC or TDC direct and would receive a rent card.
Like  the 1963  Rent  Act  within  which it  operated,  the  Rent Control  Law,  1982
(PNDC  Law 5) did not apply to housing owned by state agencies.  However, a major
modification  was made to the standing  of unauthorized sub-tenants of former SHC
and TDC houses: the subtenant was to become the direct tenant.  Where any
sub-tenancy  had been approved  by the SHC or TDC, the profit  margin was removed,
any rent being only equal to that  paid direct to the agency for that amount of
the house sublet.  Any future illegal sub-tenancy  would result in forfeiture of
the premises to the sub-tenant who was seen to have been exploited. According
to newspaper reports in 1982, such forfeitures  did indeed take place.
Under the 1986 Rent Control Law, subletting was once more permitted and
the rent charged returned to the cost plus 25% of AFRCD 5. Thus the threat of
forfeiture was removed.
Reletting After Renovations
Under the Rent Act, 1963, a statutory tenant  who is dispossessed in order
that the landlord can remodel the premises is deemed to have an option to be
reinstated  in  the premises  at  a  rent  to be  assessed  as  suitable  for  the
remodelled premises.  If the remodelled premises are too small to accommodate
all the former tenants, in the absence of agreement between them, the longest
standing tenant will have priority. Where they all of equal time, the Rent
Magistrate shall decide between the tenants on the  balance of hardship caused
by not regaining the tenancy.
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E. The Political Economy of Rent Control
Successive governments  in Ghana  have been engaged in  building housing for
rent, and recently for sale, but few have been particularly assiduous.
Most development plans have admitted governments' inactivity  and their
reliance on the private market to provide the majority of new houses.  In the
light of this,  efforts  have been made to assist the  building of private housing.
These  have  involved providing infrastructure  and  financial  assistance  to  private
builders to facilitate and regulate their activities.  At the same time, rent
controls  have been negatively affecting  the profitability  of private investment
in  housing.
From  the  beginning of  the  colonial  period,  regulations  we_e imposed  on  plot
sizes, building coverage, and sanitary provision, to ensure a high standard of
house building, (H.  M. Government, 1909; Belfield, 1912) and plots were leased
to  the  major local  chiefs and  private  individuals.  As  Kumasi grew,  new areas  were
laid out as grids  with plots over 400 sq.m. in area, 13m  wide roads and sanitary
lanes.  Old areas  were rebuilt  where required  to  make them "a  credit to the town"
(H.  M. Government, 1921).  In 1936, a new plot size (860 sq.m.) was introduced
as  standard and  the sanitary lane was  discontinued. In 1939, new building
regulations  were framed tightening  up on design and  use of  materials (The  Kumasi
Public Health Board Regulations, 1939).
It has continued to be government policy to provide services for housing
development through the  statutory supply corporations:  Ghana Water and Sewerage
Corporation (GWSC) for water supply and sanitation, Kumasi City Council for
drainage  and  the  emptying  of bucket  latrines, and  the  Electricity  Supply
Corporation (ESC).  The policy has only been successful in parts. Gt.SC  has been
required to  break even  financially  even though  government  has fixed  its charging
rates. Kumasi City Council  has been underfunded especially for the importation
of vehicles and spare parts. Thus it is  hardly surprising that the 1986 survey
shows 50% of houses without water and 29%  without a toilet of any  kind in 1986.
Electricity is almost universal in Kumasi except in the outlying  villages.
Finance has been considered an important  housing generator  by successive
governments. But financial institutions like the First Ghana Building Society
(set  up in 1956) and the Bank for Housing and Construction (1973)  make limited
loans  and  mainly to  the  relatively  secure  and  well- off  rather than  to  low income
households. Other financial institutions  have been encouraged  to invest some  of
their  capital  holdings in  housing.  The State  Insurance  Corporation  and the  Social
Security and National Insurance  Trust have been involved in  giving mortgages or
direct investment in housing but their need to make a safe profit has removed
their activities  from the reach  of low income  households  unless subsidi  by their
employers.
Government employees, in both civilian and military service, have been
eligible for concessionary loans for house building, particularly since the
Public Servants' Housing Loans Scheme Decree, 1975.  While this is undoubtedly
a boost for the ,-ecipients,  who often receive quite low wages, anomalies have
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his employer,  build  a large  house,  let it to the  university  for thousands  of
cedis  per  month,  and  continue  to  occupy  subsidi  university  housing.  This  is  now
forbidden  (by  the  Public  Servants  (Control  of Provision  of Bungalows)  Decree,
1979)  but  undoubtedly  existed  until  then.
Cost  of Housing  built  by the  Government
There  has  inevitably  been  substantial  increases  in  the  cost  of  houses  built
by government  agencies. Data  are  only  available  from  a few  documents  on  a less
than regular  periodicity. In 1948 when the Asawasi  estate  was built using
stabilized  mud bricks,  single  roomed  laborer's  quarters  with shared  utilities
cost  £140  (C280),  while  the  two  roomed  self-contained  cottages  cost  £285  (C570)
(Gold  Coast,  1948).  At that  time minimum  wage was about  C7 per month.  Ofei
(1975)  reported  that  similar  houses  in  North  Suntresu  were  being  sold  to their
tenants  for  C700  and  C1700  respectively  (when  rents  were  C6.5  per  room  per  month
in the  private  sector  and  minimum  wage  was C25).
In 1967,  when  the  minimum  wage  was  C17.5  per  month,  the  government-  built
one  bedroom  house  cost  C1,600,  the  two  bedroom  house  cost  C6,000  (Nierstrasz  and
Hunnik,  1967). Table  2.6  shows  how  house  prices  in  the  government  sector  rose
from  1974  to  1980. Thus,  in  1980,  the  cheapest  government-built  house  would  cost
2,500  months'  (208  years')  rent  for  one  room  or 167  months'  (14  years')  minimum
wage. Unless  the  prospective  owner  was  committed  to  sub-letting  for  many  times
the  legal  rent,  there  could  be  little  rationality  in  exchanging  renting  for  home-
ownership  under  such  circumstances.
Table 2.6:  Prices of Selected  S.H.C. House Types 1974 and 1980.
Price  Mornths'Minimum  Wage
House Type  1974  1980  1974  1980
SH.1  5,500  50,000  110  170
SH.2  7,400  59,000  150  500
SH.3  7,700  74,000  150  250
SH.4  14,600  103,000  290  340
SH.5  18,300  146,000  370  490
--------------------------------------------------------
Sources: 1974, State Housing Corporation  (1975),
1980, Kwakye-Safo  (1981) quoting SHC records.
Recent  Changes
In  the  1980s,  there  has  been  a  hiatus  in  government  activity  in  the  housing
field while pressing  structural  issues  were engaged followed  by a renewed
emphasis  on what is  seen  to  be a serious  housing  problem. Except  for  the  ten-
fold  increase  in  the  nominal  level  of  rentals  in  January,  1986,  which  was  quickly
eroded  in real terms,  little  attention  has been paid to encouraging  rental
housing.  The  draft  Housing  Plan  concentrates  heavily  on  encouraging  the  building
of  new  single  household  dwellings.  The  landlords  who  are  willing  to  build  rooms
in compounds (or their equivalent)  have been largely ignored except for
vilification  by the  press  after  reports  of evictions.
It cannot  be doubted  that,  since  our  data  collection  in 1986,  at a time
when landlords  appear  to  have  been  happy  with the  rew rental  leve'ls  (personal
communication,  Kumasi Houseowners  Association), Lents  have crept  up  and advances40  RENT  CONTROL  IN  KUHASI,  GHANA
and  demanding  higher  than  controlled  rents,  strictly  forbidden  in  the  rent  laws,
have  been  tolerated  by the  Rent  and  Housing  Committees,  at  least  since  1987,  as
long  as there  was  agreement  between  the landlord  and  tenant  involved. As the
availability  of rooms  for  renting  has declined,  especially  over the last two
years,  more  tenants  have  been  willing  to  concur  with  landlords'  demands  without
demur. Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that rental  levels  for single  rooms  with
shared  services  in  Kumasi  have  crept  up to  about  C1,000  in  1989  (still  quite  low
in  real  terms  and  only  half  the  rental  allowance  received  by  middle  ranking  civil
servants).
F.  Summary
Having  been started  as a  wartime  measure  to  curb  inflation,  rent  control
has continued  to dominate  the  housing  market  in Kumasi  until  the  presenc  day.
As most  households  live  in  accommodation  classed  as  having  "shared  amenities",
their  rents  are  fixed  by occasional  government  proclamation.  Apart  from  a few
properties  at the top end of the market,  most housing  units are covered  by
blanket  controls  or  case  by case  determination  by a rent  officer. Advances  and
side  payments  are  illegal  and  have  been rare  except  recently  before  and since
the  1986  increases.  Eviction  can  only  be carried  out  for  a stipulated  range  of
reasons; needing  the  room  for  a family  member  is  sufficient  reason  for  eviction
of a tenant. Government  estates  have  been included  in controls,  though  with
levels  fixed  by type  of house  or by so much per  unit  of floor  area.  Tenants
dispossessed  for  renovations  have right  of first  occupecion  after  the  work is
finished.III. THE  HOUSING  MARKET  OF KUMASI
A.  An Introduction  to  Kumasi
Kumasi  is the second  city  of Ghana,  capital  of Ashanti  Region,  and the
center  of the forest  belt  which stretches  across  southern  Ghana.  The city is
180  miles  from the  capital,  Accra,  by road  and  occupies  a series  of low  hills
separated  by sluggish  streams.  It is now an industrial  center  with a formal
timber  processing  industry  and large  informal  woodworking,  light  engineering
and  vehicle  repairing  activities.  It is  also  the commercial  center  for  a large
area of Ghana including  the  main cocoa  producing  region.  The city's  central
market  at Kejetia  vies  with Onitsha  in south  eastern  Nigeria  for  the  claim  to
be the  largest  market  in  West  Africa.
The city  was founded  around  the  turn  of the eighteenth  century  by Osei
Tutu  who, through  subjugating  the  local  people,  established  the  Asante  Empire
under  himself  as  Asantehene;  both the  king  and  the  high priest  in one  entity.
The  symbol  of  power  and  the  soul  of  the  nation,  a  wooden  stool  coated  with  gold,
remains  the apex of the cultural,  religious  and political  structures  of the
Asante  people  even  within  modern  Ghana. As  both  Asantehen~z  and  the  Golden  Stool
are to be found in Kumasi, the city retains  a very special  place in the
world-view  of its inhabitants  and the residents  of an area covering  several
hundred  square  miles.  More detailed  studies  of the  history  and  significance  of
Kumasi  can  be found  in  Aidoo  (1977),  Hagan  (1971),  Lewin  (1974),  McCaskie  (1980,
1981,  1983  and  1986),  and  Wilks (1966,  1967,  1975  and  1979).
Kumasi was  an  imposing town in 1817 (Bowdich,  1819) but  suffered
destruction  in the protracted  wars with Britain  in the last quarter  of the
nineteenth  century.  Having  been razed  by fire, it was reconstructed  as the
colonial  administrative  and commercial  center  for  the  northern  part of modern
Ghana,  beginning  in 1901,  eventually  gaining  a reputation  as the  "Garden  City
of West  Africa." Its  population  grew  to 45,133  by 1944 (Fry  and  Drew,  1945),
180,642  by the  1960  Census,  260,000  by the  1970  Census,  and  an  estimated  590,000
in 1980  (Tipple,  1984a).!/
1.!  The 1980 estimate,  made from  extensive  household  data,  has been called
into  question  by the  recently  published  1984  Census  preliminary  results
(Ghana,  1985)  which  show  only  488,991  people  in  Kumasi. Discussions  in
Kumasi  with Prof.  P. Austin  Tetteh,  a respected  Ghanaian  demographer,
suggest that the 1984 Census may be dogged by  under- enumeration.
Furthermore,  the  housing  stock  estimates  and occupancy  rate means  from
the  1986  survey  would  generate  a  total  population  of  approximately  690,000
for  1986.Figure  3. 1
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B,  Household Survey Data
At  the start of the project, a survey of housing stock and household
characteristics for Kumasi in 1980 conducted by Graham Tipple, with additional
material  collected  by  Samuel K.  Afrane  was  in hand  (Further analysis and
discussion of the findings  can  be found in  Boapeah and  Tipple, 1983;  and Tipple,
1984a,  1984b  and  1987a).  It  was  decided  to  conduct  a  further  survey  of
approximately the same size, and  -sing  as many of the same  houses as records of
the 1980 survey permitted so that sLme sense of changes since 1980 could be
gained in this tightly controlled rental  market.
As  in  1980,  students  of  planning  at  the  University  of  Science  and
Technology in Kumasi acted as enumerators under the guidance of Mr. Afrane, a
lecturer in the Department of Planning.  A survey to count the houses in the
city, exactly similar to that carried out by Boapeah in 1981 (Boapeah, 1981;
and Boapeah and Tipple, 1983)  was unsuccessful in 1986, for reasons beyond the
writers' control, but was successfully carried out in 1988 collecting data for
completions 1981 to 1985 and 1986 to 1988.  The new sur.vey  gave an opportunity
to check the 1981 data which was found to be slightly in error.  The number of
houses extant in 1980 was corrected from 20,600 to 21,000.
The main survey was carried out between late April and mid-July, 1986 in
28 arias of the city.  The sample  was based on a random sample of houses within
all the main  low income residential areas of the city plus areas chosen to
represent  the  high  cost areas  and the  peripheral  towns  and  villages (The  sampling
procedure  for areas  is discussed  in detail in Tipple, 1984a).  Within  the
residential areas, the sampling unit is the house which is defined, for the
privately de-eloped areas of the city as a structure designed for or used as a
residential building.  In the government-built areas, a house is defined as a
structure  originally  designed  to  be  used as  a single  dwelling. Within the  house,
all  heads of  households, or their  representatives  were interviewed. A household
is defined  as  a  group of  people who  normally share  the same housekeeping
arrangements.  Interviews were successfully conducted with 1414 households in
279 houses.
In addition to the graphs and  charts presented in this  chapter, there  are
a number of supporting tables in the data appendix at the end of the paper.
C.  Kumasi's Housing Stock
The housing stock in Kamasi consists predominantly of compound houses.
The 1986 survey shows that 40 percent of the houses are single story compounds
(mainly in the indigenous  sector)  with a mean of 12 rooms,  while 16 percent are
multi-story compounds (mainly the tenement sector) with a mean of 17 rooms.
Together these contain 75 percent of the rooms in the city.  The remainder are
detached  houses (24  percent  with a  mean of  7 rooms)  and  semi-detached  or terraced
houses mainly in the government  built sector and with means of 4 rooms (mainly
in high cost and government sectors). Approximately 4160 one to five roomed
houses have been provided by government as rental housing in its own estates.
Most of the houses have been sold to their tenants over the last twenty years.
Kwakye-Safo (1981)  reported that about 60 percent of houses formerly under the44  RENT  CONTROL  IN KUMASI,  GHANA
control  of State Blousing  Corporation  were privately  owned.  The 1986 survey
carried  out  for  this  project  reveals  that  62  percent  of  occupants  in  government
built  houses  are  either  owners  or  occupy  housing  owned  by their  family.
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Figure  3.2  summarizes  some  of the  key  data  on  housing  stock  utilization.
The figure  presents  weighted  estimates  of how households  are distributed  by
sector,  tenure,  house  type,  and  number  of  rooms  occupied.
For  purposes  of  sample  design,  the  city  was  divided  into  f.tr  sectors;  the
predominant  house  form  being  the  major  parameter  for  assigning  eas  to  sectors.
These  sectors  are  referred  to in  the  analysis  in  ]ater  chapters.  While  further
details  of  areas  assigned  to sectors  can  be found  in  Tipple  (1984a  and  1987a),
it  is  sufficient  here  to  state  that  areas  dominated  by  multi-story  compounds  were
assigned  to  the  "tenement"  sector,  areas  dominated  by  single  story  compounds  were
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sector,  and  high cost areas in  their  eponymous  sector.  As  Figure 3.2  shows,  most
households live in the tenement or indigenous  sectors.
Figure 3.2 also  shows that most  households rent their accommodation.
"Family  housers"  are  separate households  living  rent-free with  relatives.
Relatively few households own their accommodation outright.  Figure 3.3 shows
another key breakdown, of the number of households by tenure  by sector.
Taken  as  a  whole,  Figures  3.2  and  3.3  illustrate  that  most  households  rent
(or live rent free with  relatives)  in  single  rooms  in  compound  houses  in  the
tenement  or  indigenous  sector.
FLgure  3.3:  Tenure  by  Sector
In  many  African  cities,  the  housing
stock  contains  a  strong  informal  sector,
mainly  comprising  households  occupying  Peicent  of Households
land  to  which  they  have  no  legal  title  70%
on  which  they have  built  dwellings  which  60%  aIC  ....................................
do not conform with local planning and  50:  ......... s  j  .
building  regulations.  They  are  usually
referred  to  as  squatters.  In  Kumasi,  the  40%  .......................................
land  tenure  system  is  controlled  by  local  3  0%  ........  ......  ...... ..............
chiefs  whose  power  is  underpinned  by  the  20%  - .......  .....  ...............
belief  in  supernatural  forces  of
ancestors,  spirits  and  gods  (Busia,  1951;  10%..  ..... I...
McCaskie,  1983;  Tipple,  1983).  The  close  0%o  =IL  F
control  which  they  hold  over  their  land  own  Family  Rent  Sublet
obviates  the  opportunity  to  squat,  even
if  households dared to  defy them  and the
ancestors.  Thus, the informal sector in Kumasi comprises  houses built on land
leased from the traditional  authorities in a manner accepted  by the government.
While the structures may not conform to planning and building regulations, the
land  holding is entirely legal (Peil, 1976).  For the purposes of analysis, the
houses built in this way are included ir whichever sector the predominant type
in the  area merits.  Thus,  some are  in  the tenement sector,  some  in the
indigenous sector, and some in the  high cost sector.
Access to Utilities and Services
Few  households  have to  cope  without  a  bathroom,  which is  a  relatively  cheap
service to provide as it may only be a small bare room into which a bucket of
water is taken for washing.  However, more than a quarter of households do not
have access to toilet or water supply in their house and must rely on public
latrines and standpipes, often  many scores of meters distant.  At the other end
of the scale,  about one in  eight  households  have exclusive access to  each of the
services. As almost  all  households  have electricity,  no tabulation  is  presented
here.  Given possible sampling error  we would not make strong statements about
changes  in  services  between 1980  and 1986,  but it  appears  that  a lower  percentage
of  households  have access to  kitchen  and toilet,  while the  water situation  might
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Figure  3.4:  Households  Without  Access  to  Services
Some  notable  problems of access to
toilets  exist  for  family  housers  and  Pefceni
sub-renters.  Furthermore,  family housers  "_-
score  quite  badly  on  access  to  water  30
supply,  probably  the  most  expensive
service to provide.  25.  _
20.. . .
One  of the  main advantages  of  house
ownership  in  Kumasi  is  enhanced  access  to  '5
services,  at least 40 percent  of owners  10o  . . ........  .........
having  exclusive  access to  each and only  / 
small  percentages  having  no  access.
Family  housers  and  renters  only  rarely  D
have  exclusive  use  of  services,  but  Kttchen  Bathroom  Toilet  Waler
sub-renters show high percentages with
exclusive use.  This  is undoubtedly due to the large proportion of the few
sub-renters in government-built  housing areas where the houses have exclusive
services for the single household in occupation.
Environmental Conditions
The data in  Table 3.1 are collected at house level. Thus, each household
in  the  house scores  the  same  environmental  indicators  regardless  of their  tenure.
It  is noticeable that owner households consistently have  lower percentages
affected  by the selected environmental indicators  than tenant  households.  This
indicates that owners are more common in the houses with good environments.
Table  3.1:  Household  Environmental  Indicators  by  Tenure
Selected  Environmental  Percent  of  Household  with Problem
Indicator.  Owners  Family  Houser:  Renters  Sub-Renters
Major cracks  in  the
wall  plaster.  8  23  14  46
Overgrown  vegetation
close  to  the  house.  14  20  25  4
Standing  water  close
to  the  house.  18  33  25  46
Garbage evident  close
to  the  house.  22  35  40  55
Broken  or  absent
gutters.  31  64  56  57
Eroded  outdoor  surfaces  38  72  66  69
Housing  Supply
In  1986  there  were  approximately  22,000  houses  in  Kumasi  with  a  total  of
about  220,000  rooms;  this  compares  with  about  21,000  houses  in  1981  with  about
176,000  rooms.  Both  these  data  are  approximate  and,  therefore  liable  to  error
in  either  direction.  However,  the  number  of  rooms  per  house  in  the  sample  has
increased  from  8  to  a  little  over  10.  Thus,  although  growth  has  been  very  slow,
the number of rooms appears to be growing more quickly than the increase in
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existing  houses are providing much of the increase  in the  housing stock.  Supply
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
D.  Household Characteristics
Tenure
In this study households are divided into four tenure groups:  owner-
occupiers, renters, sub-renters, and family housers.  The great majority (65
percent) of households in the city are renters.  These households occupy rooms
owned by a landlo-d,  who may live on the  premises, and pay to  him a  monthly rent
and  a proportion of the rates and service charges (for  electricity, water and
sanitation)  which he  pays in  aggregate  to  the  relevant  agencies.  A few  households
pay rent to someone other than the landlord - most probably either a renter who
lets a room to them or an employer  who pays rent to the landlord.
Figure  3.5:  Monthly  Rents
The  great  majority  of  renter
households in Kumasi pay C200 or C300 per  Pecent
month  rent:  the  controlled  rent  for  a  single 60
room with shared facilities  built in swish 50  |  Pe,  R-  . ... ...  . . ............. ... .I....  I..  .. .-
(C200) or cement blocks (C300).  Although
almost  18  percent  pay  monthly  rent  of  more 40  ......  .........  ..  .. ..
than C300 (almost  all the C300 - 399 class  30  i  E
pay  C300), only 7.5 percent pay more than
C300 per room.  This is a similar pattern  20  . . .............................................
to  that  found  in  1980  when  the  great
majority of  rents  corresponded  to  the  ...  ...
controlled rent for one room with  shared
facilities  (C20)  under  the  Rent  Amendment  0-ss 100o-,s 200-299 300-399 400-499  500599  600
Decree,  1979  (AFRC  Decree  No.  5)  as
discussed  in  chapter  2.
House  Ownership  and  'Family  Houses"
Outright  ownership  of  a  house  is  only  enjoyed  by  a  few  households  (9
percent),  almost  all  of  whom rent  rooms  to  others.  There  is,  however,  a  strong
and  apparently  growing  proportion  of  households  who occupy  rooms  for  which  they
possess  some rights  of  ownership  through  their  family.  They  represent  25 percent
of  the  households  in  1986  compared  with  13  percent  in  1980  (Tipple,  1984a  and
1987a)).  The  basic  unit  of  society  in  Asante  is  the  abusua  lineage,  a  group  of
people  who  share  uterine  descent  from  a  common ancestress  and  who  are  ruled  by
a  chosen  senior  male,  the  "abusua  panyin"  or  elder.  Within  this  matrilineage,
a  man  and  his  children  are  separated  but  he  is  joined  by  his  sisters'  children.
Until  recent  legislation  (see  Tipple,  1986)  wh,.se  effects  are  as  yet  uncertain,
all  property  (except  for  a  few  very  personal  items)  possessed  by  members  of  a
lineage  passed  on  death  to  the  lineage  in  general,  under  the  stewardship  of  the
abusua  panyin.  In  this  way,  a  house  built  by  a  lineage  member becomes  the  common
property  of  members  of  his  lineage  upon  his  death  (see  Tipple,  1984a,  pp.152-3).48  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
During their life, a man or woman in  Asante traditionally  has obligations
to members of the lineage  which are at least  as great as  his or her obligations
to spouse  and children.  A  house-owner cannot  easily resist  requests from  lineage
members for a room in his or her  house. They have a right to a room, just as
much as if they  had already inherited it in common  with other lineage members.
In reciprocation, they would have obligations to their  benefactor and an owner
would  increase  in  status by having  them around.  Indeed,  the  rent  control
legislation recognizes the importance of this system by allowing eviction of
renters if  a  room is  required for  a family  member.  Thus,  many family  members live
rent free either in  .i  living relative's  house or in one inherited in  common. In
this report they are referred to as "family  ',ousers"
Income and Consumption
Data on income  are very difficult  to  collect in  Kumasi.  Not only do  people
have formal earnings complicated by multiple allowances  which can be anything
up to five  times as large as salaries,  but also  most  households have income  from
informal  activities,  chiefly trading, in  both cash and  kind.  As few households
seem to pay their full liability for tax, especially on non-formal earnings,
there is a great reluctance to tell the truth about  income. Both the 1980
(Tipple, 1984a) and 1986 surveys found that incomes bore no relationship to
consumption (in the 1986 survey, the median consumption to income ratio was 2
to 1).  Thus, in the 1986 survey, data  were gathered  on household expenditure on
food,  transport,  services  (water, electricity, etc),  rent  or housing  loan
payments, and  an  "other" category. The  aggregate of  these  is  taken to be
hodsehold monthly expenditure and acts as a proxy for income.
There  are shortcomings  in  this  approach,  chiefly  uncertainty about  whether
expenditure has been inflated  and to what extent the "other" category has been
accounted  accurately;  some  non-sampling  errors  are  unavoidable  in  social  research
collecting sensitive data on personal finance.  However, the  use of consumption
has advantages  as it is  likely  to  represent  permanent  income  more accurately  than
income  data, and demand is more closely related to  permanent than to short-term
income (Malpezzi  and Mayo, 1985).
The 1986 survey found median  monthly consumption  to be C12,500 ($140)  per
household  and  C3300 ($37)  per  capita.  These  can  be  compared roughly  to  estimates
of consumption from National Income Accounts.  The Bank's World Development
Report reports that average per capita income was US$ 390 in 1986, and that
consumption  was 82  percent of GNP.  Adjusting for  household size and converting
to  monthly figures  yields a crude monthly  household consumption of US$ 120.  We
would expect  Kumasi's consumption  to be  somewhat higher  than the national
average.
Owner households have a higher median monthly consumption (C16,300) than
any other tenure group but this cannot be regarded as high enough to set them
apart as  a separate class.  Furthermore,  their  larger  household size (see  below)
reduced their per capita consumption to C3100, almost C400 lower than renters.
Figure  3.6  presents  the  distribution  of  consumption  by tenure. Not  surprisingly,
owners' consumptions are generally  higher.  The other three groups --  renters,
family housers and sub-renters have roughly similar distributions.THE  HOUSING  MARKET  OF  KUMASI  49
Figure  3.6: Total  consumption  expenditures  by Tenure
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There  are  some  variations  by  tenure;  owners  have  higher  mean  and  median
consumptions  than  any  other  group  and  they  are  more  concentrated  in the  higher
consumption  classes.  Family  housers  have  very  slightly  lower  consumptions  than
any  other  group  but their  distribution  is  not  dissimilar  from  that  of renters.
However,  when consumption  levels, even for owners, are converted  to hard
currency,  they  constitute  very  little  purchasing  power.  The  owners'  mean  monthly
consumption  of C19,600  only  represents  US$220  at the  official  exchange  rate in
1986.
Looking  at the  data another  way, there  is a positive  correlation  between
household  consumption  and house-ownership. Whereas only 5 percent  of all
households  in  the  lowest  group  are  owners,  22  percent  in the  highest  group  are
owners.  This  is  close  to  the  distribution  of  consumption  within  the  owner  group.
However,  while  11  percent  of  family  housers  are  in  the  lowest  consumption  group,
they  constitute  42 percent  of all  the  households  in that  group; at the  other
end,  they  are  only  19  percent  of  the  households  in  the  highest  consumption  group.
Although  household  consumption  in  Kumasi  is  low  by  international  standards,
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consumption per month.  Mean monthly consumption per capita is only C4,200
(US$47);  the median is even lower at C3,300 (US$36).
Household Size
There is a wide spread of household sizes in Kumasi around the  mean of 4.5
persons.  It is  noticeable that  there  is  a  very gradual fade  in frequencies  above
six persons, the largest household encountered had 52 persons.  The extended
family household is still common.  Coresidential  polygamy is evident in moslem
dominated  areas  while  polygamous Akans tend  to separate  their  wives in different
households, often in different  houses.
Figure  3.7: Household Size, Selected Years  Figure  3.8: Size Distribution by Sector
Percent  of Each  Year  s Total  Percent  of Eacn  Sector  s Total
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Sources  Gnana  (1978),  Table  5, Tipple  Government  5 7,  Hign Cost 5  0,
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Households tend to be larger in the government sector than elsewhere.
This is consistent with the 1980 data (Tipple, 1984a and 1987a) but the 1986
sectoral mean of 5.7 is considerably lower than the 1980 mean of 6.7 persons.
Furthermore, whereas in 1980 the high cost sector had almost as large a mean
size of 6.5 persons, this is reduced to 5.0 in the 1986 sample. In the 1980
data, this sector had a completely different distribution from all the other
sectors  with no single  persons and only 1.6  percent two  person households.  The
1986 high cost sample is much closer to the other sectors. The change may be a
result of sampling differences or it  may reflect the  way rents in the  high cost
sector have been  kept  low by  the  indirect effect of  rent control.  In an
increasingly  tight  housing supply, the  high cost  sector appears to  be losing  its
identity as the home of a select group and becoming integrated within the city
as a whole.
There  has  been a very  slight  reduction  in the  mean  household size in  Kumasi
between the 1980 and 1986 surveys, from 4.8 to 4.5.
It  would,  perhaps,  be  expected  that  "modernization,"  increasing
urbanization, and an increase in availability of birth control might together
have reduced the proportion of large households. In fact, the percentage of
households with more than six persons has been holding fairly steady with 18
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In contrast,  there  has been a significant  decline  in the  percentage  of
single  person  households.  These  have decreased  from  a dominant  27  percent  in
1970  to  only  13  percent  in  1986. This  represents  a  potentially  important  change
in household  organization  which needs some explanation. Asante traditional
marriage  is non-coresidential.  The husband and wife do not become  a joint
corporation,  united  in  residence  and  economies.  Obligations  to  their  respective
(and  separate,  as marriage  is  exogamous)  lineages  do not  diminish  on  marriage.
It is traditional  for a man to live separately  from  his wife, in a different
house,  where  she  joins  him  for  conjugal  relations  and  to  which  she  may  send  some
of his meals.  This arrangement  is perceived  to give the  woman more economic
freedom than coresidential  marriage and enables polygyny  without internal
domestic  problems. While  this  practice  is  now  less  than  universal,  it  is  still
prevalent  and,  according  to  a survey  by  Diko (1981)  in  Bantama  (close  to  Kumasi
city center),  desired  by many married  men and women.  This survival  of a
traditional  norm  is  consistent  with  other  features  of  Asante  life  where  tradition
is  very  tenacious,  especially  during  the  economic  hardships  of the  last  decade
(see  Tipple,  1983;  1984a;  and  1987b  for further  discussion  of the  survival  of
traditional  values).  It  has  been  argued  elsewhere  (Tipple,  1984a  and  1984b)  that
the increasingly  constrained  housing  supply  in Kumasi  has, over the last two
decades,  reduced  the  ability  of men to  move  out  of the  marital  room  and  in to
a room  by themselves.91  This is  reflected  in the  dramatic  reduction  in single
person  households  not only  as a proportion,  but  also in real  terms. The 1986
data  only  reinforce  the  previous  observations.
It  should  be noted  in  passing  that  those  married  men  who  live  unwillingly
in the same rooms  as their  wives  and children  represent  a potentially  large
reserve  of latent  households. Thus, should  the housing  stock  be increased
signiificantly  in  the  future,  there  is  a strong  likelihood  that  at least  some  of
the  new  rooms  will  be filled  by  newly  liberated,  single  person  households.  The
difference  this  could  make  has  been  discussed  in  Tipple  (1984a  and  1984b).
Households  have the  ability  to decamp  some  members  at night  to ease the
problem  of crowding.  In a city  where  traditional  ties  remain  strong,  it is
quite  common  for  male  children  to  go and  sleep  in  the  room  of  a mature  brother
or an  uncle,  or female  children  with  a  mature  sister  or  an  aunt.  The  difference
this  makes  to the  size  of households  is seen  by comparing  the  total  size  with
the  co-  resident  size,  as can  be seen  from  Annex  Table  3.8.
There  may  have  been  a  very  slight  reduction  in  household  size  since  1980,
although  the  difference  is  insignificant.
ai Another  reason  might  be the  poor  economic  conditions  80-86  that  might  have
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Household  size  by tenure
Table 3.2:  Household Size by Tenure
Persons per household.  All
Tenure  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10-14 15+ Sizes Mean
Ovner  5  8  9  6  18  16  7  6  6  16  2  100  6.3
Family B'ser  13  14  13  15  18  11  6  4  4  2  1  100  4.4
Renter  14  14  13  16  15  10  7  4  3  3  0  100  4.3
Sub-renter  9  18  18  10  19  15  4  2  0  6  0  100  4.3
Total  13  14  13  15  16  11  7  4  3  4  0  100  4.5
Figure 3.9: Household Size by Tenure
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Households  in  Kumasi  typically  occupy  one  room.  Only  a  little  over  one
quarter  of  households  have  more  than  one  room,  and  only  13  percent  have  more  than
two.  Most  households  have  access  to a  veranda  or  an open,  roofed  area  in front
of  their  door,  used  as semi-private  space. While  no  detailed  data  are  available
on room sizes  in the  sample,  Houlberg  and  Nimako  (1973)  found  that  most  rooms
in  their  sample  in  Atonsu-Agogo  (an  area  in  the  indigenous  sector  on the  south
side  of  Kumasi)  were  between  12  sq.m.  and  20  sq.m.  with  a  mean  of 13  sq.m. They
found  that  owners  enjoyed  50 sq.m.  floor  space per  household  and 7 sq.m.  per
capita  while  renters  only  had 15  sq.m.  per  household  and  4 sq.m.  pet  capita.
Data presented in the appendix  show that owners  have more rooms per
household  (average  2) than  any  of the  other  tenure  groups  (average  from  1.3  to
1.7).  This is especially  noticeable  in the  rarity  of owners  only  occupying  a
single  room,  whereas  this  is  modal  for  other  tenure  groups. Family  housers  and
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probably  for  very  different  reasons.  Th  Figure  3.10:  Rooms  Occupied
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Less  than  half  the  households  in  KumasiMeans  1980,i.7,1986,16
enjoy  occupancy  rates  of  less  than  3  persons
per room while about 16 percent  have more than 6 persons  per room.  Mean
occupancy  rate  continues  to  be in  excess  of 3  persons  per  room. Alongside  data
from  other  African  cities  (for  example  in  Peil  and  Sada,  1984),  Kumasi  has a
relatively  high occupancy  rate.  The distribution  in 1986 is very similar  to
that  of 1980.
Table  3.3:  Mean Persons per Room by Tenure, 1980 and 1986
Tenure  1980  1986
Owner  2.6  2.7
Family Houser  3.4  3.2
Renter  3.4  3.5
Sub-renter  2.9  3.1
Total  3.3  3.3
There  is a high degree  of consistency  between  1980 and 1986  occupancy
rates, following from a more substantial increase in the number of rooms than
would  be expected  from  the  increase  in  houses. Furthermore,  the  distribution
between  tenure  groups  is  very  similar  to  that  of  1980. It  is  evident  that  owners
continue  to  enjoy  lower  occupancy  rates  than  any  other  tenure  group. Conversely,
family  housers  do  not  share  the  benefits  of  outright  owners,  being  closer  to the
renter  groups  in their  occupancy  rates.
More  than  half the  households  in  Kumasi  are  overcrowded  using  a threshold
of  3  persons  per  room. However,  owner  households  have  to  cope  with  overcrowded
conditions  more rarely  than  the  other  tenure  groups,  and  much more  rarely  than
renters  for  whom some  measure  of overcrowding  is  very common.
Rents  by Consumption  Ouartile
Table  3.4  presents  a  key  breakdown,  of  rents  and  rent-to-consumption  ratios
by consumption  quartile. The  means,  first  and third  quartiles  (Ql  and  Q3)  and
medians  are  calculated  and  presented  within  each  consumption  quartile.  In  Table
3.4  and  in  this  paper,  rents  are  generally  expressed  in Cedis  per  month.  The54  RENT  CONTROL  IN  KUMASI, GHANA
lack  of variation  in rents  is striking,  within  and  between  groups. Chapter  5
will present  additional  key tabulations  of rents,  as well as a simple  demand
model.
Table  3.4:  Rents by Consumption Quartlle
Rent-to-
Consumption  Quartile  Rent  Consumption  Consumption
Lowest  Quartilo
Mean  253  6,358  .04
Q3  300  8,000  .05
Median  300  6,810  .04
Q1  200  5,200  .03
Second  Ouartile
Mean  323  10,722  .03
Q3  300  11,495  .03
Median  300  10,730  .03
Qi  200  9,900  .02
Third Quartile
Mean  387  14,539  .03
Q3  300  15,689  .02
Median  300  14,425  .02
QO  250  13,393  .02
Highest Ouartile
Mean  599  25,201  .03
Q3  500  26,468  .02
Median  300  21,920  .01
Qi  300  19,393  .01
Summary  of  Key  Data  by Tenure
Table  3.5  presents  a  final  summary  of  some  key  data  by tenure. Key  points
include  the following. Most households  are renters;  both owners  and family
housers  stay  in  place  longer  than  renters  and  sub  renters. Owners  have  higher
consumptions  than  the  other  groups. Most  renters,  and  sub  renters,  pay  between
200  and 300  cedis  a  month  rent.  Even  given  low  consumptions,  rents  in  Kumasi
are very low, on the order of 2 percent of consumption.  More detailed
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Table  3.5:  Summary  Descriptive  Statistics
Median  Median  Median  Medlan
length  monthly  nmonthly  Rent  to
Tenure  of  stay  consumption  rent  consumptlon
(percent)  (years)  (CedLs)  (Cedis)  (percent)
Owners  10  16  16300
(8,  26)  (11100,  24100)
Family  housers  25  16  11700
8,  28)  (8000,  16300)
Renters  62  8  12100  300  2.3
(4,  16)  (9400.  16900)  (200,  300)  (1.7, 3,4)
Sub-renters  3  6  11600  300  3.9
(2,  18)  (7780,  20150)  (300,  300)  (2.7, 5.7)
Notes:  Numbers  in parentheses  under  medians  are  the  first  and  third  quartiles  of  the  dlstrlbutionst
family  housers  are  households  living  rent  free  in  a  house  belonging  to  family  members.IV.  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF RENT  CONTROL:  THEORY
A.  Introduction
This chapter  outlines  the  economic  analysis  and  theory  of rent  control
to  provide  a  perspective  and  prelude  to  the  empirical  results  from  the  economic
model  of the  effects  of rent  control  in  Kumasi,  reported  in the  next  chapter.,,
B.  Analysis  of  Rent  Control  as a  Tax  on  Housing
Simple  rent control,  ignoring  dynamic  price  adjustment  mechanisms,  is
usually  viewed  as a tax  on the  return  to  housing  capital. Such  a simple  model
of rent  control  as  price  control,  where  the  price  per  unit of  housing  charged
by  landlords  is  reduced  by  administrative  fiat,  is  depicted  in  Figure  4.1. Rent
control  is represented  as a  move from  price (rent)  PO to P1.  If rather  than
being  reduced,  rents  are  frozen  at  existing  levels,  then  price  inflation,  as  has
occurred in Ghana, leads to a similar divergence  between equilibrium  and
controlled  prices.
Figure  4.1:  Rent  Control  as  Effective  Price  Control
In  the  short  run  the  housing  stock
is fixed at QO,  i.e. the supply of
housing  S  is  perfectly  inelastic,  but  at  Ace
P1  there  now  exists excess  demand
(QI-QO).  Previously  the  available  units  S
only  went to  buyers  who  valued  them  at
PO or above.  But now price  has been
reduced  to P1, demand  has risen  to Ql.
Demand  exceeds  supply. We do not  know  p 0
precisely  how suppliers  will allocate
the available  supply  between  demanders  pi
in  Kumasi. The  work  of  Price  (1971)  and
others  suggests  that  few  transactions  in  0
Ghanaian  society are wholly economic;
personal  relationships  are established
as part of the  negotiation  and  used as
levers  by both or either  side.  Rooms
are  never  advertised;  there  are  no real  00
estate  agents,  all prospective  tenants
must  keep  constant  vigilance  and  use  as
many  personal  contacts  as  possible  to  obtain  information  about,  and  tenancy  of,
rooms falling  vacant.  In these circumstances,  it cannot  be doubted that
ethnicity  and  extended  family  factors  are  important.
The  divergence  between  P0  and  P1  also  provides  a  strong  incentive  for  the
development  of key money system,  where amortised  key money makes up  the
1/  Longer  reviews  of the literature  can be found  in Malpezzi  (1986)  and
Malpezzi  and Rydell  (1986). See also the recent  special  issue  of the
Journal  of Real Estate  Finance  and Economics  devoted  to international
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difference (POQO-PlQO).  However, such a featt're  neither appears to  be a strong
nor broad force in the Kumasi housing market.  Although advance rent payments
are  now common (see  chapter  2),  only commercial  rooms  attract  a form  of  key  money
known as "goodwill."  However, advance payments exhibit features of key money
in the sense that they increase the present value of the landlord's receipts.
The precise impact in terms of payments over and above official controlled rent
will depend, as in amortization  calculations, on the real interest  rate and the
period for  which the advance rent is paid.  But up to 1986 typical advance rent
payment covered about one year ahead.
Figure  4.2:  Rent  Control  with  Elastic  Supply
In  the  longer  run,  the  supply
schedule  has  more  elasticity  (S1)  (Figure
4.2), and so if key money  or advance  p
payments have not become an effective
equilibriating  mechanism  (because  of
strict  enforcement,  or  simply  because  low
incomes  and  poor capital markets  make it  Si
difficult  for  many  renters  to  finance  key
money  or  advance  payments)  then  landlords
simply decrease the quantity of housing  'O
services supplied to Q2.  Some houses  '1)
are  demolished  early,  others  are
transferred  to  owner  occupation (both  of
these factors are very rare in Kumasi),  \
or transferred to alternative land-uses  O
(commercial premises),  and new  starts
are forgone.
Q2 Qo  Qi  QuM,97
Rent Control as Expenditure Control
An alternative  view of rent control is to model it  not as a price control
but as an expenditure control, following Olsen (1969)  and Frankena (1975).
In this  model, rent control initially  lowers  real rents to P1 (Figure  4.3)
from PO.  Rent is fixed  at PlQO.  While supply is inelastic in the short run at
QO; in the intermediate run, landlords  have some latitude to vary the quantity
of housing services available in the market as represented  by the supply curve
S.
Real world rent control regimes fix rents, not  the price per unit of
housing services.  Specifically,  for  rental  expenditure  fixed  at PlQO,  landlords
are constrained by the rectangular  hyperbola E, the locus of all combinantions
of housing services and prices yielding expenditure numerica'.ly  equal to PlQO.
To  prevent  reductions  in  unit  housing  services  and  quality,  contini:al
reassessment of controlled rents in the light of the landlord's maintenance
policy  would  be required  to  prevent the implied  price  per  unit of  housing  servic3
rising above P1.  Downward filtering could be prevented if rent control were
re-inforced  with the introduction  of heavy fines in the event of deterioration
of the  landlord's  housing stock (Ricketts,  1981),  but this  is  a  judgement fraught
with evidentiary problems.  Such a strict rent control regime, based upon unit
housing services, has not been adopted in real  world housing markets.THEORETICAL  ANALYS1S  59
Figure  4.3:  Re  t  Control  as Expenditure  Control
Indeed,  the  final  price  per unit
of  housing services can  exceed the
original uncontrolled price.  Thus  b
landlords  may  reduce  the  unit  supply  of
services  to Ql during  the intermediate
period,  but charge  P2Ql.  Again,  under  S
this model there  is excess  demand  for  3  i
housing.  However,  under  the  expenditure
control  model,  the  demand  curve  is not  p  i
relevant  for  determining  the  new  t
equilibrium.  The  demand  curve  indicates
how  much  buyers  want  given  that  they  can
buy  all  that  they  can  pay for  at  a  fixed
price  per  unit  of  housing service.
Clearly  this  condition  is  not  met  under
the expenditure  model of rent control
(Olsen,  1987).
The existence  of an alternative  A
housing  market  (e.g.  owner  occupier  or
government  owned  sector)  would  further  complicate  this  analysis,  in that the
existence  of such  sectors  may limit  prices  to P0,  since  if  prices  rise  further
househnlds  will switch  sectors.
C.  Dynamic  Models  of the  Effect  of Rent  Control  on  Maintenance
Rent control over a  long period is generally  assumed to result in
reductions  in the quantity  of housing  services  supplied. Dynamic  models  of
profit  maximising  landlords  have  provide  some  insight  into  this  process  (Malpezzi
and  Rydell,  1986). Studies  in  this  area  view  the  time  path  of  real  rent  falling
by a rate of general  price inflation  not offset  by maintenance  in the rent
controlled  market  (Moorhouse,  1972). Rent  control  reduces  maintenance  on the
housing  unit,  ceteris  paribus  (Kiefer,  1980).  However,  the  scope  for  maintenance
adjustment  may  vary  in  different  markets.  and  with  the  age  of the  house  and  its
construction  type, so that depreciation  rates  can vary widely  between  areas
(Malpezzi,  Ozanne  and  Thibodeau,  1987).  However,  if  a  rent  ordinance  increased
the  rent  ceiling  if  the  unit  is  upgraded  and  decreased  it  if  the  unit  is  allowed
to deteriorate,  it can be shown  that, if the rewards  for upgrading  and the
penalty  for  downgrading  are  sufficiently  large,  the  housing  unit  will  be  better
maintained  under  rent  control  (Olsen,  1983;  Olsen,  1987).
D.  The  Relationship  Between  Controlled  and  Uncontrolled  Markets
Several  papers  have  addressed  the  potential  effects  of a  price  control  on
a related,  though  nominally  uncontrolled,  market. Needleman  (1965)  was among
the  first  to  note  the  possibility  of a price  control  covering  part  of a market
price  in  a related  market,  though  he  presented  no formal  model. Gould  and  Henry
(1907)  demonstrated  that  price  controls  can increase  or decrease  the  price  of
a substitute.  However,  their  model  cannot  be directly  applied  to the  housing60  RENT  CONTROL  IN  KUMASI,  GHANA
market, because it assumes households  consume some of  each of  the  two
substitutes.  The most thorough  treatment  of the possible  effects  of rent
controls  on  related  uncontrolled  markets  is  the  recent  paper  by Fallis  and  Smith
(1984).
Fallis  and  Smith  actually  develop  two  related  models,  one  for  rent  control
regimes  which  exempt  new units  from  price  controls,  and one for regimes  with
vacancy  decontrol  provisions. Their  short-run  models  predict  that  under  most
conditions  excess  demand  spills  over into  the  uncontrolled  market,  and, in  the
short  run,  driving  up the  uncontrolled  price. In  the  long  run,  they  implicitly
assume  an elastic  supply  function  that  implies  a reduction  in the  quantity  of
housing  services  from  the  controlled  sector,  and  an  expansion  in  the  uncontrolled
sector,  narrowing  the  wedge  between  prices.
They also present  an empirical  test of the model using data from Los
Angeles  (1969-1978).  Following  Rosen  and  Smith  (1983),  they  assume  that  there
is  a straightforward  relationship  between  rental  rates,  R, operating  expenses,
E, and  the  vacancy  rate,  V, estimated  as:
Rt  - -6.25  + .078  Et  + 34.09 (l/Vt)  + 26.49 (l/Vt-)
(3.30)  (1.64)  (4.12)  (3.10)
where  dots  indicate  time  derivatives  and  t-statistics  are  in  parentheses.  Rent
control  was introduced  in Los Angeles  at the  end of this  period,  1978.  The
estimates  are used to forecast  what rents  would have  been in the absence  of
controls,  and  the  forecast  compared  with  rents  in  the  controlled  and  uncontrolled
sector. After  two  years,  controlled  rents  had  risen  by 10  percent  less  than  the
forecast,  and  uncontrolled  rents  by 22 percent  more,  confirming  the  hypothesis
that  rent  control  increases  prices  in  the  uncontrolled  sector  in  the  short  run.
E.  Two  Approaches  to  Measuring  Costs  and  Benefits
In light  of the  above,  what  empirical  approach  will  we take  to  measuring
costs  and  benefits  in  Kumasi? As noted  earlier  we will  present  two  alternative
approaches  to  measuring  the  static  costs  and  benefits  of controls. The  first
and simplest  static  model estimates  the difference  between actual  housing
expenditures  and  what  we'd  expect  them  to  be in the  absence  of controls,  using
a  cross  country  model  calibrated  with  uncontrolled  markets. The  simple  method
does  not  decompose  expenditure  into  prices  and  quantities,  but  it  does  have  the
advantage  of yielding  information  about  the  effect  of rent  regulation  on the
"uncontrolled"  market  (to  be defined  below). The  second  method  does  estimate
prices  and  quantities,  using  the  method  of  hedonic  indexes.
Cost-Benefit  Using  a  Cross-Country  Model
The first,  simple  approach  can  be expressed  without  any  jargon  with the
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(a)  What  do households  pay  for  rental  housing  under  controls?
(b)  What  would  they  pay in  the  absence  of  controls?
The  answer  to  the  first  question  is  directly  observable  from  a  survey. Obtaining
an answer  to the second  is the  tricky  part.  Malpezzi  and  Mayo (1985,  1987a,
1987b)  have  developed  a  cross  country  model  of  housing  demand  which  can  be  used
to estimate  rents  paid by typical  households  at a city at a given  level  of
development  in the  absence  of  controls.
This  simple  model  does  not  answer  some  interesting  questions.  For  example,
what  effect  does  rent  control  have  on the  rents  for  particular  kinds  of  units?
What  are  the  consequent  costs  to  owners  of these  units? How  much  do  households
value  the  reduction  in rent  from  controls? What is the "transfer  efficiency"
of controls  (i.e.  the  ratio  of tenant  benefit  to  landlord  cost?) The  next  few
pages  present  a  more  sophisticated  model  that  can  answer  some  of  these  questions.
Cost-Benefit  Using  a  Model  Similar  to  Edgar  Olsen's
The second method is similar to that used by Olsen (1972) in his
econometric  analysis  of rent  control  in  New  York.21 It is assumed  that there
is an uncontrolled  housing  market  as well as a rent controlled  market.  The
quantity of  housing services provided by  a  unit  reflects all  of  the
characteristics  associated  with  the  unit:  size,  amenities,  appearance,  location
and  physical  features.  Thus  the  rent  of  any  unit  reflects  all  the  characteristics
associated  with  housing. Differences  in  rent  in  a  non-controlled  market  would
thus  reflect  differences  in  services  associated  with  the  good.
The costs  and  benefits  of rent  control  can  be assessed  by comparing  the
controlled  situation  with  the  non-controlled  situation.  One  way  of  implementing
this  with-without  perspective  is  to  estimate  how  much  controlled  units  would  rent
for in the  absence  of controls,  and  consider  the  difference  between  that  rent
and the observed  controlled  rent as the cost imposed  on the landlord  and,
conversely,  the  transfer  to the  tenant.
These transfers  lead to changes in producer's,  but more importantly
consumer's  surpluses,  resulting  from  the  existence  of  controls,  as  can  be seen
in  Figure  4.3.
With an uncontrolled  rent per unit of housing  se:-vice,  Pm, households
would  consume  Qm units  of  housing  service,  and  pay  a rent  PmQm. The immediate
/  For  convenience  we refer  to  this  as  the  Olsen  model  because  his  1972  paper
was (to  our  knowledge)  the  first  published  study  to  analyze  rent  controls
with  such  a  model. Olsen  cited  the  work  of  De  Salvo  (1975)  and  others  as
antecedents;  similar  models  and extensions  have  been applied  to  housing
market  policies  and  programs  of  various  kinds,  e.g.  Murray  (1978),  Mayo
(1981),  Schwab  (1985)  to  name  but  a  few. Malpezzi  (1986)  and  Struyk  (1988)
apply  variants  of the  model  to rent  controls  in Cairo  and  urban  Jordan,
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effect  of  rent  control  is  to  reduce  rent  Figure  4.4:  Rent  Control  and Consumer's  Surplus
to  PcQm.  Thus  the  consumer  spends  (PmQm
- PcQm)  more  on  non-housing  goods.
At  price  Pc  the  consumer  would
demand  Qd units of housing services.
However,  under  real  world  rent control  \
regimes,  landlords  have  no incentive  to  Z
increase  the  flow  of  housing  services  to  >  -
Qd;  and  indeed as  landlords filter  p
housing  downwards,  tenants  are  likely  to  w
end  up  consuming  Qc  housing  units.  p,__ 
Households  will find it more difficult  -
to obtain  and  move to a suitable  unit.
Households  will systematically  consume
"off  their  demand  curve."
With rent control  expenditure  on
the units is reduced to PcQm.  In the  - - _  _  ad  __  ucn
short run, price control has no effect  '  d
on supply.  But  it  has  a profound  effect
on the  allocation  of supply  between  demanders. Previously  the  available  units
only  went  to  renters  who  valued  them  at  Pm  or  above.  But  now  that  price  has  been
reduced  to  Pc,  demand  has risen  to  Qd.  Demand  exceeds  supply. We do not  know
in detail  how owners  will allocate  the  available  units  between  renters. But
there  is evidence  to suggest  that  family  and  own use  occupation  has risen  in
Kumasi.  However  the  allocation  is  done,  the  total  market  value  of the  available
units  to  consumers  (renters  or  owners)  will  be less  than  the  value  before  price
control.
If housing  is filtered  to Qc, there  is a further  efficiency  cost since
supply  will  be altered: i.e. there is an additional loss of producer surplus
(WXV). Thus  the  triangle  ZVX  is  a  minimum  estimate  of the  welfare  cost  of  price
(rent)  control.
This  geometric  exposition  illustrates  the  basic  method  quite  well,  but  an
algebraic  generalization  is  better  suited  for  actually  estimating  the  size  of
welfare  gains  and losses  using  a sample. It can  be shown  that if the  price
elasticity  of  demand  is  constant,  the  benefit  of a  program  which  changes  prices
and  quantities  can  be written  as:
b +  1  b +  I
Benefit  _  (L_  (  b) [Qc  Qm  b  1  +  PmQm  _  PcQc  [1]
where
Benefit  - cash  equivalent  value,  a  measure  of change  in  consumer's
surplus
Qm - predicted  housing consumption in the absence of rent
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Qc - housing  consumption  under  rent  controls
PmQm  - estimated  rent  in  the  absence  of  controls,  also
denoted  Rm
PcQc  - observed  controlled  rent,  also  denoted  Rc
b - price  elasticity  of dcmand.
In the  special  case  where  the  price  elasticity  of demand,  b, is  equal  to
-1, the expression  b/(b+l) is undefined.  But it can be shown  that in this
special  case  the  benefit  can  be expressed  using  natural  logarithms  as:
Benefit - PmQm [log (PmQc) - log(PmQm)]  +  PmQm - PcQc  [2]
These two related  equations  will be the centerpiece  of the empirical
analysis  in the  next  chapter. The  benefit  may  be thought  of  as composed  of two
parts. The  first  is  comprised  of the  two  terms  to  the  right  of the  brackets  in
equations  [1]  and [2]. This is  simply  the  additional  spending  on non-housing
goods  brought  about  by paying  a rent  Rc (=PcQc)  rather  than  Rm (-PmQm). This
simple  difference  between  market  and  controlled  rents,  Rm - Rc, is  often  used
as  an  approximation  to  tenant  benefits  from  the  imposition  of  controls.  But  this
simple  benefit  measure  does  not  take  into  account  how  households  value  changes
in  housing  consumption  in  addition  to  changes  in  disposable  income. The  second,
comprising  the  terms  in  parentheses  and  brackets  in  the  two  equations,  depends
on the  difference  in  housing  consumption  with  and  without  rent  controls. But
whereas  in the  simple  benefit  measure  (Rm  - Rc)  an extra  dollar  of  non-housing
is counted  as being  worth exactly  one dollar  to the tenant,  in the benefit
measures  [1]  and [2]  extra  housing  is  discounted  based  on the  tenant's  relative
preference  for  housing  vis-  a-vis  other  goods.
The  measures  in [11  and [2]  do  not  include  all  possible  costs  and  benefits
to tenants.  For example,  rent control  may increase  transactions  costs for
tenants,  including  search  costs (Clark,  1982),  and increase  waiting  time for
housing  units (the  cost of which to tenants  may  be considerable,  see  Willis,
1984). All  of these  will reduce  the  benefits  to tenants,  but  the full  system
may also increase  the  bundle  of property  rights,  such as security  of tenure,
enjoyed  by tenants  thus increasing  their  benefits  in this area.  The above
measures  [1]  and [2]  are then  better  approximations  of benefits  than  Rm - Rc,
but they  are  still  approximatiot.s.
The cost imposed  on landlords  is straightforwardly  approximated  by PmQc
- PcQc, or the difference  between  controlled  and market  rents for the unit
inhabited  by the  tenant. This measure  of cost to landlords  does  not include
losses  from  prior  accelerated  depreciation  of the  unit.  However,  this  could
be regarded  as a saving  in  maintenance  costs,  whiclh  would  generate  benefits
elsewhere,  perhaps  equal  to  the  opportunity  cost  forgone.  The  cost  to  landlords
would  also  include  losses  from  the  uncompensated  transfer  of  property  rights  to
renters. Thus, the  true costs  to landlords  may therefore  exceed  the (PmQc  -
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Estimating these costs and benefits requires four pieces of information
for each consumer:
(a)  the rent currently  paid for the current controlled unit, PcQc;
(b)  the rent that the current unit would rent for in the absence of
controls, PmQc;
(c)  the  rent  that  the household  would  pay  if  they  were  at  their
equilibrium demand at market prices, PmQm;
(d)  the price elasticity of demand for  housing, b.
The section on empirical implementation below explains how  these were
constructed in some detail, for the Kumasi housing market.  Briefly, PcQc can
be observed directly from a sample of controlled households.  PmQc will be
estimated using  the method of hedonic  indexes, described below, which uses
information from an additional sample of housing units rented at  (as near as
possible) market prices.  PmQm will be estimated using two alternatives: (i)
the cross-country model of Malpezzi and Mayo, and (ii) a demand relation from
a sample  of  households facing (as  near as  possible)  market  prices.  The  M&M model
will  also be used  to examine the net effect of controls on prices  in the
"uncontrolled"  market.  The price elasticity,  b, will  be a parametric  assumption
based on other studies.  While each of these methods has potential problems,
sensitivity analysis will give us some idea of the confidence we can place in
these results.V.  ESTIMATES  OF THE  COSTS  AND BENEFITS  OF CONTROLS
A.  Introduction
Once  again,  two  separate  approaches  will  be taken  to estimating  costs  and
benefits. The  first,  simpler  approach  will  be based  on the  difference  between
actual controlled  rents and rents predicted  by the cross-country  model of
Malpezzi  and  Mayo. The  second  approach  will  be  based  on the  Olsen  cost-benefit
model. The  parameters  used  to  derive  the  first  set  of  estimates  were  taken  from
Malpezzi  et al.,  and  were  presented  in  the  previous  few  pages. The  parameters
for  the  second  set  will  be  derived  here  from  the  household  survey  data.  Each  will
be compared  to the  actual  current  rent  paid,  PcQc.
Recall  that  the  simple  model  requires  two  basic  pieces  of information:
(a)  the  rent  currently  paid  for  the  current  controlled  unit,  PcQc;
(b)  the rent that the household  would  pay if they were at their
equilibrium  demand  at market  prices,  PmQm.
The empirical  estimation  of the  Olsen  model  discussed  in the  previous  chapter
requires  four  pieces  of information:
(a)  the  rent  currently  paid  for  the  current  controlled  unit,  PcQc;
(b)  the rent that the  current  unit would  rent for in the absence  of
controls,  PmQc;
(c)  Lhe rent that the  household  would pay if they were at their
equili'-ium  demand  at market  prices,  PmQm;
(d)  the  price  elasticity  of demand  for  housing,  b.
Note  both  methods  require  PcQc  and  PmQm. For  both  we use  the  household  survey
data  for  PcQc,  but  we use  the  cross  country  model  to  estimate  PmQm  in  the  first
instance  and  demand  estimation  using  a  sample  of  "uncontrolled"  Ghanaian  renters
to  estimate  PmQm  in the  second.
The  rest  of  this  chapter  is  organized  as follows. First  we  will  describe
how  we  estimate  or  otherwise  arrive  at the  components  just  described:  PcQc  from
the  household  survey;  PmQm  from  a cross  country  model  of housing  demand;  PmQc
using  the  survey  and the  method  of  hedonic  indexes;  and  an alternative  measure
of PmQm  using  the  survey  and  demand  estimation;  and  finally  the  price  elasticity
of  demand. Then  we  will  present  the  static  cost  benefit  estimates,  and  evidence
sbout  their  distribution.
Given  the rather  extreme  results  presented  earlier,  i.e.,  that  typical
rents  are  less  than two  percent  of total  consumption,  and  that  a  month's  rent
is roughly  equivalent  to the  price  of a loaf  of  bread,  readers  may reasonably
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Why even bother with such statistical analysis?  Isn't
the demonstration that rents are  so low sufficient?
What could be gained from further analysis?
There are three answers to these questions:
(a)  While the  result  that  rents  are  very low  is  obviously  robust,, 1
we would prefer a standard for comparison with basis in fact
or theory.
(b)  Also, the simple (implicit) comparison of observed rent to income
ratios with similar statistics from other markets, controlled or
uncontrolled,  or  with  mere  notions  of  what  is a  "reasonable"
fraction, tell us nothing about the relationship  between costs and
benefits, or their incidence.91
(c)  Finally, Kumasi  is one of  several markets being  studied in the
larger research project, and there is a return to estimating costs
and benefits in as comparable fashion as possible.
A  related  point  is  that  by  estimating  such  models  in  rather  extreme
circumstances  we learn more about the  robustness  of the  models.  We have already
noted that we  will  actually estimate costs and benefits  using  two related
models.  Neither is free from problems or criticism.  But given the very low
rents in  Kumasi virtually all of the  qualitative  conclusions  of the  paper in the
following  chapters stand given any likely change in quantitative estimates.
B.  Choice of Reference Group
Perhaps  the  single  most  difficult  empirical  problem  is  choosing  a
reference group.  It must be reasonable to assume that they are enough like the
controlled group that they are comparable--or  can be made so statistically.  It
must be reasonable to assume that rents are not so distorted in the reference
group by the presence of controls that they are unreliable guides to rents in
the  absence  of  controls--or  that  a  good  adjustment  can be  made  for  that
distortion.  Here we note the following:
j/  Three hundred cedis is roughly the price of a loaf of bread (admittedly
a nicer loaf than is readily available in the U.S.).  An express airmail
letter from Ghana to the  U.S. requires 200 cedis postage.
21  As noted above, the models in this  chapter are comparative static models.
Dynamic costs of controls could be quite large, and are discussed in the
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(a)  Regression  analysis  is,  in  fact,  a  statistical  method  which  enables
analysis of  "treatment"  and  "control" groups which  are  not
identical.13
(b)  One  possible  problem  is  that  households  in  the  reference  and  control
groups  are systematically  different  in their  demand  for  housing;
Malpezzi  (1986)  has found  such  selectivity  bias  does  not  make  much
difference  in  Cairo,  but  Caudill  et  al.(1987)  found  it  did  make  some
difference  in  Vancouver.  We can  use  a simple  correction  from  Olsen
(1980)  to test  for  selectivity  bias in  our  results.
(c)  As noted earlier,  rent controls  can, under some circumstances,
affect  rents in the  uncontrolled  sector.  But the cross country
model  of  housing  demand  can  be used to  test  for  and, if  necessary,
correct  for  such  a problem.
There  are  several  variables  in the  survey  which  could  be used  to estimate
the  market  rent  of the  unit in  the  absence  of controls:
(a)  rent  charged  on  rooms  let  in  the  house  for  commercial  purposes.
(b)  landlords'  estimate  of  market  rent;
(c)  landlords'  estimate  of the  replacement  cost  of the  unit;
(d)  rent  paid  on  units  in  the  high  cost  sector
(e)  key money and/or advance  rent paid in addition  to rent in the
controlled  sector;
(f)  rents  paid  for  units  which  are  renting  for  greater  than  controlled
rents  (are  demonstrably  "uncontrolled.")
None vf these is without problems.  After examining the data we  chose
alternative  f (with  some  modification,  discussed  below). Each  of  the  potential
methods  will  be discussed  briefly  here.
Rent charged for rooms let in the house for commercial  purposes  was
quickly  rejected  as  an  appropriate  vehicle  to  assess  market  rent  in  the  absence
of controls. There  were a very  small  number  of observations  in this  category
(N-15),  although  the average  maximum  commercial  rent paid was C590  (median
C400)  compared  to mean room rents  of C340  per room (median  C300)  per month.
Landlords  also reported  what they  thought  would  be a minimum  commercial  rent.
This was C220 per month (N-6 and median  of C300).  Apart from problems  of
interpreting  commercial  rents  as proxies  for  residential,  the  small  number  of
observations  caused  us to  drop  this  option.
i/  See  any  intermediate  statistics  text  for  a more  detailed  explanation.68  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
The landlord's estimate of market rent was also rejected.  The average
monthly rent  was estimated to  be C340, the same  as the  actual average  house rent
per room (medians  C200  and C300 respectively).  We believe that the simple  way
the  contingent  valuation question  was framed  did  not control  for possible  biases
such  as strategic,  hypothetical, information,  instrument  and starting  point  bias
(see Schulze, d'Arge & Brookshire, 1981; Boyle, Bishop & Welsh, 1985).  There
were also few responses.
While replacement costs comprised a  reasonable number of observations
(N-131), preliminary hedonics on the landlord's estimate of replacement cost
produce low R squared  values (less  than 0.13 for all houses) and disaggregating
by sector produced very low numbers of observations.  Moreover, the data were
heavily skewed towards  low  replacement  estimates  which  were unrealistic in  terms
of  known  building  costs.  Finally,  in  any  market  rents  are  not  simply
proportional to replacement costs.  Thus replacement cost was rejected as a
vehicle for analysis.
Under the Rent Control Law, 1986, premises renting for more than C1,000
per month are outside rent control.  Out of the almost 900 renting households
in the sample, only 36 were paying C1,000 per month or more.  Thus, rent paid
in the high cost sector,  while a likely candidate  as a suitable  variable, could
not  be  used,  since  the  degrees  of  freedom  were  so  limited  (only  4  in
multivariate  models).  Furthermore,  many  of  the  households  rent  their
accommodation  through their  employer  and  pay a percentage  of their salary  rather
than an amount depending on the quality of the house.  We have no data on the
amount paid by employees for the  houses but hearsay evidence shows C25,000 per
month to be quite common in 1988/9.
Key money  is a  one-time non-refundable  deposit paid  in  addition  to
controlled rent.  Key  money can  be translated  into  a rental  equivalent (RE)  with
the following formula  provided th: time  horizon is reasonably long:
RE - K1 *  r
where
Kl - the amount of key money paid in the first  period
(assuming  no subsequent  deposits are paid)
r  - real rate of discount.
This is valid if it is assumed that the landlord keeps the key money invested
at the prevailing rate of interest.  However, this form of key money is not a
significant feature of the Kumasi housing market, unlike other parts of West
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Advance  Raymer.ts  (A)  are  more common  in Kumasi,  and  denote  the  practice
of paying  periodic  (controlled)  rent  in advance. Again,  advance  payments  can
be converted  into  an  approximate  rent  equivalent  (RE)  if  the  following  equation
is  solved  for  RE
n
A - E  RE/(l+r+p) t
t-l
where A - advance payment
n - number  of  periods  in  advance
r - real discount rate
p - rate of price increase
t - time period.
In effect,  RE is the same  as a payment  on a self-amortizing  loan  having
the present  value  A.  Roughly  15 percent  of renters  reported  paying  advance
rent.  However,  the  variance  in the  amounts  paid  was  enormous  (ranging  from  2
to 53,000  cedis. Of advances  paid the  first  quartile  was 300,  the  median  was
4,000, and third quartile  was 10,000.  Since advance amounts  paid varied
tremendously  (partly  with  when  the  tenant  moved  in)  we found  it  difficult  to  use
them to predict  market  rents  with any confidence. However,  recent  trends  in
advance  are  of  interest  in  themselves,  and  we  analyze  advances  separately  below.
Advances  paid  will also  be used  when  we estimate  gross  rents  (below).
After considering  and rejecting  the above,  we took the simplest  path.
Rents  are not controlled  for  units renting  above 1,000  cedis.  This is only
about  8  percent  of  median  income  (yet  relatively  few  households  pay  rents  this
high).  Further,  as  we mentioned  earlier  in Chapter  2 controlled  rents  are so
low that,  while  the  practice  is not  widespread,  some  households  choose  to  pay
rents  in exce3s  of controls  but less  than the  1,000  cedis  which  would  exempt
landlords  from  controls. "Uncontrolled"  units  were  therefore  defined  as those
where  the  rent  paid  was  greater  than  the  controlled  rent  for  that  type  of  unit.
Table  2.5 (in  Chapter  2,  above)  lays  out  the  exact  criteria  by number  of
rooms and type of material  (swish,  concrete,  etc.)  While these units are
outside  rent  control,  since  their  rents  exceeded  controlled  levels,  common  sense
as well as the  model  of Fallis  and  Smith  (1984)  suggests  that  the  presence  of
controls  could  affect  the  rents  of these  "uncontrolled"  units  as  well. Many  of
these  units  have  exclusive  use  of either  a kitchen  or bathroom,  and  shared  use
of other  facilities,  in contrast  to the part of the sample  where  controlled
rents are enforced.  This could lead to upward  bias in the imputation  of
uncontrolled  rents,  even  though  we  attempt  to  control  for  characteristics  of  the
unit  and the  household.if  Also,  there  may  be some  units  which  would  rent  just
below  the  1,000  cedi floor  for  uncontrolled  rents  in the  absence  of controls,
!J/  Briefly,  this can be thought  of as the problem  of predicting  "out of
sample." Even  though,  in  an idealized  model,  correctly  specified,  there
should  be no problem  with such  predictions,  when working  with real  data
and aDRroximate  specifications  (Leamer,  1978),  predicting  out of sample
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but which rent for 1,000 or more to escape  controls.  But there could  be
offsetting  bias  because  these  rents  could  be held  down  by the  threat  of appeal
to  the  Rent  and  Housing  Committee.  The  net  bias in  "uncontrolled"  rents,  then,
is  an empirical  question.
One  way  we control  for  household  and,  especially,  house  characteristics,
is by limiting  most of cur analysis  in this chapter to the tenement  and
indigenous  sectors. While  there  are  differences  between  these  two  sectors  they
are  small  compared  to differences  between  them  and the  omitted  high cost and
government  sectors.  Of course  further  analysis  of high cost and government
sectors  would  be worthwhile.
In the  next few  paragraphs  the  issue  of comparability  of controlled  and
"uncontrolled"  samples  will be addressed  further. Then  we will  use the  cross
country  model  again  to examine  the likely  net bias of this  procedure,  and to
suggest  a correction  for  the  bias.
Controlled  and  "Uncontrolled"  Households  Compared
Table  5.1  presents  some  key  statistics.  The  uncontrolled  households  are,
on average,  25  percent  richer,  more likely  to  have their  own toilets,  live  in
larger  units,  and  pay twice  as  much in  rent.
Table 5.1:  Controlled and Uncontrolled Samples Compared
Controlled  'Uncontrolled'
Number of Observations  677  78
Median Rent  300  600
Median Number of Rooms  1  2
Percent Living  ln 1 Room  93X  8X
Mean Persons Per Room  3.1  2.1
Percent with Own Toilet  1X  26X
Median Consumption  11,749  14.612
Median Rent-to-Consumption  .02  .05
Note:  Derived from unweighted sample frequencies.  Government and hlgh
cost sectors omitted.
The  evidence  suggests  that  the  differences  between  households  are  a  matter
of degree  rather  than  kind.  Differences  between  units  are  more substantial,
which  is  in  itself  suggestive.  One  possible  correction  for  remaining  bias  will
be described  after  we address  the  other  issue,  the  extent  and  nature  of the  net
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Selectivity Bias
Figure  5.1:  Effect  of  Selectivity  Bias
Consider the following potential
source of  bias in the  demand and  hedonic
estimates using  households who pay more  60____d_s_P__o__Mth
than the controlled rent as a proxy for
'uncontrolled"  rents.  We  have,  in  SOo
effect, chosen the sample on the basis  400
of  the  dependent  variable;  while  we  R
retain  information  on  controlled  n
households  we  don't  use  those  200  U;a  ne  C.lolI
observations  directly  in  the  estimation.
It can be easily shown that this  .
is a  version  of the  so-called  "censored  Income(IODOCeCols)t
sample" problem  simply  illustrated in
two dimensions in Figure 5.1.1  Suppose
the unobserved true relationship between  (say) uncontrolled rents and income
could be represented  by the data  points in the figure, and the heavy regression
line through those  points.  But in the procedure adopted above,  we stated that
any rents lower than $3006/  were denoted as controlled.  In Figure 5.1 the
regression estimate of the relationship is  biased because the two points lying
below the dotted line aren't included in the estimation.
More formally, the model is
lnRu - XB + m  (if  R > 300)
Ru is unobserved  (if  R < 300)
where Ru is "uncontrolled" rent, R is rent (controlled  or not), and XB are the
vectors of demand (or hedonic) determinants and coefficients; m is the error
term.
Randall Olsen (1980)  has proposed a simple consistent estimator for such
models.  In brief, the method works as follows.  Estimate a linear  probability
model for selection into the sample,  and then use the  predicted value from the
probability model to  construct  an explanatory  variable in  the  hedonic and  de.nand
regressions in turn.
2/  Censored samples are those in which observations on particular values of
the dependent variable (here "uncontrolled"  rent) are not available but
the  right  hand side  variables  are,  permitting  estimation  of  the  probability
of  being in the  selected  sample. Another important  class  of  problem,  where
the right hand side variables are also unobserved, is known as truncated
samples,  and is  more difficult to  handle.  See  Maddala (1986),  and  Heckman
(1979).
i/  Actually  a  set  of cutoffs  depending on  type of unit, but  the graph
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Even if the estimated regression coefficients change with the inclusion
of the correction  variable, the  prediction for individual  households may or may
not change.  Since the purpose of these regression models is predicting total
rent,  the  question  is  whether  the  selectivity bias  correction makes  much
difference  in  estimating  PmQc  and  PmQm,  and hence  the  final cost-benefit
results.'/
We applied Olsen's estimator in preliminary  work.  This procedure  made no
appreciable  difference  in  the  predictive  power  of  the  hedonic  or  demand
regressions;  nor did they  affect the  predictions themselves,  or the  cost-benefit
estimates derived  from  them.  The  estimates  of PmQm  and  PmQc  were the  same  within
3 percent  with  and without  the correction.  For  the rest  of  this paper,
therefore, we  report results based on models without  this correction.  The
alternative estimates are available on request.
Net versus Gross Rent
So far we have focused on net rents, that is on the monthly payment to
landlord for housing services.  However, we noted above that some households
pay advance and/or key money.  Some tenants also pay  directly for various
utilities or services associated with the dwelling.  In some markets tenants
pay for maintenance of houses, or even upgrade them.l8
In  Kumasi few  households  pay directly for  utilities.  Among other reasons,
they aren't often provided.  Few  rental households were  found to pay  for
maintaining their unit.  For this study gross rent is therefore defined as net
rent plus (when  relevant) the imputed  value of paying in advance. 21
Recall that advance payments can be converted into an approximate rent
equivalent RE:
./  See Butler (1983)  and Ozanne and Malpezzi (1985) for more details on the
robustness of predictions versus robuqtness of coefficients.
t./  Malpezzi (1986)  describes these in some detail for Cairo.  Side payments
--  key  money,  utilities,  tenant  expenditures  on  maintenance  and  upgrading -
- accounted for a significant fraction of gross rent in Cairo.
2/  For  households which have paid advances in  the past which have amortized,
gross rent and net rents are equal.ESTIMATES  OF COSTS AND  BENEFITS  73
n
A - Z  RE/(l+r+p)t
t-l
where  A  - advance  payment
n - number  of  periods  in  advance
r - real discount rate
p - rate of price increase
t - tivte  period.
Figure  5.2:  Advance  by  Length  of  Tenure
Some  105  out  of  754  sample  60  000 Ced.s  N  (OvtoisRenters)100
households  made  advance  payments  in  lieu  _  u8w,mo
of  rent  for  a  specified  period  (14  Aso  A-  X  +eow.  ao N
percent). A  nominal  discount  rate  of  20  am 1.6|Wb  k.m
40  b
percent  was used to  calculate the  rental  6t  e
equivalent.  While it might be expected  e  3
that  households  with  higher incomes  would  m  40 0  20 
be willing to pay higher advances  to  n
secure  a rental  unit of their  choice,  '  t<4/  \  20
advances  were .iot  highly  correlated  with  e
total  consumption.  ' 
teRgth  ot Tenure  (Years)
Figure  5.2  shows  that,  according
to  the  sample  of  105,  at  least  some  advances  have  increased  markedly  in  recent
years.  Since  1980  the  median  advance  --  of  those  wno  report  advance  --  is  on
the  order  of  2-12,000  cedis,  and  up  to  maxima of  15-50,000.  The  latter  represent
50-167  months  typical  rent.  The  relative  frequencv  oI  households  paying  advance
has  also  increased.
Anecdotal  Rrecent  Evidence  on  I-.crease  in  Advances
The  1986  survey  was  carried  out  at  a  time  wher.,  with  the  recent  decree
raising  controlled  rents  to  a  level  above  that  to  which  rents  had  crept
informally,  landlords  were  satisfied.  Since  that  time,  however,  prices  have
risen  very  rapidly  while  rents  have  not  and  landlords  have  begun  to  demand
advances  from  all-comers.  By early  1988,  anecdotal  evidence  pointed  to  all  new
tenancies  being  subject  to  between  two  ard  five  years'  rent  in  advance  and  even
some  existing  tenants  being  asked  for  their  rent  to  be  paid  yearly  in  advance.
At  that  time,  the  general  belief  appeared  to  be  that  an  amount  of,  say.  twenty
times  C300  would  last  twenty  months  unless  controlled  renots  were  increased.
However,  this  appears  to  have  been  over-optimistic  on  the  tenant's  part.
in  February,  1989,  it  was  universal  practice  to  ask  for  advances  from  all
renters,  except  where  landlords  had  -trong  personal  relationships  (an  advantage
for  particularly  long-standing  tenants).  Renters  were  reportirng  that  their
advances  were  being  used  up  at  a  rate  of  about  C1,OO0  (US$4)  per  month  per  room
and  the  advance  demanded  was  C50,000  (US$190)  or  more  for  a  single  room  or
C250,000  (US$960)  for  a  self-contained  apartment.74  RENT  CONTROL  IN  KUMASI,  GHANA
Any renter  opposing  the  landlord  and seeking  satisfaction  from  the  Rent
and  Housing  Committee  may  win  his  case  but  would  find  that  the  provision  in  the
rent  laws  allowing  eviction  in  order  to  accommodate  the  owner's  family  members
would  nullify  his  pyrrhic  victory.
Wnile advances  are and  were growing  in amount  and frequency,  they  were
not sufficiently  widespread  in 1986 to have much effect on rents in the
aggregate. Table  5.2  presents  the  comparisor,  of  net  and  gross  rents. While  it
doesn't  make  much  difference  with  the  1986  sample,  we  will  henceforth  work  with
gross  rents.
Table 5.2:  Gross and Net Rents Compared
Net  Net Rent to  Gross  Gross Rent to
Rent  Consumption  Rent  Consumption
(cedis)
Units  Pavinx  Some  Advance
Median  300  .04  318  .04
N  105  105  105  105
All.  Units
Median  300  .02  300  .02
N  754  722  754  722
Note:  Unvei6hted statistics, government and high cost units omitted.
C.  PcQc: Current  Rent  Paid
The  first  piece  of information,  the  rent  currently  paid  in the  controlled
unit, PcQc,  is directly  available  from the  sample  survey. Again,  to improve
comparability,  government  and  high  cost  units  are  omitted  from  the  sample. The
distribution  of gross  rents  paid  in  the  two  remaining  (arnd  largest)  sectors  Is
presented  in  Table  5.3  and  corresponding  Figure  5.3.11
12/  In  Figure  5.3,  as in  similar  figures  below,  the  first  and  third  quartiles
of each variable are represented  by the top and bottom 'ticks" or
horizontal  line;  the  median  by the  middle  tick.ESTIMATES OF  COSTS AND BENEFITS  75
Table 5.3:  Controlled and 'Uncontrolled' Rents Paid  by Sector (Cedis)
+---  Gross Rent  ---+  +-  Gross Rent/Consumption+
Q3  Median  Q1  N  Q3  Median  Q1  N
All Renters
Tenement  300  300  300  403  .03  .02  .02  383
Indigenous  300  300  200  351  .04  .02  .02  339
Both  300  300  202  754  .03  .02  .02  722
"Controlled" Renters
Tenement  300  300  300  359  .03  .02  .02  341
Indigenous  300  250  200  318  .03  .02  .02  307
Both  300  300  200  677  .03  .02  .02  648
"Uncontrolled' Renters
Tenement  866  500  500  44  .05  .04  .03  42
Indigenous  929  600  500  33  .09  .07  .04  32
Both  875  600  500  77  .08  .05  .03  74
Note:  Unveighted  statistics, high cost and government excluded.
Figure 5.3:  Rents by Sector (Cedis)
The  striking  results  are  the  lack  of
variation  in rents  in both indigenous  and  1000
tenement  controlled  sectors,  and the  much
larger  variation  in "uncontrolled"  rents.  800
The  difference  between  sectors  is  dominated
by  differences between controlled and  600  --  - - ----
uncontrolled  units  within  sectors. Recall
that  the  indigenous  sector  has  more  single  400
rooms  and  more  houses  built in swish. Their
controlled  rents  are somewhat  lower  as a  200  .-.  e  ...
result  (see  Table  2.5,  above).
lOndig  Cont  Inoig Uncont  Tenmt  Cont  lenmt Uncont
D.  Estimating  PmOm  With  a  Cross  Country  Model  of  Housing  Demand
This  section  presents  a  variant  of the  cross-country  housing  demand  model
of Malpezzi  and  Mayo (1985,  1987a,  1987b)  which  can  be used  to estimate  market
rr;nts  in  the  absence  of  controls.  These  estimates  can  be  used  to  predict  market
-;ents  in  cities  where  no  uncontrolled  sector  exists  for  comparison;  to test  for
bias and to adjust  rents  in the  uncontrolled  sector  if such rents  have been
affected  by controls  as in  Fallis  and  Smith's  model;  and  as  an independent  check
on other  methods.
First  we  will  describe  Malpezzi  and  Mayo's  model  generally,  then  we will
present  new estimates  from  a variant  of that  model.  Malpezzi  and  Mayo first76  RENT  CONTROL  IN  KUMASI,  GHANA
estimated  a simple  log-linear  model of housing  expenditures  in each of the
sixteen  cities:
ln R  =  a + Ey (ln  y) + bH + cH  2  +  U
where  R is rent;  y is income;  H is  household  size;  E. is  the  estimated  income
elasticity  of demand;  a, b, and c are regression  coefficients,  and u is an
estimated  disturbance. The  model  w_s stratified  for  renters  and owners. For
renters,  rent  was defined  as  net rent,  exclusive  of separate  utility  payments.
For  owners,  rent  was defined  variously,  and  in  order  of  availability,  as owner
imputations  of  net  rent,  hedonic  estimates  of  net  rent  based  on  applying  renter-
based  hedonic  price equations  to owners'  housing  characteristics,  or imputed
rents  based  on applying  a fixed  amortization  ratio  (from  one  percent  to  one  and
one-half  percent  per month  depending  on the  country)  to owners'  estimates  of
housing  value. While  other  functional  forms  were  tried,  and  other  demographic
variables  were included  in alternative  estimating  equations,  results  from  the
simple  log-linear  model  were  found  to  provide  adequate  fits  and  robust  findings
regarding  major  demand  parameters.Table 5.4:  Malpezzi and Mayo Demand Results  M
Renters  Owners
Log  BB  HE size  R-squared  Log  HH  HH size  R-squared
Country  City  Constant  Income  Size  Squared  N  Constant  Income  Size  Squared  N  0
(-3
Colombia  Bogota  (coef)  1.11  0.66  0.09  -0.006  0.40  0.77  0.15  -0.00  -0.003  0.49  0
(1978)  (std err)  0.03  0.03  0.003  1016  0.03  0.04  0.003  821  En
Cali  (eoef)  2.81  0.44  0.13  -0.006  0.27  1.25  0.69  -0.05  -0.000  0.38
(1978)  (std err)  0.06  0.07  0.007  257  0.06  9.7  0.005  256
Egypt  Cairo  (coef)  0.25  0.46  -0.17  0.010  0.16  0.89  0.17  0.12  -0.009  0.06
(1981)  _-td err)  0.06  0.09  0.008  303  0.12  0.21  0.019  76
Beni Suef  (coef)  -1.2  0.51  0.38  -0.047  0.25  -0.09  0.42  0.14  -0.003  0.23
(1981)  (std err)  0.14  0.28  0.029  63  0.13  0.14  0.010  63  t
El Salvador  Santa Ana  (coef)  0.37  0.48  0.13  -0.014  086  -2.5  1.11  -0.06  -0.004  0.3714
(1980)  (std e.r)  0.11  0.08  0.007  131  0.11  0.12  0.009  169
Sonsonate  (coaf)  0.79  0.50  -0.10  0.007  0.16  0.39  0.79  -0.13  0.001  0.57
(1980)  (std err)  0.12  0.09  0.007  83  0.15  0.17  0.012  27
Ghana  Kumasi  (coef)  0.82  0.33  0.02  0.000  0.11  - - --
(1980)  (std err)  0.04  0.03  0.002  814  - - --
India  Bangalore  (coef)  0.66  0.58  -0.08  0.003  0.18  2.84  0.43  -0.17  0.007  0.15
(1975)  (Istd  err)  0.04  0.04  0.00Z  1041  0.08  0.06  0.004  205
Jamaica  Kingston  (coef)  -0.12  0.70  0.16  -0.012  0.30  - - -
(1975)  (atd err)  0.08  0.07  0.007  223  - - --
Korea  Seoul  (coef)  5.04  0 45  0.07  -0.004  0.15  6.06  0.44  -0.04  0.002  0.12
(1979)  (std err)  0.03  0.04  0.005  952  0.04  0.04  0.003  952
Busan  (coef)  6.26  0.31  0.05  -0.001  0.08  5.93  0.45  -0.05  0.002  0.10
(1979)  (std err)  0.07  0.06  0.006  508  0.08  0.10  0.011  296
Taegu  (coef)  4.95  0.44  0.03  -0.C03  0.23  6.32  0.47  -0.19  0.011  0.18
(1979)  (std err)  0.07  0.07  0.008  292  0.08  0.08  0.006  152
Kwangju  (c4ef)  2.70  0.b2  0.09  -0.002  0.32  7.53  0.41  -0.27  0.018  0.14
(1979)  (Istd  err)  0.09  0.13  0.014  134  0.11  0.18  0.016  84
Oth.K.c.  (coef)  3.33  0.54  0.04  0.002  0.17  2.16  0.79  -0.12  0.003  0.26
(1979)  (3td  -r)  0.05  0.05  0.007  1000  0.05  0.05  0.005  779
Philippines  Davao  (coe..  -1.6  0.88  0.00  -0.002  0.42  -3.2  0.99  0.04  -0.004  0.28
(1979)  (std err)  0.03  0.05  0.002  1376  0.04  0.04  0.003  1968
Manila  (coef)  1.27  0.56  0.01  -0.002  0.22  2.46  0.57  -0.02  -0.000  31
(1983)  (std err)  0.04  0.04  0.003  605  0.04  0.05  0.003  390
U.S.  Pittsburg  (coef)  3.07  0.26  -0.02  -0.002  0.15  3.50  0.18  0.08  -0.005  0.21
(1975)  (Istd  err)  0.02  0.04  0.005  946  0.01  0.02  0.002  2378
Phoenix  (coaf)  3.68  0.18  0.12  -0.015  0.13  3.62  0.18  0.13  -0.011  0.24
(1975)  (std err)  0.02  0.03  0.005  918  0.01  0.01  0.002  228478  RENT CONTROL IN  KUMASI,  GHANA
Table  5.4 presents  those  estimated  parameters  of  housing  expenditure
functions  for  renters  and  owners.  In  general  the  results  are  remarkably
consistent  with  results  from  developed  countries  (see  Mayo,  1981).  The
regression  fits  were  typical  for  this  type  of  equation:  typical  R-squared
statistics  are  in  the  0.1  to  0.3  range  (minimum  is  0.06,  maximum,  0.57).  Fits
were  similar  for  owners  and  renters.
The  median  of  all  renters  income  elasticities  was  0.49;  developing  country
elasticities  ranged  from  0.31  (Pusan,  Korea)  to  0.88 (Davao,  the  Philippines).
Most  clustered  between  0.4 and  0.6 with  estimated  U.S.  elasticities  lower  than
developing  country  estimates.  The  median  of  all  point  estimates  of  owner  income
elasticities  was  0.46, with  extremes  of  0.17 in  Cairo  and  1.11  in  Santa  Ana,  El
Salvador.  The  majority  of  point  estimates  lie  between  0.4  and  0.6.  In  9  of  14
cases  where  comparison  was  possible,  estimated  developing  country  owner  income
elasticities  were  greater  than  those  of  renters.  Comparing  expenditure  equations
across  countries  revealed  practically  no  systematic  variation  of  income
elasticities  with  country  or  city  income  level  or  population  size,  but
considerable  variation  in  dollar-adjusted  intercepts,  which  were  positively
related  to  average  city  income.  Rent-to-income  ratios  therefore  declined
systematically  with  income  within  cities,  but  increased  with  income  across
cities.
Figure  5.4:  Rent  to  Income  Ratios,  Cros-  Country  Model
These  relationships  are  shown  Pent  to income  (Penters)
graphically  in  Figure  5.4  for  renters  in  100*
four  representative  cities  . Seovl
Relationships  for  owners  are  similar,  80%  ..  . ..
although  average  rent-to-income  ratios  +  cairo
are  invariably  higher  at  every  income  %14
>evel  for  owners  within  given  housing
iarkets.  40
The  relationships  portrayed  in  20%  . .....
Figure  5.4  are  very  similar  to  the
consumption  patterns  within  and  across  50  100  150  200  250  300  350  400  450  500  550
countries  documented  by  Kuznets  (see  Income  in 1981  U  S Dollars
Kuznet3,  1961  and  other  works  citedSource  Malpezzi  and Mayo (t985)
therein).  Qualitatively,  housing  consumption  is  remarkably  smaller  at  various
income  levels  than  are  between-country  differences  at  lifferent  average  income
levels.  Malpezzi  and  Mayo  explored  alternative  theoretical  explanations  for
these  results  and  then  tested  a  series  of  long  run  cross-country  housing
expenditure  models.  The  simplest  cross-country  model  parallels  the  log-linear
within-country  model,  but  with  the  addition  of  a  price  term,  the  relative  price
of  housing  which  was  constructed  using  data  from  Kravis,  Heston  and  Summers
(1982).
Defining  R  as  rent,  y  as  household  income,  and  p.  as  the  relative  price
of  housing,  Malpezzi  and  Mayo  originally  estimated  the  following  models  for
renters  and  owners  in  developing  countries:ESTIMATES  OF COSTS  AND BENEFITS  79
Renters:






ln R - 3.57 +  1.38 ln y +  0.65 ln PH
(0.35)  (0.50)
R2  - 0.76
d.f.  - 11
where  rent,  and income  are  city  means  converted  to 1981  U.S.  dollarsll',  and  pH
is  the  Kravis-Heston-Summers  price  index,  with  the  U.S.  relative  price  normalized
at one.  Standard  errors  as in parentheses;  R2 is the multiple  correlation
coefficient,  and  d.f.  are the  numbers  of degrees  of freedom.
The implications  of these  models,  which  were  confirmed  with alternative
specifications,  are  straightforward.  In  the  very  long  run,  housing  consumption
is  income  elastic.  Price  elasticities  are  smaller  in  absolute  value  than  income
elasticities,  although  confidence  intervals  are  quite  wide  for  the  former.  Long-
run income  elasticities  are estimated  to be slightly  higher  for renters  than
owners. This  means  that  as cities'  economies  develop  over the  very long  run,
that  owner  and  rencer  consumption  patterns  increase  at  a similar  pace,  ceteris
Raribus. However,  because  renter  price  elasticities  are  estimated  to  be  higher
than  owner  elasticities,  the  net  effect  of  both  incomes  and  prices  rising  with
economic  development  is that  owners'  consumption  increase  faster  than  renters'
consumption  over  most  of the  range  of the  data.
However, Malpezzi and  Mayo's sample included both  controlled and
uncontrolled  markets. While  they  tested  for  rent  control's  effects,  no precise
or robust  effect  was found  in their  sample.12J  The cross  country  price  term,
which  was  (unsurprisingly)  lower  for  the  controlled  markets,  seemed  to  be  picking
up  most  of rent  control's  measured  effects. But  the  sample  was  too  small  to  be
particularly  confident  about  this  result,  and  it  is  singularly  inappropriate  as
a maintained  hypothesis  for  cross  country  estimates  of demand  used to  evaluate
11/  Note that  in a log-linear  expenditure  equation  the  coefficient  of price
is  equal  to one  plus  the  price  elasticity;  thus  the  price  elasticity  is
the  estimated  coefficient  minus  one,  or -0.85  and -0.35  for  owners.
12/  Malpezzi  and  Mayo  did  not  report  these  results  in  any  of their  published
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costs  and  benefits  of controls. Therefore  Malpezzi  et al.  (1988)  developed  new
estimates  here  using  only  uncontrolled  markets.
Malpezzi  et al.  reestimated  the  cross  country  model  segmenting  the  samples  by
controlled  and  uncontrolled  markets.3  Reestimating  the  model  above  yields  the
following  estimates  for  uncontrolled  markets:
Uncontrolled  Renters:




For controlled  markets and the original  data the model yields the
following:
Controlled  Renters:
ln R - - 5.934 +  1.709 ln y
(1.412)  (0.286)
R2  _  .85
d.f.-  5
As expected,  the  point  estimate  of the  elasticity  from  this  uncontrolled
sample  is  greater  than  one,  although  the  limited  degrees  of freedom  reduces  the
precision  of the estimates  from  M&M's  original  model.  Using  average  sample
incomes  of C12,500  and  an exchange  rate  of 90 cedis  to the  dollar  this  model
predicts  an average  rent-to-income  ratio  of .09  for  Kumasi  in 1986.
Of course  these  estimates  from  the  uncontrolled  variant  of the  Malpezzi
and  Mlayo  model  are  estimates  of  the  long  run  equilibrium  average  rent-to-ir.come
ratio. In  order  to  predict  the  uncontrolled  rent  (PmQm)  of  particular  households
in  a  controlled  sample--or  of  representative  households  at  an  income  level  above
or  below  the  average-  -it  is  necessary  to  combine  an  estimate  of  the  average  rent-
to-income  ratio  derived  from the  cross  market  model,  with an assumed  within-
market income elasticity.  Malpezzi and  Mayo  found most within-market
elasticities  for  renters  ranged  between  .4  and  .6. If  anything  these  estimates
may have a slight  downward  bias, so we suggest  using an income  elasticity
estimate of 0.6.W4
D/  The Kravis-Heston-Summers  price  term  was dropped  from the  new, smaller
model  for  reasons  described  in  Malpezzi  et  al.  pp.  47-57.
4J/  Analysis  of  the  individual  within-city  elasticities  from  Malpezzi  and  Mayo
was  unable to discern  any relationship  between the elasticities  and
income,  or  between  the  elasticities  and  the  presence  of controls.ESTIMATES OF  COSTS AND BENEFITS  81
There  is no question that these estimates could be improved  with a still
better cross country model.  While these estimates are reasonable and we are
confident of their utility for the rent control study, further improving the
precision of these estimates can have a high payoff.  12I
"Uncontrolled"  Rents Compared to Predictions from the Cross-Country Model
Table 5.4 showed typical controlled rents to be less than 2 percent of
total  consumption.  Median rent-to-consumption  level for  uncontrolled  units was
.05.  Using the median income for  Kumasi in 1986 cedis, Malpezzi et al. (1988)
predicted that the median rent-to-income level would be  .09 in the absence of
controls.  However, the median income in the "uncontrolled" sector is about
14,750 cedis, compared to about 12,500 for the city as a whole.  Using an
elasticity of .6  we therefore derived a slightly lower estimate of the typical
uncontrolled rent-to-consumption  ratio, .08.
Figure 5.5:  Rent-to-Income  Comparisons,  Various  Models
Figure  5.5  presents  a  simple  A  14%
comparison  of  these  results.  The  bottom  e  12% - .....  ....
line  is  derived  from  the  actual  Ito  Predicted  .
controlled  data  (i.e.  constrained  '  1.r.........
estimates).  The middle  line  is from  the  c  8% -
"uncontrolled"  Kumasi  sample  Ors  6X - ................................. \.
(unadjusted).  The highest line is from  u  \ 
the "uncontrolled"  demand  estimates  from  V.
the cross z-ountry  model.  In Kumasi a  1  2%  -
household with a typical  monthly income  n  0%
of US$ 150 or more would have an actual  0  5  10 Cs  20  25  30
rent  to  income  ratio  of  0.025  in  thePred  1  Monthly  Consumption  (1000s)
controlled  sector  (see  Table  5.1).  Even Pred 2  From  Cross  Country Mode.
in  the  uncontrolled  sector  with  a
household  monthly income  of  US$ 195,  the rent  to income  ratio  is  still  only 0.05.
The prediction from the cross country model is .09 for the market, .08  for the
slightly higher income group in the uncontrolled sector.  It appears that the
net effect of the biases on "uncont:rolled"  rents discussed above and in Fallis
and Smith (1984) i5  to lower "uncontrolled"  rents.
Given data on household consumption, the average rent-to-income ratio,
and an assumed elasticity (.6), estimating PmQm for each household with the
cross  country  model  --  free  from  such  bias  --  is straightfcrward.  In addition,
when we estimate the  hedonic and demand relations  below  with the "uncontrolled"
lJ/  Particularly since there are many other uses of these estimates, such as
evaluating shelter projects and other government housing policies.  See
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sample, the sample rent will be  adjusted (multiplied by  1.6) to reduce the
bias.  wA
E.  Estimating PmOm With Kumasi Survey Data
As noted above, the rent that  households would pay if they were at their
equilibrium demand  at market prices  (PmQm) can also be  estimated from  the
household  survey.  Table  5.5 presents  the estimated  coefficients from  the
expenditure regression estimated using the sample of "uncontrolled" renters.
Only  households in the  tenement  and indigenous  sectors  are included. Households
and (especially)  units in the government  and high cost sectors are so different
from the rest of the sample that they were omitted.-71 The dependent variable
is gross rent, adjusted as described above (multiplied  by 1.6).
The  demand results  are  reasonable, with  an  R-squared  of  0.18.  The
estimated consumption elasticity is 0.28.  This is a low estimate compared to
others from the Malpezzi and Mayo results above.
The  relationship  between  rents  and  length  of  tenure  is  strong;
transformation of the log-log model shows rents falling about 15 percent per
year in  the first  few  years of tenure,  and around  1  percent  per year at 20  years.
The total discount at 20 years and beyond is about 40 percent. There have not
been many studies of this discount in developing countries; this i. high but
within range of estimates of length of tenure discounts for U.S. cities found
by Malpezzi, Ozanne and Thibodeau  (1981).  Household size is a weec demand
determinant.
j6/  See Malpezzi  (1;.o6)  pp. 129-139 and Fallis and Smith  (1984) for more
detailed justification.
l!  In general, if we know the "true" model a priori and have all the data
necessary to implement it, we could gain valuable information from the
omitted government and high cost units.  However neither condition is
satisfied, and  dropping these sectors  as unrepresentative is,  we  believe,
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Table 5.5i  Demand  Equations
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  Log  of  Gross  Rent  (Adjusted)
DEGREES OF  FREEDOM:  73
R-SQUARE:  .23  F:  5.18
R-SQUARED(ADJ):  .19  PROB>FP  .0010
STD
VARIABLE  ESTIMATE  ERROR  T  STAT  PROB>|TJ
Intercept  5.016  1.437  3.49  .0001
Log  of  Consumption  0.277  0.150  1.89  .0694
Log Length  of  Tenure  -0.283  0.079  -3.60  .0006
Household  Size  -0.001  0.029  -0.04  .9693
Household  Size  Squared  0.003  0.010  0.30  .7654
F.  Price  Elasticity  of Demand
The  fourth  piece  of information  for  the  Olsen  model,  the  price  elasticity
of demand, could not be directly  estimated  from the Kumasi housing data.
Malpezzi  and  Mayo (1985)  surveyed  estimates  of this  key parameter  in a number
of developing  countries,  and found  most estimates  lie  between  -0.5  and -1.0.
Hence  these  two  values  were  chosen  as  upper  and  lower  bounds  for  the  benefit-cost
measures.
G.  Estimating  PmOc  With  Hedonic  Indexes
Hedonic  regression  models  can  be used to estimate  the second  piece  of
information  required  - - PmQc,  the  rent  that  would  be  commanded  by the  ontrolled
units  in  the  absence  of controls.
Hedonic house price models have been widely used in environmental
economics  to estimate  air  quality  (Ridker  &  Henning,  1967);  neighborhood  parks
(Weicher  & Zerbst,  1973;  Hammer  et al,  1974);  lakes  and reservoirs  (Knetsch,
1964;  Darling,  1973);  aircraft  noise (Walters,  1975);  green  belts  (Correll  et
al,  1978;  Willis  and  Whitby,  1985);  land  use  zoning  (Avrin,  1977);  environmental
risk and  uncertainty  (Brookshire,  et a., 1985);  and option  prices  and  values
(Smith,  1985). Hedonic  price  models  are  also  common  in  housing  policy  analysis
and  have been extensively  used to estimate  the  berefits  of subsidized  housing
programs  (see,  for example,  Kraft and Olsen, 1977;  Olsen  and Barton,  1982;
Hammond,  1987;  and  Clemmer,  1984).
The  purpose  here,  however,  is  to  use  hedonic  price  models  to  estimate  PmQc
(market  price for  controlled  quantity)  by comparing  rents  for  different  kinds
of dwellings  in  the  controlled  and  uncontrolled  sector. Hedonic  equations  are
one way that rents for different  dwellings  can be compared,  or rents for
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The  hedonic  model  has the  form
R  f (S,  L, C)
where  R  - contract rent
S  structural  characteristics  of dwellings
L  - neighborhood  characteristics,  including
location  within  the  market
C  - contract  conditions  or characteristics
which  affect  the  price  such  as utilities
included  in the  rent,  length  of tenure
in dwelling, etc.i81
The  independent variables  (S,  L,  C)  represent  the  individual
characteristics  of the  dwelling,  and  the  regression  coefficients  are  estimates
of the  implicit  prices  of those  characteristics.  The  results  provide  estimated
prices  for  housing  characteristics.  It  is  then  possible  to  compare  twc  dwellings
by  using  these  prices  as  weights.  For  example  the  estimated  price  for  a  variable
measuring  the  number  of rooms  indicates  the  change  in  value  or rent  associated
with the  addition  or deletion  of one  room,  it indicates  in a dollar  and  cents
way  how  much "more  house"  is  provided  by a dwelling  with  an extra  room.
A  hedonic  model  can  be  used  to  estimate  the  implicit  prices  of  measurable
housing  characteristics  in  the  uncontrolled  market  sector. The  coefficients  of
this  model  can  then  be used  to  estimate  market  rents  for  the  controlled  sector
units.
Hedonic  Estimates
Table  5.6  presents  the  hedonic  index  for  76 "uncontrolled'  renters.  The
dependent  variable  is the natural  logarithm  of adjusted  gross  rent,  and the
independent  variables  are the  number  of rooms  occupied  by the  household,  that
number  squared,  the  number  of verandas  in the  unit,  the log  of the length  of
tenure,  and  a  set  of  dummy  variables  indicating  the  household's  exclusive  access
to a toilet,  whether  the  unit is  in the  indigenous  sector,  whether  the  unit is
built of swish.  The coefficients  of linear  variables  can be interpreted  as
(approximately)  the percentage  change in rent, given a unit change in the
variable  in  question.  The  coefficient  of log  variables  can  bi interpreted  as
the  percentage  change  in  gross  rent given  a percentage  change  in the  variable
(length  of tenure).  For dummy  variables  (eg.  exclusive  use  of toilet),  the
coefficient  is approximately  the  percentage  change  in rent compared  to some
omitted  category  (not  having  such  use).
j,2/ Note  that  household  characteristics  which  do  not  affect  the  price  per  unit
of services -- such as income --  do not enter the hedonic regression.
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Table 5.6:  Hedonic index
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  Log of Adjusted Gross Rent
DEGREES OF  FREEDOM:  76
R-SQUARE:  .83  F:  47.26
R-SQUARED(ADJ):  .81  PROB>F:  .0001
PARAMETER  STANDARD  PROB  >
VARIABLE  ESTIMATE  ERROR  T  STATISTIC  ITI
Intercept  5.7100  0.2574  22.18  .0001
Number of Rooms  0.7517  0.1654  4.55  .0001
Rooms  Squared  0.1009  0.0285  -3.54  .0007
Number of Verandas  0.0149  0.0483  0.31  .7587
Log Length of Tenure  -.0C98  0.0429  -0.23  .8204
Exclusive Use of Toilet  0.8864  0.0983  9.02  .0001
Indigenous Sector  0.0061  0.0756  0.08  .9361
Swish Construction  0.1204  0.0911  -1.32  .1908
The above may appear to be a short list of characteristics on which to
base a  hedonic  model and  market  price estimates. But recall  that  we  have already
limited  the sample to the tenement  and indigenous  samples.  Also, as Follain and
Malpezzi (1979) have shown, a simple specification of 5 to 10 per structure
variables  (rooms, baths, etc.) produces about as good a fit as 40 variables.
In other woris, prediction of the dependent variable (our purpose here) is not
sensitive t'  he number of variables, given a reasonable reduced set and fit
(Boland,  1979).  When the focus is on individual  implicit  prices, specification
is more critical (Butler, 1982; Ozanne and Malpezzi 1986).
In general the regression results are quite reasonable.  The overall fit
of the equation compares very favorably with such models estimated in other
countries: over 80 per cent of the  variance in the log of rent is explained by
the model.  Coefficients are generally of the expected sign.  However, note the
large coefficient  for the  exclusive  use of  a toilet,  and the  fact :hat  the  number
of verandas  and  the  log  length of  tenure variables  have  no  -tatistically
discernible  effect  on  rents.  Also,  there appears  to be  no  statistically
discernable difference between tenement and indigenous sectors, once we have
controlled for other characteristics  of the  units.
H.  Cost-Benefit Measures
Costs and Benefits from the Cross-Country  Model
This model is  very simple:  we compute the predicted rent from the cross-
country demand model and compare it to the actual cent paid.  In the notation
above, we are comparing PmQm to PcQc.  In other words this  produces no estimate
of the  household's exact  valuation of the  benefits,  and is  at  best  an approximate
measure of the cost of controls PmQc-PcQc.86  RENT  CONTROL  IN  KMMASI,  GHANA
Table  5.7:  Summary  Cost-Benefit  Measures  From  Cross  Country  Model
Actual  PredLcted
Rent  Rent  Difference
PcQc  P,Qm  PmQm-cQc
Tenement  Sample
Mean  290  1179  887
Q3  300  1334  1043
Median  300  1162  868
Ql  300  999  711
N  358  338  338
Representative
Consumer  300  t62  862
Indigenous  Sample
Mean  244  1040  795
Q3  300  1186  955
Median  250  1025  766
Q1  200  829  584
N  322  312  312
Representative
Consumer  250  1025  775
Figure  5.6;  Rents  and  Predictions  from  the  Cross  Country
The implicit  assumption  is thatMoel
the  cross  country  demand  results  can  be  1400
used to predict long run competitive  1200
equilibrium  rents  in Kumasi. While  we  _
have confidence  in these  cross  country
demand  models,  it is clear  that in any  8oo0
event  the difference  between  estimates
of PmQm  and  actual  PcQc  is large  enough  bOO
to dominate  any likely  imprecision  of  400
the  estimates.  Table  5.7  and
corresponding  Figure  5.6  present  200  T
summaries  of the  results. Note  that  rows  O  -
of  the  table  do  not  add  up  exactly,  Pcoc  PmOm  PmOm-PcOc
because  the  sum or  difference  of  medians  Note  Lostsscannot  be  distinguisned
(or  of  other  statistics)  is  not  generally
the  median  of  the  sum  or difference.  The  controlled  rents  are  overwhelmintiy
in  the  range  of  200  to  00  cedis. The  estimates  of  uncontrolled  rents  from  the
cross  country  model  range  .rom  800  to 1300. These  results  are  so strong  that
they  could  be described  as  a "smoking  gun."ESTIMATES  OF COSTS  AND BFENEFITS  87
PmQm-PcQc  is the  estimated  difference  between  expenditures  with and
without  controls. We can  compare  these  results  with  those  from  Olsen's  method,
presented  in  the  next  section.  How  efficient  is  the  transfer  of  purchasing  power
to tenants,  i.e.  are  the  benefits  received  by tenants  in line  with  the  costs?
Costs  and  Benefits  Constructed  from  the  Hedonic  and  Demand  Eguations
Table  5.8 and  corresponding  Figure  5.7  present  estimates  of the  various
welfare  measures  and their  components,  using % variant  of Olsen's  model  which
was  described  in  Chapter  4.
Each welfare measure can be  calculated  separately  for each sample
observation  (the  approach  used  to derive  the  sample  statistics);  or calculated
for  a  representative  consumer,  constructed  using,  say.  medians  of  the  components.
The  two  approaches  do  not  yield  exactly  the  same  results.  Again,  note  that  rows
of  the  table  do  not  add  up,  because!  the  sum  or  difference  of  medians  (or  of  other
statistics)  is  not  generally  the  median  of the  sum  or difference.
The  representative  consumer  rows  are  calculated  for  a  representative  renter
using  median  values  of the  components  PcQc,  PmQc  and  PmQm. Computing  costs  and
be-iefits  separately  for  each  observation  allows  us  to  study  their  distriLution.
But  since  the  true  demand  relation  is  unknown,  and  every  household  is  off  their
estimated  demand  curve,  there  is  no information  in the  sample  to sort  out  how
much  of  the  difference  between  costs  and  benefits  is  due  to  the  stochastic  nature
of the  demand  relation,  and  how  much  is  due  to  rent  control  (Olsen  and  Agrawal,
1982;  halpezzi,  1986;  Gyourko  and  Linneman,  1986).  However,  unlike  Malpezzi
(1986)  and  the  other  studies  cited,  we see  from  Table  5.8  that  both  approaches
yield  similar  results  in the  Kumasi  case.88  RENT CONTROL IN  KUMASI,  GHANA
Table  5.8:  Cost-Benefit Measures From Survey Ccmand and Hedonic Models
Current  Market  Est.d.  Median
Cont-  Rent  for  Rent  Cost  of  Tenant  EffLciency,
rolled  Current  with no  Rent Control  Benefits  Ep--l
Rent  Unit  Controls  Subsidy  1  2  (Beneflt/Cost)
PcQc  PmQc  PMQm  (PmQC-PcQc)  (Ep--i) (Ep--0.5)
Tenement Samole
Mean  290  613  1094  .32  106  -264
Q3  300  580  1220  287  221  125
Median  300  574  1040  274  135  -76  0.50
Q1  300  570  909  270  14  -415
N  358  343  328  343  328  328
Representative
Consumer  300  574  1040  274  122  -105  C.45
Indigenous Sample
Mean  244  563  1105  319  72  -382
Q3  300  580  1205  370  221  80
Median  250  574  1044  291  123  -127  0.41
Ql  200  513  910  275  -17  -542
N  322  319  311  319  310  310
Representative
Consumer  250  574  1044  324  169  -61  0.52
The  key results  from  Table  5.8  are:
(a)  Renters  pay  a  fraction  of the  estimated  market  rents  for  their  units.
The rent  paid is  only  43 percent  of the  estimated  market  rent  in the
indigenous  sector,  and  52  percent  in  the  tenement  sector.  Furthermore,
while  the  controlled  rents  PcQc  hardly  vary,  the  estimated  market  rents
PmQc  vary  with  size  and  type  of  unit. Market  demand  PmQm  varies  even
more.
(b)  The median  cost of the subsidy  implied  by these  rent reductions  is
estimated  to  be about  274  cedis  per  month  in the  tenement  and  291  in
indigenous  sector.
(c)  But  household  would (we  estimate)  spend  even  more on housing  in the
absence  of controls. Median  PmQm  is  over  1000  cedis  in  both  sectors.
(d)  Comparing  PmQc and PmQm it appears  that while  units rent for less
because  of  controls,  households  would  spend  even  more  at  market  prices;
that  is,  consumption  of  housizlb  services  has  been  greatly  reduced  under
controls.
(e)  Rent control  imposes  a landlord  cost (PmQc-PcQc),  which  exceeds  the
net benefit to tenants  in both sectors.  This cost to landlords
approximates  only the static  cost of rent control.  Dynamic  costs,
which  can  also  be large,  are  discu_.sed  in the  next  chapter.ESTIMATES  OF  COSTS AND BENEFITS  89
FLgure  5.7:  Cost  Benefit  Me.sureo  by  Sector
(f)  Unlike some previous  studies
(Malpezzi,  1986),  net  benefits
calculated  for  the  single  Tenement  Sector  Indigenous  Sector
"representative  consumer"  are  soo____
reasonably  close  to  the  sample
median  of benefits  calculated  1  1  ±
separately  for  each  household.  100  0
(g)  The  "transfer  efficiency"  '  I
(ratio  of benefVts  to costs)  _
is therefore  low.  If Ep--l
(the  most  "favorable"
assumption  in  terms  of
controls'  efficiency),  the  5  ma  mO,  P.O  C.[  D  .. i  I  b(,  PPQe  cO.  CM  M. I  a..  ,
efficiency  is  40-50  percent.
Tenants receive  net benefits
which  are  less  than  half  the  static  cost  to landlords. If the  price
elasticity  is on the  order  of -0.5,  net  benefits  to  most tenants  is
negative;  both landlords  and (most)  tenants  are made worse off by
controls.
(h)  While  costs  and  benefits  are large  relative  to rents  paid,  they  are
small  relative  to income. The cost  of the  subsidy  is  usually  on the
order  5f 2-3  percent  of  consumption.  Net  tenant  benefits  are,  at  best,
negligible  compared  to  total  consumption.
(i)  These  estimates  of  PmQm  are  smaller  than  those  taken  directly  from  the
cross  country  model (above),  but are  of the  same  order  of  magnitude.
This  is  not  surprising,  since  we  also  used  the  cross  country  estimates
to "calibrate"  our estimates  of uncontrolled  rents due to biases
discussed  above.  While the exact results  here would change  given
different  cross  country  estimates,  the  qualitative  results  presented
would  not  change.
Figure  5.8:  Changes  in  Consumers  Surplus
With  these  results  we  can put some  for  Typical  Tenants
numbers  on  the  graphs  from  the  previous  Price Per  Unit of  Housing  Services
theoretical  chapter.  Figure  5.8  presents
such  a diagram. Normalizing  the  market
price per unit of housing services at
one,  we  estimate that  the  typical
tenement  household  would consume  1040  3
units  of  housing  services  in  the  absence
of  controls  and  other  market 2\
imperfections.  In  fact we  observe
households consuming 574 units, butt  '
spending  only 300 (i.e.  the price  per 0  A  A  .
unit of housing  services  is 300/574  - o  250  5  750  1.000  1,250  1,500  1.750  2.000
.52,  or  about  half  the  market  price).  QUantily  of  Housing services
Two  demand  curves  are  drawn,  representing
the two alternative  assumed  price  elasticities  of -1  and -0.5,  respectively.
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consume  more  housing  at the lower  controlled  price  than at the  higher  market
price. Depending  on  which  demand  curve  we use,  we estimate  they  would  like  to
consume  1400  to  2000  units  of  housing  services  (for  which  they  would  pay  roughly
700 to 1000  cedis  in 1986  controlled  prices). But they  are constrained  by a
shortage  of  appropriate  units  at  the  lower  price,  and  they  end  up  consuming  less,
i.e.  574  units  for  C300. They  benefit  from  the  lower  rent  (a  C274  subsidy  from
landlords)  but  they  also  lose  from  consuming  less  housing  than  they  would  consume
in  the  absence  of  controls.  As  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  this  loss  can
be  measured  as the  area  under  the  demand  curve  and  above  the  market  price  line,
i.e. triangle  ABC or A'BC.  If the  price  elasticity  is -1,  the area  of this
triangle  implies  a loss  of 137  which  cancels  out  half  the  gain  from  lower  rent;
if the  price  elasticity  is -. 5, the  loss  is greater  than  the  gain from lower
rent,  and the  tenant  is  made  worse  off  by controls.
The bottom  line is that  rent control  reduces  the  rents  households  pay,
but the  benefit  of this  rent reduction  is  more or less  offset  by the  welfare
loss from  underconsumption  of housing. Three further  points  should  be made.
First,  tenants  often  perceive  that  controls  reduce  rents  even  more than they
do.i9/  Second,  these  estimates  don't  account  for "persistence"  or habit --
tenants  are  now  used to low  rents,  and change  will  be resisted. Many tenants
probably  see  no strong  link  between  low  rents  and  low  quality  housing. Third,
we estimate  that  existing  units  of typical  quality  would  rent  for  about  twice
current  rents,  but  that  households  would  typically  spend  more  than  three  times
current  rents  --  implying  higher  housing  consumption.  The  latter  is  a long  run,
comparative  static  result. How  to  get  from  here  to  there  --  especially  in  terms
of better housing --  is the topic of the next chapter.
I.  Distribution  of Costs  and  Benefits
Distribution  By Consumption
Table 5.9  and Figure 5.9 present summary cost-benefit  measures by
consumption  quartiles,  viz. the  median  within  each  quartile. The  median  rent
paid  for  each  unit (PcQc)  remains  constant  at  300  cedis. The  price  the  housing
unit  would  rent  for  in  the  absence  of  controls  (PmQc)  is  also  remarkably  stable.
Even  with  the  comparatively  modest  income  elasticity  estimated  above,  equilibrium
demand  in  the  absence  of  controls  rises  with  income. So  the  cost  of  the  subsidy
does not vary much with consumption,  but since  PmQm does rise higher  income
households  have the largest  "disequilibrium  in consumption,"  i.e. are most
constrained  by the  lack  of  housing  of suitable  quality. Richer  households  have
the smallest  benefits (or the largest losses in the case where Ep--.5).
9J/  In  what is,  to our  knowledge,  the  only  direct  test  of these  perceptions,
a study  prepared  for the city of Los  Angeles (USA)  by Hamilton  et al.
(1984),  found  that  tenants  there  believed  controls  reduced  their  rent  by
an  average  of 33  percent. Los  Angeles'  rent  control  system  is  very lax,
compared  to  Ghana's  --  for  example,  rents  are  indexed  to inflation,  newly
constructed  units  are  exempt,  and  rents  are  reset  when  tenants  move. As
a consequence,  the average  actual  rent  reduction  was estimated  at about
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Conversely,  poorer  households  receive  larger  benefits,  both absolutely  and  as
a percent  of total  consumption.
Table  5.9:  Sumnary  Cost-Benefit  Measures  By  Consumption
Mkt  Cost
Median  Rent  of  the
Household  House-  Controlled  Curr  Uncon-  Subsidy  Benefits  Benefit/
Consumption  hold  Rent  Unit  trolled  (PmQm-  1  2  Consump.
Quartile  Consumption  PcQc  PMQc  PmQm  PcQc)  (Ep--1)(Ep--0.5)  (Ep--l)
Median  Within  Top  Quartile  21,160  300  573  1127  275  82  -214  .003
Median  Within  lst  Quartile  6,800  00  574  944  282  187  45  .030
Median  Within  2nd  Quartile  10,799  300  574  1053  278  112  -140  .011
Median  Within  3rd  Quartile  14,250  300  574  1069  278  117  -129  .007
Figure  5.9:  Cost  Benefit  by  Consumption
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While  benefits  may  be  larger  for  poor  tenants,  again,  overall  they  are  small
relative  to the static  costs  imposed  on landlords. Further,  the  distribution
of  benefits  within  the  renter  class  is  not the  most important  redistribution;
more important  is redistribution  from  landlords  to tenants,  discussed  below.
Benefits  By Length  of Tenure
Sulmmary  cost-benefit  measures  were also tabulated  by length  of tenure
(Table  5.10  and  Figure  5.9). Here  the  picture  is  also  clear. Median  controlled
rents  do  not  fall  with  length  of  tenure;  market  rents  for  units  occupied  by  long
term  tenants  fall  by a little.
But we  estimate that market rents for long term tenants would be
considerably  lower  than  for  recent  movers.LQY  Therefore,  long  term  tenants  have
201  As  discussed  above,  and  in  Malpezzi,  Ozanne  and  Thibodeau  (1980),  pp.  78-
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the  smallest  estimated  disequilibrium  in  consumption,  and  the  largest  benefits.
Net  benefits  are  still  small  in  comparison  to  consumption.  Note  that  the  largest
net costs  are to recent  movers.  Zven  larger  unmeasured  costs  are imposed  on
households  who are  constrained  from  moving  at all.
Table 5.10:  Sumnary Cost-Benefit Measures By LenSth of Tenure
Mkt  Est
Curr  Rent  Rent
Length  Cont  Curr  no  Cost of  Benefits
of  Rent  Unit  Cont  Subsidy  1  2
Tenure  PcQc  PeQc  PmQm  PmQc-PcQc  Ep-1  EpO0.5
Median  Within  lst Quartile  4  300  580  1279  285  -52  -649
Median  Within  2nd  Quartile  9  300  575  1049  278  128  -93
Median  Within  3rd  Quartile  16  300  572  958  273  168  14
Median  Within  4th  Quartile  26  300  569  824  270  226  164
Figure 5.10:  Cost  Benefit  by  Length  of  Tenure
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With these  caveats,  Table  5.11  presents  a summary  of the  results. There
are 92 resident landlords in the sample,  who  report a median household
consumption  of  C15,668. In  Kumasi  there  are  many  landlords  with  modest  incomes,
and  many  tenants  with  substantial  incomes.  In  Ghana  as  in  other  countries  there
will  be  a significant  number  of  cases  where  rent  control  transfers  income  in  the
wrong direction. Of course,  with the  present  data the exact  extent  of this
problem  is  unknown.
The  landlord  median  is  about  36  percent  more  than  the  median  consumption
of 725  controlled  renters  (11,563),  and roughly  the  same as 105  uncontrolled
renters. In  other  words--as  Figure  5.10  highlights--while  landlords  are  richer
than tenants  "on average,"  there  is quite  a lot of overlap.  One fourth  ofESTIMATES  OF COSTS  AND BENEFITS  93
controlled  renter  consume  more  than  that  the  median  resident  landlord;  one  fourth
of resident  landlords  consume  less  than  the  median  tenant.
Malpezzi (1986)  presented  similar  evidence  for Cairo.  Again,  richer
landlords  certainly  own  more  buildings  and  more  rooms. But  in  Bangalore,  India,
Malpezzi  and  Tewari  (forthcoming)  were  able  to  control  for  the  amount  of  housing
capital  owned;  while  it  widened  the  gap  in  average  incomes  between  landlords  and
tenants,  significant  overlap  remained.
Table 5.11:  Landlord and Renter Consumption
Standard
Mean  Deviation  Median  Q3-Ql  Mode  I
Resident Landlords  18,381  12,124  15,668  11,024  10,500  92
Controlled Tenants  12,808  6,356  11,563  6,791  10,700  725
Uncontrolled Tenants  17,554  9,151  15,260  10,665  9,850  105
Figure  5.11:  Distribution of Consumption by Tenure
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The previous chapter  described  the costs and benefits  to individual
landlords  and  tenants.  What  are  the  market  wide  effects,  particularly  on  supply?
This  chapter  begins  by describing  the  supply  side  of the  market  in  more  detail.
To anticipate  the key results,  despite  very strict  controls  some additional
housing  is  being  supplied.  To explain  the  apparent  anomaly  between  rents  which
seem  to offer  no real  return  and  a rental  stock  which,  while  poorly  maintained
still  houses  two  thirds  of  the  city,  we  will  develop  a  simple  present  value  model
of  hous!.ng  investment.  While  simple,  the  model  captures  the  essentials  of the
landlord's  investment  decision,  as well as effects  on tenants  and government
revenue. The  model  will  also  be used  to  examine  alternatives  for  relaxation  or
decontrol.
A.  Housing  SuDppV in  Kumasi
As discussed  in detail  in Chapter 3, the great  majority  of Kumasi's
households  live  in  rental  housing,  and  most  of  those  in  rooms  in  compound  houses.
How  has  the  supply  of  this  housing  in  general  and  the  rental  stock  in  particular
changed  over time?  Here we discuss  new construction  (and  its  counterpart  of
removals  from the stock),  conversion  to other  uses,  and the supply  from the
existing  stock.
New  Construction
From  the  above,  it can  be seen  that  foregone  starts  on new  building  are
probably  the  most likely  response  to rent control. The evidence  for  Kumasi
shows substantial  support  for this.  According  to Census  data and Boapeah's
survey,  the  number  of houses  grew from 11,600  in 1960 to 21,000  in 1981 in
response  to,  but not keeping  up with,  population  growth  (Boapeah  and  Tipple,
1983).  By 1980,  impressionistic  evidence  showed  that the rate of growth  of
houses  in the  city  had already  slackened  as the  economic  problems  of the  late
seventies  reduced  real incomes,  and as rents fell behind  prices  and costs.
Apart from  a modest  spurt  of starts  during  the  Limann  government  (September,
1979  to December,  1981),  most  of  which  were  at the  very  top  end  of the  market,
there  had  been  a noticeable  decline  in  house  starts  since  the  mid  1970's.
The new survey  of the number of houses in Kumasi in 1988 supports
impressions  formed  in  1986  that  building  had  continued  only  slowly  since  1981.
Less  than 800  houses  appear  to  have  been  added  between  1982  and  1985  and  only
900  between  1986  and  1988,  with  the  index  for  houses  falling  further  behind  that
of population. 11 However,  the  increase  in  rooms  per  house  between  the  1980  and
1986  samples  (supported  by no increase  in occupancy  rates)  gives  some  grounds
to  believe  that  extensions  to  existing  houses  have  allowed  the  growth  in  rooms
to  keep  pace  with  population  growth  since  1980.
.1/  The  slow  rate  of  new  house  building  in  Kumasi  over  at  least  the  past  decade
is all the  more  notable  because  there  is a tradition  of gaining  status
through  building  houses  in  Kumasi;  so  much  so that  it  has  been  a  priority
over  building  in the  home  village  in some  periods.  (See  quotation  from
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Rental  Housing  Losses  --  Demolitions.  Conversions  and  Foregone  Starts
Demolitions  of houses appear  to be extremely  rare except  during the
A.F.R.C.  regime's  "house-cleaning"  in  1979  in  which  one  or two  houses  used  for
storing  contraband  were  blown  up  by the  army. However,  a  demolition  by  landlord
in  order  to evict  a tenant  occurred  in early  1989  in  Accra  causing  much  public
attention. A lack  of a tradition  supporting  individualistic  action  may have
inhibited  demolitions  in  order  to rebuild  for  commercial  purposes  even  in  prime
sites,  e.g.  the  town  center  and  around  Konfo  Anokye  Hospital/Bantama  High  Street.
In  theory,  rent  contrcl  ought  to  motivate  landlords  to  consider  alternative
uses  for  their  properties,  i.e.  conversion  to  non-  residential  uses.  There  is
little  evidence  of a spread  of the commercial  sector  spreading  into central
residential  areas. Throughout  the  city,  the  survey  showed  10%  of houses  with
any  rooms  in  commercial  use  and  only  3%  of  houses  with  any  rooms  converted  into
commercial  use since  1980.
In the  United  Kingdom,  rent  control  has  provided  incentives  for  landlords
to sell  their  property  into  owner  occupation  (although  many  tenants  also  have
security  of tenure  under  the  law,  see  Robinson,  1979 Mac'ennan,  1982). This
does not occur  in Kumasi  because  of a strong  taboo  .g  the  dominant  ethnic
group  against  selling  fixed  property. As Tipple  (1v .,  explains,  not  only  do
landlords  abhor  the  idea  of  selling,  but  also  the  tenants  would  be unwilling  to
buy  from  them. The  only  exception  to  this  has  been  the  State  Housing  Corporation
which  has  been selling  its  property  to sitting  tenants,  or  new  property  to the
allocatee,  for  many  years  as  the  rents  have  fallen  ever  further  behind  the  cost
of  maintenance.  In  the  survey  sample,  40%  of  households  in the  government  sector
owned  their  house,  22%  were  family  housers.  As a  quasi-government  organization,
SHC  cannot  act  with  economic  rationality  alone  and  allow  its  property  to  decay
in line  with its  returns. On the  other  hand,  it  has  been required  to  operate
on a commercial  basis  since  subsidies  were  removed  (Ghana,  1975). The result
has been a slow  decay  in the  housing  stock  still  in  SHC  ownership  and  few  new
houses  being  built  for  rental  by SHC.
Housing  From  the  Existing  Stock
Rent  Control  in  Kumasi  creates  an incentive  for  landlords  to allow  their
properties  to  deteriorate.  The  1986  survey  of  housing  in  Kumasi  shows  that  many
renters  live in housing  which,  structurally,  has been allowed  to fall into
disrepair. Rents  are  generally  insufficient  to cover  even  maintenance  costs.
The  hedonic  models  show  that,  while  these  units  would  rent  for  more than  the
controlled  price  in  the  open  market,  their  price  is  still  low  and  sometimes  less
than  what  tenants  would  be  willing  to  pay  for  a  room  with  additional  facilities.
Renters  pay little  but receive  little  in  return  except  a location  in the  city.
However,  impressionistic  evidence  indicates  that housing  deterioration  as a
result  of landlord  behavior  is compensated  for  somewhat  by tenants'  spending
resources  on  maintaining  and  improving  their  rooms,  probably  encouraged  by  their
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of stay to date.  In addition,  capital  raised  through  the recent  practice  of
demanding  rent  advances,  is  allowing  some  landlords  to  carry  out  repairs  between
tenancies  --  either  from  the  advance  or  by  asking  for  extra  to  cover  ranovations.
Quite  apart  from  rent  control,  the  deterioration  problem  is  compounded  by
the multi-ownership  of  family houses where ownership in common under a
caretaker/lineage  head  requires  lineage  members  occupying  tvl'  house  to  share  in
the cost of maintenance. This appears  to be a classic  "prisoners'  dilemma"
problem (Robinson,  1979).  Since  rent does not cover  maintenance  costs,  the
different  "owners  in  common"  have  little  incentive  to invest  in  maintenance  of
a common  property,  especially  when  no  kudos  are  traditionally  attached  to  part
ownership  of a building. Status  depends  on completing  a new  building  rather
than  maintaining  or rehabilitating  an old  one (Tipple,  1983  and  1984a).
In  addition  to  the  fact  that  units,  not  their  quality,  confer  status,  the
control  regime  makes  no distinction  between  houses  with  no services  and those
with services  shared  by many  households.  In order  to  benefit  from  an increase
in  rent,  the  landlord  must  make  his  rooms  "self-contained"  so  that  each  household
has  exclusive  use  of  water  supply,  sanitation,  kitchen,  and  bathroom.
Apart from fulfilling  the demands of the building regulations  (and
enforcement  has  been  very lax  for  years),  a landlord  has  very  little  incentive
to fit  water  supply  and  sanitation,  kitchen  and  bathroom, into  his  house. To
increase  the rent,  full conversion  to self-contained  units is necessary,  for
only  then  can  the  improvement  costs  be  passed  through  to  the  tenant  by  means  of
increased  rents.  Therefore,  why  should  a  landlord  fit  a  water  pipe  to  the  house,
or improve  the  latrine  from  a bucket  to  an aqua-privy  or a  ventilated  indirect
pit,  when  these  will  be shared  facilities?
A similar  question  arises  with  qualitative  improvements  to the  structure
of rooms  with shared  facilities.  As it  would  make  no difference  to the  rent,
what incentive  can  a landlord  have  for fitting  ceilings  or other  improvements
or repairing  the  fabric  of the  house?
Net  Effects  on SuRpRj
What is the net effect  of all of the above?  While some starts  have
undoubtedly  been forgone,  neither  have starts  dropped  to zero, as might be
expected  with  such  extreme  controls.  However,  the  current  rent  control  policies
also  have  effects  on the  quality  cListribution  of  houses. We  have  macro  evidence
on the  number  of units  of different  type,  and  micro  evidence  on the  quality  of
the  units.
Figure  6.1 shows  that the number  of houses  has grown over time  but at
different  rates  in different  sectors. The trend  for the  high cost sector  to
grow  faster  than  others  noted  from  the  1960  to  1981  period  by  Boapeah  and  Tipple
(1983)  has  been somewhat  stemmed  in the  1981  to 1988  period  as the indigenous
sector  appears  to have kept pace (both  have grown  by 10 percent  over the 8
years). The  total  number  of  houses  has  not,  however,  kept  pace  with  population
growth  in  either  the  short  or  medium  terms;  while  there  was  one  house  for  every
20  people  in  1960  (1960  Census  of  Population),  there  was  only  one  per  29  in  1980
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Figure  6.1:  Number of  Houses  by  Sector
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In terms of the change in the quality and utilization of the stock, we
have evidence from  chapter  2 than  there  are  more family  housers, that  the  service
levels, never good, have deteriorated, and that crowding remains a problem.
Evidence from chapter 5 suggests that in the absence of controls the majority
of  households  would consume  more  housing than  obtained from  their current  units:
the median estimated PmQm of about 1040 cedis is substantially greater than
median estimated PmQc of about 575.
Ultimately, in order to understand the interaction  between rent control
and supply, we have  to understand the interaction between  controls and the
investment  incentives  faced  by suppliers. We therefore turn  to a simple  present
value analysis of the effect of controls on landlords' profitability.
B.  Rent Control and Landlord Profitability
The  previous  Chapter described  the  costs  and benefits  to  individual
landlords and tenants.  What are the effects of controls on supply?  In order
to understand  how controls affect incentives  to landlords,  and hence supply,  we
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Present  Values
Government  subsidies,  regulations,  taxes and other interventions  --
including rent control -- change the cash flows to  landlords.  Some
interventions  impose  costs  (e.g.,  land  use  regulations,  taxes,  rent controls,
building  regulations)  and some benefits  (e.g.,  land subsidies,  tax relief,
financial  subsidies)  to landlords. The incidence  of costs and benefits  is
didcussed  in  more  detail  in  Malpezzi  (1988).
Present  values  are  a  summary  of  the  cash  flow  and  its  components.  Present
values are computed  by adding a stream  of net costs and benefits  from an
investment  after  discounting  them  to  account  for  the  fact  that  a cedi  today  is
worth  more than  a cedi  tomorrow.11
Consider  a simple  4 period  example:
PV - A 0 +  A 1  /(l+r)  +  A 2  /(l+r)  2  +  A 3 /(l+r)  3
.here  A represents  the  net  costs  and  benefits  in  each  of four  periods,  and  r is
the discount  rate,  or the opportunity  cost of capital.  For example,  if an
initial  investment  of 300  cedis  is followed  by three  years  of net returns  of
'.50  cedis  per  annum,  and  the  disccunt  rate  is  10  percent,  the  present  value  is:
PV - -300  +  150/(1+0.1)  +  150/(1+0.1)2  +  150/(1+0.1)3  - 73 cedis
The present  value  rule states  that  if the  present  value  of the  investment  is
greater  than  zero,  the  investment  yields  greater  than  the  opportunity  cost  of
capital  (the  normal  rate of profit  for an investment  of that type),  and the
investment  should  be undertaken.
A closely  related  concept  is the internal  rate  of return. This is the
discount  rate  at  which  the  present  value  of  the  cash  flow  would  be  zero  (benefits
would  equal  costs,  adjusted  for the  timing  of receipts  and expenditures).  It
can  be interpreted  as a  measure  of  profitability.
A Present  Value  Model  of  Housing  Investment  in  Kumasi
Rent control's  market  effects  can  be analyzed  using  a simple  cash flow
model  of  a representative  rental  investment.31  Table  6.1  presents  such  a  model.
Each  column  represents  a  year's  time. Landlord-developers  are  assumed  to  build
or  purchase  a  unit  in  development  period  (year  0)  and  rent  out  the  rooms  therein
for 10 years.  During  this time landlords  collect  rents  and spend  money on
21  Even  in the  absence  of inflation.
.i/  The  general  method  used  is  described  in  any  corporate  ft.nance  text  (e.g.
Brealey  and  Myers  1981). Application  of cash flow  models  to investment
in  developing  countries  is  discussed  in  (e.g.)  Gittinger  (1982)  and  Mishan
(1982). Examples  of housing  policy  analysis  using  such  models  include
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maintenance  and  taxes.  At the  end  of the  10  year  period  the  unit (structure  and
land)  have  some  salvage  value., 1
This  model is quite  simple,  5  yet it allows  us to compare  two  different
rent  regimes  (labeled  the  baseline  regime  and  the  revised  regime  in  Table  6.1,
sometimes  referred to controlled  and uncontrolled).  We can examine the
interaction  between  controls,  taxes,  maintenance,  depreciation,  profitability
and  affordability  in  a simple  but  consistent  framework.
Of course  the  model  has limitations. It focuses  on a "representative"
investment,  and the  exact  numbers  presented  aren't  exact  for  all  or even  most
units. But  we can  analyze  more  than  one  "representative"  investment  (including
different  structure  types,  service  levels,  locations,  and  rents). We  don't  want
to  focus  on  point  estimates  but  rather  on  robust  qualitative  conclusions.  Also,
as  it  happens  in  Kumasi  at  least  physical  structures  and  current  controlled  rents
are  fairly  standardized.
The cash  flow  model ts  only  as good  as its  inputs;  "garbage  in,  garbage
out."  But we can and have tested  the  model  with a range  of inputs  not all
reported  here,  and  while  the  exact  numbers  change,  the  qualitative  conclusions
drawrn  from  the  simulations  reported  below  remain  robust.6 1
We  note  once  again  that  the  real  valued  inputs  to  the  simulations  in  this
chapter  are all  in 1986  prices. We have assumed  a constant  20  percent  annual
inflation  rate  for the ten  year  horizon  of the  model;  while  official  data  on
recent  price  changes  are  not available  yet, it  appears  that  inflation  has  run
well  above  20  percent  recently.
i/  The salvage  period  is often  discussed  as if the owner  sells  the unit.
Actually  it  makes  no difference  to the  analysis  if the  owner  retains  it;
the  salvage  value  is the  opportunity  cost  of doing  so.
./  For  example,  we assume  the  landlords  pay  cash  for  the  unit. In  Ghana,  few
rental  units  are  financed  through  the  formal  financial  system. While  it
remains  true  that  all  durable  assets  must  be financed  in some  way (even
if self financed)  ignoring  finance  is an appropriate  simplification  for
the  present  purpose. The  analysis  could  be readily  extended  to  evaluate
proposals  for  rental  finance.
i/  We encourage  interested  readers  to  undertake  their  own  analysis  of other
representative  investments  and  using  other  parameter  values  (especially
representing  other  changes  in  controls). The  model  itself  is  written  in
Lotus  1-2-3,  and is available  upon  request  from the  authors. Using  the
computer  model requires  the Lotus spreadsheet  system,  version 2.0 or
higher,  which  is  not  available  from  the  authors.Table  6.1:  Cash  Flow  Model  of  Rental  Ivtstment
Year  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
General  Price  Index  1.00  1.20  1.44  1.73  2.07  2.49  2.99  3.58  4.30  S.16  6.19  0
Market  Value  of  Land  soo.Oo  500,000 
Baseline  Structure  Value  2.000,000  1,488,188
Financial  Cost  of  Land  (100.000)
Financial  Structure  Cost  (2.000.000) 
DASELINE  RENT  CONTROL REGIME:
-----------------------------  _---  ----
f
Capital  Gain/Loss  (111,812)
Maintenance  (20,-a0) (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) (SO,000) (20,000) (20,000) (20,000)  (20.000)  (20.000)
NIIIIAL  Monthly  HH  Rent  300  300  300  300  300  300  300  300  300  300
REAL  Monthly  8N  Rent  250  208  174  145  121  100  84  70  58  48  F- NOKINAL Annual Gross  Rent  54,000  54,000  54,000  54,000  sA,o00  54,000  54,000  54,000  54,000  54,000
REAL  Annual Gross  Rent  45,000  37,500  31,250  26,042  21,701  18,084  15,070  12,559  10,466  8,721
Rental  Income  Taxes  (2,250)  (1,875)  (1,563)  (1,302)  (1,085)  (904)  (754)  (628)  (523)  (436)
Property  Taxes  (2,000)  (2,000)  (2,000)  (2,000)  (2,000)  (2,000)  (2,000)  (2,000)  (2,000)  (2,000)
Landlord's  Real  Cash  Flow  I (under  controls)  (2,100,000)  20,750  13,625  7,688  2,740  (1,384)  (4,820)  (7,683) (10,069)  (12,058) 1,974,473  r
'-4
REVISED RENT  REGIME
Change in  Structure  Value  352,477
RevLsed  Structure  Value  2,352,477  2,129,667
Revised  Capitol  Gain  529,667
Maintenance  (60,000)  (60,000)  (60,000)  (60,000)  (60,000)  (60,000)  (60,000)  (60,000)  (60,000)  (60,000)
REAL Mionthly  BB Rent  1.200  1.200  1.200  1.200  1.200  1.200  1.200  1.200  1.200  1.200
NROIKAL  Monthly  3!H  Rent  1,440  1,728  2,074  2,488  2,986  3,583  4,300  5,160  6,192  7  430
NOMINAL Annual  Gross  Rent  259,200  311,040  373,248  447,898  537,477  644,973  773,967  928,760 1,114,513  .415
REAL  Gross  Rent  216,000  216,000  21b,000  216,000  216,000  216,000  216,000  216,000  216,00o  ,000
Rental  Income  Taxes  (21,600) (21,600) (21,600) (21,600) (21,600) (21,600) (21,600) (21,600)  (21,600)  (21,600)
Property  Taxes  (2,000)  (2,000)  (2,000)  (2,000)  (2,000)  (2,000)  t2,000)  (2,000)  (2,000)  12,000)
Landlord's  Cash  Flow
(no  controls)  (2,100,000) 132,400  1;,2,400 132,400  132,400  132,400  132,400  132,400  132,400  132,400  2,791,734
OLD REGIME  COMPARED  TO NEW
Foregone  Rental  Income  (171,000)(178,500)(184,750)(189,958)(194,299)(197,916)(200 930)(203,441) (205,534)  (207,279)
Tax Savings  19,350  19,725  20,038  20,298  20,515  20,696  20,846  20,972  21,077  21,164
Savings  in  Maintenance  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000  80,000
Change  in  Structure  Value  (641,479)
Net  Change  in  Cost  to  Landlords  (71,650) (78,775) (84,713) (89,660) (93,784)  (97,220)(1;,,083)(102,469) (104,458)  (747,594)
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Key inputs  to the  model  are  underlined  in Table  6.1  and  Table  6.2.  The
latter  table  lists  underlying  assumptions  about  changes  in market  conditions,
depreciation,  tax  rates,  and  demand. Other  numbers  are  calculated  by the  model
given -"ese  assumptions.  The  landlord's  financial  cost  of  building  or  acquiring
the  unit (here  2,000,000  cedis  for  the  structure  and  100,000  for  the  land)  may
be greater  or less  than  theic  corresponding  value  (here  the  structure  is  worth
what it costs but the lhndlord  acquires  land through  the traditional  land
allo-ation  system  at  a  financial  price  of  100,000,  less  than  its  value  of  500,000
outsLde  the  traditior.l  system).  Baseline  controlled  rents  are  assumed  (in  this
example)  to  remain  at  the  nominal  level  of  300  cedis  per  month;  inflation  erodes
their  -eal  value  over  time. Uncontrolled  rents  are  assumed  to  be 1200  cedis  per
month  in  real  terms,  i.e.  they  keep  pace  with  inflation.
Table 6.2:  Key Model  Inputs
Number  of  Units  in  Structure
Inflation  Rate  21
Real  Discount  Rate  lOX




Gross Depreciation as a Percent of Capital Cost  4X
Demand
Average R/Y:  0.08
Elasticity:  0.60
Baseline Controls:
Maintenance  to Capital Cost  1X
Net Depreciation Rate  3X
Landlord Tax Rate  5X
Revised Controls:
Maintenance to Capital Cost  3X
Net Depreciation Rate  1X
Landlord Tax Rate  lOX
Any number of alternatives  for .eiaxing  or removing  controls  may be
specified  by  changing  the  time  path  of  rents  in  the  revised  case. Here  we  assume
a simple  but dramatic  quadrupling  of rents  to 1200  cedis  per room,  which  then
rise  with inflation.
Other  assumptions  for  this  example  include  a  general  inflation  rate  of 20
peruent  per annum;  a real  discount  rate  of 10  percent;  and land  and structure
'-alues  rise  with  inflation  (i.e.  their  relative  price  remains  constant.)  Wages,
depressed  for so long,  are assumed  to rise  by 2 percent  per annum.7 2 Gross
depreciation  of the  unit is  assumed  to  be  4 percent  per  annum;  spending  more  on
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maintenance  is  assumed  to  reduce  net  depreciation  one  for  one.11 Landlords  pay
an income  tax  of 5  percent  on rents  collected,  rising  to  10 percent  for  higher
rents. 2 9  Households  at the  median  income  are  assumed  to  be willing  to spend  8
percent  of their  income  on  such  a  unit;  the  income  elasticity,  .6,  assumes  that
lower  income  households  spend  higher  fractions,  and  vice  versa.
Gains  and  Losses  from  Four  Components  and  their  Interaction
Five  key components  of landlord  cash flow  are:  initial  outlay,  rents,
maintenance,  taxes,  and capital  gains.  Initial  outlay  does not change  when
controls  are removed,  but the other  four do.  Rent control  directly  reduces
profitability  because  it  reduces  the  rents  a  unit  can  command.  But  reduced  rents
also affect  maintenance  (and  depreciation),  taxes,  and capital  gains.  These
"indirect"  effects  can  be large  and should  be taken  into  account. Figure  6.3
summarizes  the  changes.
Figure  6.3:  Change  in  Components  of  Landlord's  Present
V.xue
Rents.  Ghana's  current rent
control  regime  fixes  nominal  and  reduces  1,500  piesentelvlyes  ('000 cedes)
real  rents.  In  the  example  presented  in  1.  327  C 
Table  6.1  above,  the  reduction  in  real
rents  increases  over  time  as  inflation  1,000
takes  a  larger  bite.  Our  "uncontrolled"
or  modified  regime  assumes  rents  rise
with  inflation.  500
156  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~20  4
Figure  6.3 shows  that  the  present  n
value  of  real  rents  collected  from  this  .43
15  room  compound  over  lC  years  under  the  .133
decontrolled regime is about 1.3  million -soo 
cedis,  compared  to  158,000  under  Rent  Me,ntenance  Taxes  Ca,lt:l  Ga,
contrels.
Taxation.  If  taxes  on  rental  income  are  collected  from  landlords,  rent
control  reduces  these  taxes  as it reduces  rent.  This partially  offsets  the
reduction  in  rent  to  landlords,  but  also  decreases  government  revenue.'of  Tipple
(1988)  reports  that  effective  property  taxes  for  units  of this  type (when
B.!  One way  the model could be extended  would be to build in a  more
sophisticated  production  function  relating  maintenance  to  depreciation  in
a non-linear  fashion.
2/  Tax on rental  income  rl-es  with the  monthly  rent  collected. See  Tipple
(1988,  p. 34)  for  the  full  schedule.
jQ/  If  the  household  spends  the  extra  cash  on  goods  or  services  that  are  taxed,
the  reduction  in government  revenue  will  be partially  offset. We assume
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collected)  are  on  the  order  of 2,000  cedis. We assume  this  is  unchanged  in  real
terms  over  time.liI
Figure  6.3 shows  that  the  present  value  of taxes  rises  from  8,000  cedis
to about 133,000  cedis.  From the landlord's  point  of view the tax increase
partially  offsets  the  rents  collected.l12  But  it  also  represents  a  badly  needed
increase  in  government  revenue.
Maintenance.  Landlords have  the  option to  increase or  decrease
maintenance.  While  good  data  are  lacking,  we  assume  in  these  first  simulations
that maintenance  on a controlled  unit is a minimal 1 percent  of structure
cost.  13  When controls  are removed  landlords  increase  maintenance  to a still
modest  3  percent.
Figure  6.3  reflects  this  assumption  that  landlords  spend  about  three  times
as much on maintenance  if controls  are removed.  But if the unit is not
maintained  it  depreciates  faster. This  will  reduce  the  capital  gain.
Capital  Gains.  Capital  gains (and losses)  stem from several  sources.
First,  structures  and  land  can  appreciate  more  or less  than  general  inflation.
The simulation  presented  here assumes  both structure  and land  prices  move  with
inflation. Second,  the  land  and  the  structure  may originally  (at  period  0)  be
worth  more  or less  than  the  value  of resources  put  into  it. We've  assumed  that
the  original  value  of  the  structure  (in  the  baseline  case)  is  worth  its  financial
cost  to the  landlord-developer,  but that  the  land  is  worth  considerably  more.
The latter can readily be the case given the traditional  system of land
allocation,  especially  if the landlord  is an Asante.  Thus we immediately
identify  one incentive  in the  current  system  --  in traditional  areas  building
a  house  can  give  the  landlord  control  over  land  worth  far  more  than  the  fees  and
ground  rents  paid. Third,  the  real  value  of  structural  capital  declines  as the
unit depreciates.  As we've  seen,  depreciation  depends  on maintenance,  and in
this  version  we've  assumed  a simple  one-for-one  offset.  Fourth,  if the rent
control  regime  changes,  increases  in rents  will be capitalized  into  value.",
11/  In  the  current  system,  rates  or  ground  rents  are  usually  negligible.  While
we don't  do so here, the  model  could  be used to study  the effects  of
indexing  and increasing  these  rates.
w2.  This  model  assumes  that  taxes  are  collected  and that  landlords  bear the
tax. Other  assumptions  about  incidence  could  be  explored  in  future  work.
fl/  Good  data  on  maintenance  are  lacking. In  developed  countries  maintenance
and other  recurrent  expenditures  are much higher  --  on the order  of 8
percent  of structure  values  --  but more services  are provided  with the
units.  On  the other hand, swish units require regular structural
maintenance. The  figures  in these  models  represent  best  guesses.
JA/  For these  simple  simulations  we've assumed  full capitalization  of the
difference  between  the average  net income  streams  for the two regimes.
We've also assumed  that  decontrol  was completely  unanticipated. These
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Finally,  we note that  we do not assume  that the landlord  actually  sells  the
unit;  among  other  things,  we can  abstract  from  capital  gains  taxation.
Effects  of Pent  Control  on Landlord  Profitability
Figure  6.4:  Sunnary  Present  Value  Figure  6.5:  Internal  Rate  of  Return:  New  Unit















Controlled  Uncontrolled  Olt erenoe
Controlled  Uncontrolled  Diflerence
Figure  6.4  presents  the  overall  net present  value  of the  controlled  and
uncontrolled  investments  laid  out  in  Table  6.1. We  have  assumed  a  real  discount
rate  of 10  percent.i11'  Figure  6.5  presents  the  corresponding  internal  rate  of
return,  or discount  rate  at which  the  present  value  of the  unit is zero (the
landlord-investor  breaks  even).
At a  real  discount  rate  of  10  percent,  the  present  value  of  the  controlled
unit is about  -1.3  million  cedis.  If the  unit  was uncontrolled,  the  present
value  would  still  be  negative,  but  the  "loss"  would  be smaller: about  -260,000
cedis. We can interpret  these  numbers  as follows. If investors  could  receive
a real  return  of 10  percent  on an asset  with similar  risks,  they  would  prefer
such  an investment  over  rental  housing  in  either  case.  But  clearly  they  would
lose  less  in  the  absence  of controls.
What if (as  will  be developed  further)  there  are  no similar  investments
for  Ghanaians  which  yield  10  percent? How  high  a rate  of  return  could  housing
compete  with?  The internal  rate  of return  for  a controlled  unit is estimated
at about  -1/2  percent  per  year,  not too  different  from  zero.  In other  words,
landlords  could  break even with housing if other investments  were yielding
neGative  returns.  Without  controls,  housing  could  compete  for capital  with
investments  yielding  up to 8 percent. Controls  reduce  the  rate of profit  by
about  9  percent  overall.  Like  any  other  investment,  if  you  want  someone  to  build
housing,  you  have to let  him  make  money  at it.
Now we can  begin to see  an answer  to our earlier  question: Why  would
anyone  invest  in  housing  currently,  given  stringent  controls? Rates  of return
L5/  Ten percent is, in our judgement,  quite  a high real rate.  The Bank
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of zero  and  net cash flows  are  almost  nil, as  we have seen.  But recall  from
Chapter 2  that returns to financial  investments  were negative  until very
recently.
Alternative  Investment  Opportunities
Figure  6.6:  Real  Interest  Rates
There  is  a strong  entrepreneurial
spirit in most Ghanaian  cultures  and
Kumasi  has  a  reputation  for being a  -aeposi  e  - (Pmopetyl
source  of  cash  ready  to  chase  investment
for  profit. If  housing  ceases  to  provide  °
ready  returns,  other  forms  of  investment
are  available.  In  recent  years  anecdotal
evidence suggests investment in (e.g.)  -50%  - ...  . ...
trading,  transportation  and  machine  tools
seems  to have increased,  all of which
give  a  quick  return. But  these  kinds  of  _00%  V  V  .....  .
investments  are  small  scale,  and  limited
by  the  time  and  skills  of  the  7  a  72  7  76  7B  S0  B2  8648S  88
investor.  16/  Financial  investments,
which  are  not  so  limited,  have
consistently  showed  atrocious  returns  (see  Figure  6.6),  and  further  the  financial
system  may  still  suffer  the  after  effects  of  previous  vetting  of  savers. Under
such conditions  "maximizing  returns"  may be more accurately  thought  of as
"minimizing  losses"  or capital  preservation.
Figure  6.7:  Returns  to  Financial
Figure  6.7  compares  the  average  And  Other  Investments  Cowared
rate  of  return  on  financial  assets  over  Real Return
the 1970-1984  period to the internal
rates  of  return for  controlled and 100x.81o.
uncontrolled  housing.  The  difference  is  a  f\f&  _
arresting.  -10  .
Returns  to  some  other  activities,
such as  trading, were probably higher -20.0%  .....
than housing.  But not everyone  can
trade,  and if one has a large  sum to -30  0% .. . . .. .\ 
invest  alternatives  are  required.  4  ...........
-39.0X
Of  course  real  financial  rates  are  New Controlled UnIt  New  U,cofttroiied  Avg  Boka Rote  70.84
no  longer  on the  order  of -100  percent,
as -hey  were  in  the  seventies.  Paradoxically,  as  inflation  abates  and  financial
investments  yield  positive  real  returns,  the  capital  gain/preservation  motive
for  housing  investment  will  weaken.
16/  Except to  the  extent informal financial systems can  successfully
intermediate. Experience  suggests  while better than no system  these
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Emphatically,  we do not  argue  for  subsidies  or tax  breaks  to restore  the
status  quo before  Ghana's  difficult  struggle  against  inflation. Rather,  we
recognize  that  current  cash  flow  will  become  a  more  critical  investment  incentive
in a stable  economy. Some  housing  investment  may  have occurred  as  a vent for
savings in the past, but housing will --  and should --  face stiffer competition
from  a wider  range  of alternative  investments.  Rent  control  will bite  deeper
into  incentives  for  such  investment  as recovery  proceeds.
Affordability
Figure  6.8:  Wtillingness  to  Pay
The  model  has  a  simple  demand  side  Decontrolled  New  Unit  (Yr  1)
which  enables  us  to  study  the
affordability  of  each  rent  regime.  Given  1600  Y Pyme
an  income  distribution  (midpoints  of  1400
income  quintiles)  and  average  and
marginal  propensities  to  consume  housing
(the  median  income  household's  average  '000  O.Iliagness.-  Pay
willingness  to pay for such a unit, and  8O0  controlledcost
the  income  elasticity),  the  model  600C
generates  willingness  to pay  for the  00
entire  income distribution and compares
it to rents under each regime.  Figure  200
6.8 presents this graphically  for the  o  7  9  t7  t9  21  23  25
first  year.  The diagonal  line  represents  Income (Thousands)
willingness  to  pay  by  income, given the
income  distribution  and  demand  parameters  from  Table  6.2.  The  five  dots  on  the
line  represent  the  income  midpoints  of  the  five  quintiles.  Note  that  controlled
rents (the  bottom  horizontal  line)  are affordable  to all 5 quintiles,  while
higher  uncontrolled  rents  are  affordable  to the  top  2  quintiles.
Recall  that  this is a representative  new unit.  Representative  does  not
mean that  all  units  will deliver  the  same  package  of  housing  services,  or  will
rent  for  this  amount. Some  units  will  be  produced  which  will  rent  for  more,  some
for less.  Note in particular  that  rents  are always  higher  for new units in
uncontrolled  markets. We will  examine  existing  units  below.
Figure  6.9:  Affordability  Over  Tim
Since  rents  change  over  time,  and
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decline  of real  wages,  see  Table  6.2)1"1  the  model  also  generates  the  time  path
'f affordability  (Figure  6.9).  The five  unmarked  horizontal  lines  represent
willingness  to  pay  in  each  of  five  income  quintiles  over  time  (10  years). These
lines  are  rising  because  of the  assumption  noted  above  that  real  wages  rise  by
2 percent  per  year.  The  heavy  marked  line  represents  the  income  at which  real
uncontrolled  rents  aie "affordable"  over  the  same  period  given  the  particular
demand  assumptions  made. This  amount  is  fixed  because  (in  this  simulation)  real
rents  are  constant  over  time. So,  in  this  simple  case,  since  real  rents  remain
constant,  while  real  wages  increase,  the  affordability  picture  improves  somewhat
over  time.
Profitability  and  Affordability  for  an Existing  Unit
Our estimated  rent  of 1200  cedis  for  this illustration  was based  on the
market  rent of the typical  household  in equilibrium  (PmQm). But what about
existing  units?  They yield  fewer  housing  services,  and  our  best estimate  of
typical  market  rents,  PmQc,  is  roughly  twice  current  rents  (i.e.  600  cedis).
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In addition  to changes  in rents,  the key difference  is that existing
structures  provide  fewer  services  and  are  hence  worth  less  than  new  structures.
We have  assumed  the  structure  is  worth  500,000  cedis,  and  the  land  is  worth  the
same  500,000  cedis  as  before. 111 Figures  6.10  and  6.11  present  the  key  internal
rates  of return  and  affordability  results  for  these  units.
i.Z/ We  assume  that  changes  in  real  wages  shifts  the  initial  income  distribution
up or down  proportionally.
1i8/  In  other  words  we have  assumed  that  if  such  units  were  traded,  landlords
could  sell  their  existing  units  and  land  for  about  1,000,000  cedis  total.
Such  trades  rarely  occur  in  practice,  but it  gives  us some  guesstimate  of
the opportunity  cost of not trading  (i.e.  what it costs an existing
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These assumptions yield similar profits to landlords, as measured by the
internal rate  of return.  Note,  however, that the  unit is  affordable  even at the
bottom  income quintile, according to our demand assumptions.  If rents for
existing units rise to our estimates of market levels, decontrol  will not make
existing units "unaffordable."
What's Missing From the Model, and Related Conjectures
Risk.  It is implicitly  assumed that the time path of rents is known with
certainty  by all  market participants.  If landlords  believed that  controls  would
be reimposed, they would be unlikely to respond to decontrol by building or
maintaining  and  upgrading  units.  If  tenants  believed  controls  could  be
reimposed, they might spend high fractions of their income initially to gain
tenure rights in a unit whose real rents might decrease; but such behavior
carries risks for them as well.
Imperfections  in input  markets  and from  other regulations. One motive for
housing investment mentioned briefly above is that it yields an accompanying
property right to use of  land.  In general, as Chapter 2 described, land,
infrastructure, and financial  markets have not worked well in Ghana in recent
years.  Planning regulations  and building codes  have at times been impediments.
As a consequence, when someone does succeed in financing and building a house,
a capital gain (at least relative to alternative investments) is guaranteed.
Cash flow is not an issue, since cash flow under rent control is negligible.
Whatever housing has been built, has been to capture capital gains (or reduce
capital losses).
If controls are removed, cash flow can become a positive incentive.  But
if the other impediments to housing supply --  land, infrastructure, finance,
other regulations --  are not removed or mitigated, supply  will be constrained.
Real rents will rise, possibly well above our estimates of equilibrium rents,
until such supply is forthcoming.  We said above that "if rents rise to market
levels, decontrol will not make existing units "unaffordable."  This  will  only
come  to pass  if the supply side is enabled to respond.  It is essential,
therefore, that decontrol  be accompanied  by action on these other fronts.
Market-wide effects.  What can we say about market wide effects, given
analysis of representative but  still individual units?  It is important to
carefully consider the difference between marginal changes to an individual
landlord  and  market wide  changes. For example,  an individual  landlord  freed from
controls  could raise rents  well above  estimates  of "market"  levels  and  keep them
there  indefinitely,  if  everything  else  was  held equal (notably  if  other landlords
were still controlled).  But if all landlords  are freed from controls, they are
bound by the fact that  many if  not most tenants  would  not pay rents  greatly  above110  RENT CONTROL IN KUMASI, GHANA
these levels, although rents could certainly rise above our particular point
estimates.  "
So  we have implicitly  considered  some market  wide effects already, in the
sense that our estimates of rent changes in newly decontrolled units are in a
sense average rather than marginal changes.  More sophisticated  models can, in
principle, account for market wide effects directly.  While we are doing some
work in this  area,  we feel that  these  models" 2 I  are not  yet adequately  calibrated
and tested to fairly represent  Ghanaian markets.
Summary of Effects of the Current Regime
Controls reduce the present value of rents and capital gains but taxes
foregone and lower maintenance expenditures partially offset this loss.  Such
current  investment as  exists  is motivated  more  by  capital  gain  (or more
accurately avoiding  capital loss) and  by nonpecuniary income (status  conferred)
than by  current  income  from the unit.  Units  are currently  affordable by
virtually  all households,  given  a unit  is available.  Service levels  and
niaintenance  will be decreased.
If rents for  new compound rooms  were of the order of 1200  cedis (compared
to median estimates of 1050 cedis from the previous chapter), they would be
affordable to the top 40 percent of the income distribution.  If rents for
existing units  were to rise to 600 cedis (compared  to median estimates of 575),
they would remain affordable to virtually all income groups.
Markets  always  produce "affordable"  housing  for  the  poor,  in  the  sense  that
everyone will  live somewhere.21  The  market does so now,  in Kumasi  as in
everywhere else.  Our concern is that in the current market this housing is
overcrowded, with inadequate services, and deteriorating faster than need be.
Rent  control  contributes  to  this  problem. The  previous  chapter  demonstrated  that
in  Kumasi rent control reduces tenant's  welfare by reducing  housing consumption
as much or more than it increases their  welfare by reducing rents.
Rent  control  is  not  the  only  problem  in  rental  or housing  markets
generally.  Other  problems  --  in  land,  infrastructure,  finance,  materials  --
adversely affect the  market, and  drive costs  up.  They drive costs  up higher for
the poor than for others, as we will discuss next.
19/  We note  in passing that in the absence of careful surveys, anecdotal
information  usually overstates  changes  in  rents.  Everyone talks  about  the
units  with  the most  dramatic  changes; units  which  have  more  modest
increases remain out of the public consciousness.
ZQ/  Some  models  represent  multiunit,  multihousehold  "assignment"  models  similar
to (e.g.)  Murray and  Rydell (1987). Some try  to  model  the likely  time  path
of prices market wide (e.g.  De Leeuw and Ekanem 1972 and Muth 1987).
21/  In extreme  cases  - - in developed  countries  as well  as developing  - - shelter
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C.  Effects  of Other  Regulations
Rental  housing  suffers  from  the same  problems  as the market  overall  --
problems  in  the  key  input  markets  of  land,  finance,  infrastructure  and  materials,
and  prcblems  in  the  regulatory  framework.  Many  such  problems,  when  addressed,
are  not  tenure  specific  but  will  aid  rental  as  well  as  owner  occupied  housing  -
- for example,  improvements  in land titling,  or in infrastructure  provision.
But  other  problems  affect  rental  disproportionately.  Building  codes  and land
use regulations  which discourage  compound  houses  particularly  affect  rental
housing.  Rent controls  and other rental  regulation  obviously  discriminate
against  this  form  of  housing  supply. Less  obviously,  solutions  to  market  wide
problems --  such as land and finance --  need to  be designed  with both rental and
owner  occupied  housing  in  mind.
Quite  properly,  most  Ghanaian  officials  do  not  view  publicly  owned  rental
housing  as a solution  to  housing  problems. For  example,  SSNIT  is  working  out
its  inventory  of subsidized  rental  units  --  finishing  off  uncompleted  units  and
selling  them  to tenants. Their  experience  has  highlighted  the  high costs  and
limited  replicability  of  publicly  (or  quasi-publicly)  owned  rental  housing.
Relaxation  of rent  control  is  necessary  but  not  sufficient  for  expanding
the supply  of rental  housing.  Relaxation/decontrol  must be accompanied  by
measures  to  ensure  a  rapid  supply  response  to the  demand  for  rental  housing,  or
else rapidly rising rents could squeeze existing tenants and jeopardize
decontrol. Political  consensus  is,  after  all,  required  for  successful  change.
Of  the  major  constraints  on  private  rental  housing,  many  --  land,  finance,
infrastructure,  materials,  building  codes  and  standards  - - were  discussed  briefly
in Chapter  2.  While  detailed  discussion  of each is beyond  the  scope  of this
report,  the following  points  should  be noted. Rental  markets  suffer  from  the
same constraints  as housing  markets  generally,  but there  are also some  which
affect  rental  particularly  (in  addition  to  the  obvious  problem  of  rent  controls).
Among  other  collateral  actions,  it  will  be necessary  to:
(a)  Pay  particular  attention  to building  codes,  land  use standards,  and
other  regulations  which  discriminate  against  low  cost  compound  housing.
Land use regulations  should  be modified  to permit  construction  of
compounds  in urban areas.  Building  in swish should  be permitted,
subject  to proper  construction  techniques.
(b)  Do not discriminate  against  rental  in provision  of serviced  land.
Don't require owner occupancy  for access to land in any program
designed  to  improve  land  availability  (including  sites  and  services).
(c)  Don't neglect  finance  for rental  housing.  Ensure  that rules for
lending  don't  discriminate  (intentionally  or  unintentionally)  against
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These  and  other  actions  need  to  be  taken  as  complements  to  any  decontrol  program.
Let  us now  turn  to analysis  of several  alternatives  for  decontrol.
D.  Analysis  of  Decontrol  Policy  Options
There  are  a number  of options  which  could  be considered  for  removing  or
relaxing  controls.  Arnott  (1981)  presents  a  clear  taxonomy.  The  main  options,
with a few  comments  are  as follows:
(a)  Blanket  lifting: all rent  controls  are  completely  removed  as of a
certain  date.  This is the simplest  method,  but is very difficult
politically,  and  may lead  to short  run  dislocations.
(b)  Decontrol  new  construction:  an  obvious option which  is being
undertaken  in India,  Brazil  and  a number  of other  markets. But new
construction  can  still be  inhibited unless government  credibly
guarantees  units  will  not  come  under  controls  later.
(c)  Rents  could  also  be immediately  decontrolled  for  units  which  are  meet
certain  standards,  either  now  or  after  upgrading  (e.g.  for  units  which
provide  acceptable  water  supply  and  sanitation).  Standards  would  have
to  be  carefully  chosen,  however,  to  meet  requirements  without  imposing
unnecessary  costs.
(d)  Floating  up  and  out: controls  are  gradually  relaxed,  for  example  rent
rises  are  some  multiple  of CPI  or  wage index  changes,  until  controls
are  no longer  binding  on  most  units. Then  controls  can  be abolished.
This  method  can  permit  a smoother  adjustment  if  potential  landlords
view the  gradual  program  as credible.
(e)  Vacancy  decontrol:  Units  are  decontrolled  as  they  become  vacant.  This
method  has been tried  in some  North  American  markets,  but may keep
mobility  down, with possible  adverse  effects  on housing and labor
markets.
(f)  Vacancy  rate decontrol: particular  markets  are  decontrolled  as the
vacancy  rate  rises  above  some  threshold.  But  while  controls  (and  other
problems)  remain,  vacancy  rates  will  probably  remain  extremely  low.
How  can  vacancy  rates  increase  while  controls  remain?
(g)  Rent level  decontrol: decontrol  by market  segment. Rents  could  be
decontrolled  from  the  top  down (the  current  system,  with  a threshold
of  1,000  cedis,  embodies  this  to  a  limited  extent). But  such  a system
can provide perverse incentives  to  raise rents above long run
equilibrium  levels  in  order  to  escape  controls.
(h)  Contracting  out: landlord  and  tenant  negotiate  a  payment  to  the  tenant
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(i)  Decontrol new  construction:  an  obvious option which  is being
undertaken  in India,  Brazil  and  a number  of other  markets.  But  new
construction  can  still be  inhibited  unless government credibly
guarantees  units  will  not  come  under  contr)ls  later.
Of course  these options  are not all mutually  exclusive.  In many respects
floating  up and  out  has some  a  priori  appeal,  because  the  market  may  take  time
to respond,  particularly  given the current  problems  in input markets,  etc.
Blanket  lifting  carries  the  danger  of  a  sharp  short  run  rise  in  rents  which  would
be reduced  over  time. The  present  value  model  from  above  can  be used to  study
scenarios  derived  from  the  above.
Do  Nothing
This  is the  baseline  case  already  described.  Rents  are  frozen  in  nominal
terms  at 300  cedis. Even  if  there  were  a  one-time  revaluation,  inflation  would
quickly  erode  its  value  (as  has  happened  in  the  recent  past). Households  would
continue  to  consume  roughly  half  of the  housing  services  they  would  consume  in
the  absence  of controls.
Also,  we noted  above  that  during  the financial  disruptions  of the  past
decade  and  a half  housing  was  one  of the  few  ways to  preserve  capital. As the
structural  adjustment  takes  hold  financial  and  other  investments  will  offer  more
favorable  returns,  housing  will  no  longer  be  such  a  vent  for  savings.  If  housing
is prevented  from  offering  a competitive  rate  of return  by controls,  housing
conditions  will  worsen.
Blanket  Decontrol
Conceptually,  this  is the  simplest  decontrol  option. This  second  option
was studied  above,  under  the  assumption  that  rents  for  new rooms  in compounds
quickly  adjusted  to  the  (highest)  static  estimate  of  market  rents  from  the  cross
country  model  of  the  previous  chapter.  New  rooms  would  therefore  be "affordable"
(given  the  demand  assumptions)  to  the  top  40  percent  of  the  income  distribution.
Market  rents  for  existing  units  (PmQc)  are  lower  (and  more  affordable).  But  we
noted  that  other  market  imperfections  could  constrain  the  supply  response.  Let's
then  examine  a "worst  case"  where  rents  for  new  rooms  rise  much  higher  initially
due  to inelastic  supply.
In  this  option  we  are  concerned  more  with  the  changes  in  rents  for  existing
units  than  for  new units.  If  a household  is  given  a choice  between  remaining
in an  existing  unit  and  moving  to  a new  unit,  however  expensive,  they  can't  be
made worse  off  because  they  have the  option  to remain. But they  can  be made
worse  off if  rents  rise  for  their  current  unit.
Blanket  decontrol,  where  all  controls  are  lifted  at  one  time,  is  simplest
administratively.  But some rents  in Kumasi  have fallen  so far  behind  market
values  that  rises  could  result  in major  dislocations.  Arnott  (1981)  indicate,
that the  greater  excess  demand  there  is in a market,  the greater  will  be the
disruption  caused  by  blanket  decontrol.  The  data  show  that  there  is  substantial
excess  demand  in  the  Kumasi  market;  thus,  disruption  under  this  alternative  could114  RENT  CONTROL  IN  KUMASI,  GHANA
Figure  6.12:  Internal Rate  of  Retum  be large,  especially  if other housing
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household  to devote  15 percent  of their  Year
income  to housing.  If initially  rents
were double  our  best estimate,  low income  households  would typically  spend  20
percent  until  rents  came  down  to  their  equilibrium  levels.
While  11  or even  15  or 20  percent  of income  may  not  seem  extraordinary  to
an  outside  observer,  especially  when  low  income  households  typically  spend  large
fractions  of their  income  for  housing  elsewhere,  the  change  from the current
situation  is substantial. One way to cushion  the blow and ensure  political
sustainability  of  decontrol  is  to  replace  controls  with  better  targeted  housing
subsidies  for  the poor.  This is the approach  that  was used to relax  postwar
European  controls.
But large scale subsidy  schemes  are probably  not administratively  or
budgetarily  feasible  in  Ghana  at this  time.  Are there  any  other  alternatives
which  do  not  make  such  demands  on the  budget  and  on  government's  administrative
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Decontrol  New  Construction  and  lUpgraded  Units
Completely  freeing  rents  for  newly  constructed  units  can only increase
supply. As noted,  if a household  is given  a choice  between  remaining  in an
existing  unift  and  moving  to  an  expensive  new  unit,  they  can't  be made  worse  off
because  they  have the  option  to  remain.
Exemption  of  new  construction  from  rent  controls  is  most  atFtractive  to  the
authors  in the  short  term  on the  grounds  that  it encourages  new construction.
Similar  exemption  could be applied  to improvement  of existing  housing,  to
encourage  improvements  in  conditions  without  adversely  affecting  many  existing
low-income  tenancies. It  must  be recognized  that  revaluing  the  upgraded  units
may be very complex to administer.  However,  given that there is quite a
sophisticated  rent  control  administration  in  place  in  Kumasi,  this  method  may
be practical.
In  a  sense,  new  construction  is  already  potentially  decontrolled.  "Luxury"
units  renting  for  over  C1000  are  nominally  exempt  from  controls.  Given  inflation
since  the  date  the  ceiling  was set,  market  prices  for  newly  constructed  rooms
probably  now exceed  the ClOO  ceiling  for controls  (at least  in Kumasi  and
Accra). But landlords  still  face  the  risk  that  the  schedule  of controls  will
be revalued.  As long  as controls  remain  in  place  they  remain  a  disincentive  to
investment.  Our  conjecture  is  that  credible  decontrol  of  new  units  and  a firm
plan  for  decontrol  of  existing  units  are  required  to  build  investor  confidence.
In  addition  to  removal  of  controls  on  newly  constructed  units,  revaluation
or  decontrol  of  units  which  have  undergone  upgrading  could  also  increase  supply.
In Ghana  as in other  countries,  most housing  services  are produced  from the
existing  stock;  preserving  and upgrading  this stock is a critical  but oft-
rneglected  part vf any  housing  strategy. It  would  be important  to choose  the
threshold  at  which  decontrol  occurs  carefully;  for  example,  requiring  (say)  flush
toilets  would  simply  make  the  regulation  irrelevant  for  much  of the  population.
Decontrol  for  New  Tenants
This  option  has  been considered  in  a number  of developed  and  developing
markets  (for  example,  Los  Angeles,  see  Murray  and  Rydell,  1987). Cities  like
Cairo,  with  functioning  key  market  systems,  have  systems  whi  function  de  facto
in  a similar  way,  since  key  money  can  usually  be collected  -rom  new  tenants  but
not  from old.  But these systems result in several perverse incentives.
Landlords  have  incentives  to  undermaintain  units  or  even  harass  tenants  in  order
to reclaim  the  unit  and increase  their  rental  income. Tenants  have  incentives
to  avoid  moving  to  units  more  in  line  with  their  current  needs  because  they  would
give up existing  rent discounts. Such systems  have the  potential  to reduce
mobility  and  decrease  the  efficiency  of  use  of the  existing  stock.
Revaluation  for  new  tenancies  could  be  unhelpful  as it  would  continue  the
problems  caused  at  present  by the  demands  of advance  payments  and  result  in  an
even  less  mobile  rental  sector  than  at  present. As renters  in  compound  houses
live  in  closer  proximity  to other  households  than  most  tenancy  groups  in  other
countries,  vastly  different  rents  being  paid  by  neighboring  households,  according
to their  length  of tenancy,  is likely  to  be socially  unacceptable.116  RENr  CONTROL  IN  KUMASI,  GHANA
Floating  UR and  Out
The  most  effective  method  for  encouraging  new  investment  while  protecting
low  income  renters  may involve  a combination  of indexation  of increases  with  a
"floating  up and out" of controls. The latter  involves  the transition  from
controlled  rents  to market  rents  over  a period  of years.  It is preferable  te
have an end  date  when controls  are  withdrawn  completely  in order  to maintain
landlord  confidence  in the  reality  of the  end of the  controls  which  have cost
them so much.  Indexation  could provide a  formula for determining  the
intermediate  rent  levels. For  example,  rents  could  be increased  annually  by,
say,  the  Consumer  Price  Index  plus  a  percentage  of  the  previous  year's  rent  until
a set  date  when  the  final  increase  to  market  levels  would  be implemented.  Any
units reaching  their  market  level  before  this date would,  of course,  remain
there.  This is quite  possible  for  many rooms  in Kumasi  where there  are no
services  and  physical  conditions  are  poor.  This  phasing  would  smooth  the  path
of adjustment  giving  tenants  who could  not afford  their  current  room at the
market  rent  time  to find  suitable  alternatives.
Figure  6.14:  Internal  Rate  of  Return  Figure  6  15:  Willingness  to  Pay
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Figures 6.14 and 6.15 present the changes in rates of return and
affordability  for a newly constructed  unit between the current system  and
floating  up  and  out. Suppose  (1)  rents  were  completely  indexed  to  inflation  and
(2)  real  rents  were  phased  in  as  follows:  real  rents  were  doubled  to  600  in  the
first  year,  800 the  second,  1000 the  third,  then finally  freed  at their  free
market  level. Landlord  profitability  is  roughly  the  same  as  it  was  for  the  first
option  presented  in  Figure  5.5,  and  affordability  is  ultimately  also.
But  the  phase-in  could  prove  less  disruptive  in  tenants'  minds. The  latter
may seem  a strange  point,  but  no system  of decontrol  is  worth  attempting  which
is not  politically  fsasible  and  sustainable.  Decontrol  followed  by recontrol
does  not do the  market  nor any  participant  any good.  Only if relaxation  is
perceived  as fair  by a substantial  nurber  of  both  landlords  and  tenants  will  it
succeed.  Only  if  the  government's  commitment  to  the  announced  schedule  is  firm
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Other Options
Other systems which differentiate between tenants and or units (such as
vacancy rate  decontrol)  are  unlikely  to  be workable in  Kumasi.  Data  requirements
and  administrative  capacity  are  simply  too high.  Any  decontrol measures
suggested should  be simple to  administer  and as fair to all  parties as  possible.
The contracting out option, where landlords are permitted to pay '-enants
a compensatory sum in order to either change their lease or to let the room to
someone else is  most relevant in cities  where the scale of rent is  closely tied
to date of occupation.  Thus, in  a city  where newer tenancies are uncontrolled,
landlords can negotiate to buy out their existing tenants. Existing rents in
Kumasi are unaffected, in law,  by the date of occupation; thus, contracting  out
is unlikely to be a useful mode of decontrol.
Decontrol  by market segment  could be useful for the self-contained  units
especially as many of them are employer housing in which the tenant would be
cushioned from rent increases at least in the short term. Furthermore, this
sub-market  has  been excluded  from  controls  on  previous  occasions. However,  rents
in self-contained premises are currently heavily affected by those of shared
accommodation and would have  to rise very  considerably to represent market
values.  If further segments of the market were required to spread control
gradually to the  whole stock, division of the remainder would be very complex.
Thus, what is intended to  be a gradual  process, may need to be implemented  in
only two stages.
E.  Summary
This Chapter showed that  while housing quality in  Kumasi is quite low, at
least the number of rooms seems to have kept pace with population growth in
recent years.  Everyone lives somewhere,  but often in overcrowded, unsanitary
conditions.
While rents are very low, landlords  have had some residual motivation to
invest in  order to reduce capital  losses at a time  when alternative investments
did  not  yield  positive real  returns. Since  rents  are  no longer  economic, "family
housing" increased.
Simple present value models were used to explore alternative methods of
relaxing controls.  If rents rose to the levels  suggested  by the results  of the
previous Chapter, landlords could obtain positive real returns and households
would still pay reasonable fractions of their income for rents.  However, it
cannot  be denied that  many households  would be shocked to see their  rent  burdens
double for existing units.
Yet the present system is clearly not working.  Government can choose
between:
(a)  Low  rents  accompanied  by  continuing  overcrowding,  insanitary
conditions, reduced labor mobility, which will probably worsen as
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(b)  Increases  in  rents  which  are  not  popular  with  tenants  but  which  can
mitigate the problems  above, if combined  with action on other
impediments  to the  supply  of  housing.
Alternatives  for decontrol  exist.  While there is certainly  room for
discussion  of  other  alternatives,  results  presented  above  suggest  decontrolling
new construction,  indexing  rents for existing  units to general  prices,  and
letting  real  rents  for  existing  units  rise  gradually  has  some  appeal.
Once  again,  it cannot  be overemphasized  that  whatever  option  is chosen,
actions  must  be taken  to  ensure  elasticity  of  housing  supply  so that  increases
in  rents  are  accompanied  by  an increase  in  production.  This  requires  that  rent
control  is seen  as one  part of a housing  strategy  which  also  aims to release
resources  on the  supply  side;  land,  infrastructure,  materials,  and  finance;  so
that  supply  and  demand  can  reach  equilibrium  through  increases  in  both  the  scale
and the variety of the housing  stock  rather  than through  greatly  increased
prices.VII. A FINAL  SUMMING  UP
Forty  years  of  rent  control  have  been  successful  in  keeping  rents  in  Kumasi
very low,  both  as a  percentage  cf consumption  and in  proportion  to the  cost  of
building. There  can  be few  households  in  Kumasi  who  cannot  afford  the  monthly
rent of a room.  But  housing  conditions  are  worse  than  we would  predict  even
given  low incomes. And payment  of rent  advances  is further  eroding  whatever
gains  some  tenants  receive  from  controls.
The  Kumasi  results  are  striking  in  the  sense  that  rent  absorbs  less  than
2 percent  of income  on average. Indeed  the  rent  to income  ratio  is  extremely
low  even  compared  to other  rent  control  regimes  in  less  developed  countries.
The private sector has  always provided most housing in the city.
Government  direct  activity  has  been limited  to a few  small  houses,  now  mostly
sold to their  occupants. At the same  time,  although  there  are  major  cultural
incentives  to  build  houses  in  Kumasi,  very  few  households  build  only  for  their
own  occupation.
Other  severe  problems  in  the  housing  market  include  problems  in  obtaining
the inputs to housing: land at affordable  prices,  building  materials,  and
finance. Land  use  and  building  regulations  also  take  their  toll. However,  the
evidence  in  this  paper  demonstrates  that  low  rent  levels  have  contributed  to  the
poor  state  of housing  in  Kumasi  in 1989.
Housing  conditions  in  Kumasi  show  many  of the  characteristics  of  shortage.
Occupancy  rates  and  the  percentage  of  households  in  only  one  room  are  both  high.
There  are  fewer  single  person  households  than  in  the  past,  and  the  high  cost  area
is  becoming  more  like  the  rest  of  the  city  than  it  was  in  1980. While  there  has
been  a  slowing  down  in  housing  starts  since  the  mid  1970s,  recent  years  have  seen
an increase  in the number  of rooms  by additions  to existing  stock.  Thus,
although  the  number  of houses  has not kept  pace  with population  growth  since
1980,  the  number  of new  rooms  has.
There  has  been  a  reduction  in  the  proportion  of  stock  available  for  rental
since 1980.  Landlords  have been replacing  rent paying  tenants  with family
members  who  live  rent-free  to  such  an  extent  that  the  percentage  of  family  house
tenants  has  doubled  in  the  1980  to  1986  period. There  has,  however,  been  little
transfer  to commercial  or other  non-residential  uses.
There  is  a generally  low  expectation  of rent  levels  among  both landlords
and renters.  Rents  are only  about  half  of the  market  price  for  which  the  unit
would  rent  in the  absence  of rent  control  (roughly,  300  cedis  controlled  rent
compared  to 600 estimaced  market  rent for current  units).  But we estimate
typical  households  would spend  considerably  more than the the estimates  of
uncontrolled  rents  for  cairrent  units  (roughly  1100  cedis). This implies  that
housing  consumption  is  well  below  equilibrium  demand.  Decontrolling  rents  would
permit  landlords  co  achieve  a  positive  real  rate  of  return  on their  investment,
which  may  be sufficient  (given  the  additional  cultural  status  attached  to  house
building)  to stimulate  an  expansion  in  new  housing  units. However,  collateral
actions  will  be required  in land,  infrastructure,  finance  and  other  regulation
to  ensure  that  the  supply  response  will  be forthcoming.120  RENT  CONTROL  IN  KUMASI,  GHANA
Rent control  is inefficient  in the  sense  that  the  costs  imposed  by rent
control on landlords  are not all captured  by tenants  as benefits.  This
efficiency  loss  is  severe  in  some  sectors  of the  Kumasi  housing  market. In  all
cases,  rent  control  costs  landlords  more than  the  net  benefit  to tenants. If
the  elasticity  of  demand  for  housing  is  around  -0.5  (one  reasonable  assumption)
a  majority  of tenants  lose  more  from  underconsumption  of  housing  than  they  gain
from  lower  rents.
in terms  of  distribution,  the  largest  net  benefits  are  captured  by poorer
households. Richer  households  suffer  the  most from  consuming  less than  their
equilibrium  demand. Long  term  tenants  receive  larger  gains  than  others;  in  fact
for  recent  movers  costs  exceed  benefits. In the  last  few  years,  landlords  have
begun to demand  payment  of rent for years in advance,  creating  considerable
hardship  for  renters  who  must  find  many  month's  income  in  cash  to  obtain  or  hold
on to  a room.
Landlords  differ  little  from  renters  except  in  the  amount  of  housing  they
are able to consume.  Their incomes  are little  higher than renters'  per
household;  they  are lower  per capita  owing  to their  greater  household  size.
However,  the  larger  number  of rooms  they  occupy  does  allow  owner  households  to
have lower occupancy  rates;  they also have better access to water supply,
toilets,  and  other  facilities  in  the  house.
Controls  depress  landlord's  profitability  and,  hence,  their  incentives  to
supply  rental  housing.  Even  after  accounting  for  reduced  maintenance  and  taxes,
our  estimate  for  a typical  new  unit  is that  the  rate  of  return  falls  from  about
8  to  -1  percent. We  noted  that  -1  percent  at  least  preserved  capital  during  the
period  when returns  to financial  investments  were highly  negative,  but that
returns  to  financial  investments  should  do  better  in  the  future. So  must  rental
housing,  if it is to  compete  for  capital.
We estimate  that,  if  decontrolled,  rents  for  existing  units  would  double
(in 1986  prices),  and rents  for  new units  would  roughly  quadruple. However,
these  are estimates  of long  run  equilibrium  rents.  While  we have no dynamic
model  capable  of predicting  the  time  path  of rents,  we  were  able  to  explore  the
implications  of  different  assumed  time  paths  using  the  present  value  model.
Note  also  that  since  the  ceilings  for  "luxury"  units  have  remained  fixed
(at  1000  cedis)  as  well  as  rents,  and  we estimate  that  new  units  would  rent  for
over  1000  cedis,  new  construction  could  be  deccntrolled  "by  default"  if  landlords
believed  the  ceiling  would  not  be changed  in  the  future. A  credible  promise  not
to  raise  the  ceiling  could  be one  way to  decontrol  new  construction.
Finally,  while  we  emphasized  "floating  up  and  out"  for  existing  units  along
with immediate  decontrol  for  new construction  and  upgraded  units,  there  are  a
wide  range  of  options  which  can  be explored  in  more  detail  with the  aid  of the
present  value  model.  Building  a political  consensus  behind  decontrol  is not
independent  of but is more important  than the technical  means chosen for
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Rent  controls  reduce  efficiency  in  the  Ghanaian  economy  by depressing  the
return  to a major  share  of Ghana's  fixed  capital,  in  addition  to reducing  the
social  efficiency  of  the  housing  stock. However,  it  is  vital  that  policies  for
changes  in rent  policy  be taken  as part  of a  broad  housing  strategy  including
policies  to  improve  the  functioning  of  input  markets  for  land,  services,  building
materials,  and  finance,  so  with  changes  in  land  use  and  building  regulations  as
well,  so  that  increases  in  rent  would  be accompanied  by increases  in  the  housing
stock.ANNEX TABLES
Table A.l:  Type of House by Number of  Rooms (Percent)
Number  of  rooms  Mean
Type  of  house  1-5  6-10  11-15  16-20  21-25  26-30  31+  Number
1-st  compound  21  27  33  9  4  0  6  12
Multi-St.  comp.  6  18  21  28  10  3  13  17
Detached house  48  27  23  2  0  0  0  7
Semi-det. house  73  18  9  0  0  0  0  4
Terraced  house  72  25  3  0  0  0  0  4
Total  35  24  24  9  3  0  5  10
Table A.2:  Type of House, 1979 and 1986 (Percent)
Type of house  1979  1986
Single storey compound  41 \
Multi-storey  compound  1-60  16  57
Detached  house  13  24
Semi-detached  house  17  12
Terraced house  6
Others  11  0  6
Note:  1979 data are from  Srivastava (1980).
Table A.3:  Monthly rents paid per household and per room (Percent)
Rent Paid (C)  per household  per room
0 - 99  2  4
100  - 199  5  7
200  - 299  26  33
300  - 399  50  51
400  - 499  3  2
500 - 599  4  4
600  +  9  1
Mean  366  264
Median  300  300124  RENT CONTROL  IN  KUMASI, GHANA
Table  A.4:  Distribution of Household Monthly Consumption by  Tenure  (Percent)
Household monthly  Tenure
consumption  (C)  Owner Familyhousers Renters  Sub-renters  Total
0 - 4999  3  11  5  8  6
5000  - 9999  14  30  26  30  26
10000  - 14999  23  27  36  24  32
15000  - 19999  22  lB  18  13  18
20000  - 24999  18  8  8  13  9
25000  +  19  6  7  12  8
Mean  (C)  19600  13400  13500  16200  14300
Note:  In  1986  C90  US$1.
Table  A.5:  Household  size  distributions,  1970,  1980  and  1986  (Percent)
Persons  per  household.  All
Year  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10-14  15+ Slies  Mean
1970  27  15  13  11  9  7  6  4  3  5  1  100  4.0
1980  14  12  14  14  13  12  6  6  3  6  1  100  4.8
1986  13  14  13  15  16  11  7  4  3  4  0  100  4.5
Sources:
1970,  Ghana  (1978,  table  5)g  1980,  Tipple  (1987a,  Table 18),
1986,  household  survey.
Table  A.6:  Total  household  size  dLstributLon  by sector,  1986  (Percent)
Persons  per  household.  All
Sector  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10-14  15+  Sizes  Mean
IndiSenous  10  13  14  17  16  12  7  4  4  4  0  100  4.5
Tenement  18  16  12  13  16  8  7  4  2  3  1  100  4.2
Government  6  10  11  14  15  12  8  8  2  14  1  100  5.7
High cost  10  12  11  10  17  18  5  7  6  6  0  100  5.0
Total  13  14  13  15  16  11  7  4  3  4  0  100  4.5
Note.  The  indigenous  and  tenement  sector  are  characterised  by  compound  houses of one  or  more  storeys.
The latter  has  more  tvo  and  three  storey  buildLngs  than  the fonmer.  The  government  sector  has
been  built  by government  agencies,  the high  cost sector  is domLnated  by dvellngs for the
elite.  For  further  details  of sectoral  characteristics  see  Tlpple  (1987a).ANNEX TABLES  125
Table A.7:  Rooms occupied per household, 1980 &nd 1986  (Percent)
Rooms
Occupied  1980  1986
1  70  (70)  73  (73)
2  14  (84)  14  (87)
3  7  (90)  5  (92)
4  5  (95)  4  (96)
5  2  (97)  2  (97)
6  2  (99)  1  (99)
7  0  (99)  1  (100)
8  1  (100)  0  (100)
9  0  (100)  0  (100)
10+  0  (100)  0  (100)
Mean  1.7  1.6
Table AS:  Rooma occupied by tenure (Percent)
No. of rooms  Tenure
occupied  Ovner  Family houser  Renter  Sub-renter
1  30  66  83  62
2  22  21  12  15
3  14  5  3  13
4  12  5  2  10
5  8  1  1  -
6  9  2  0  -
7  4  - 0  -
8  2  1  - -
9  _  _  _  _
10+  - 1  0  -
Mean  rooms  3.0  1.7  1.3  1.7
Table A.9: Total and co-resident household  sizes,  1980  and  1986  (Percent)
Persons  per  household.  AlL
Year  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10-14  15+  Sizes  Mean
Total  14  12  14  14  13  12  6  6  3  6  1  100  4.8
1980
Co-res.  15  13  15  13  12  11  5  6  2  5  1  100  4.5
Total  13  14  13  15  16  11  7  4  3  4  0  100  4.5
1986
Co-res.  16  14  13  14  15  10  7  4  3  4  0  100  4.3
Sources;
1980, Tipple  (1987a, Table 18). 1986, Household Survey.126  RENT CONTROL  IN  KUMASI, GHANA
Table A.10: Co-resLdent Occupancy Rates,  1980 and 1986 (Percent)
Persons
per  room  1980  1986
0.0-0.9  6  4
1.  0-1.9  22  22
2.0-2.9  21  20
3.0-3.9  17  16
4.0-4.9  12  13
5.0-5.9  9  9
6.0-6.9  6  7
7.0 +  8  9
Mean
(persons/room)  3.3  3.3
Table A.11:  Overcrowded Households, Measured Against Different Thresholds,  by Tenure  (Percent)
Percentage of households overcrowded  at:
OvercrowdLng threshold (persons per room)
Tenure  2.5  3.0  3.5
Owner  38  34  29
Family houser  54  49  35
Renter  62  59  44
Sub-renter  64  46  26
Total  58  54  40
Table A.12: Households vithout access to  services,  1980  and 1986 (Percent)
Service
Year  Kitchen  Bathroom  ToLlet  Water
1980  15  3  22  33
1986  22  2  30  26ANNEX TABLES  127
Table  A.13:  Households with exclusive access to  services, 1980  and 1986  (Percent)
Service
Year  Kitchen Bathroom  ToLlet  Water
1980  16  15  13  12
1986  16  13  12  11
Table  A.14: Households  without  Access  to Services,  by Tenure  (Percent)
Service
Tenure  Kitchen  Bathroom ToLlet  Water
Owner  11  3  14  17
Family  houser  24  3  43  34
Renter  24  2  26  25
Sub-renter  14  0  50  2
Total  22  2  30  26
Table  A.15: Households  with  exclusive  access  to services,  by tenure  (Percent)
Service
Tenure  Kitchen  Bathroom Toilet  Water
Owner  49  49  46  41
Family  houser  12  8  6  6
Renter  12  8  8  8
Sub-renter  22  27  26  27
Total  16  13  12  11128  RENT CONTROL  IN  KUMASI, GHANA
Table A.16:  Length of stay in the house, by tenure  (Percent)
Length of stay  Tenure
(years).  Owner  Family houser  Renter  Sub-renter
0 - 4  16  21  26  38
5 - 9  13  16  30  22
10 -14  16  10  17  8
15 -19  13  12  13  11
20 -24  11  9  6  8
25 +  32  32  9  13
Mean (years)  19  19  11  10
Table A.17:  Selected Index Numbers (Rounded), 1970 to 1986 (1963 - 100).
General  Prime  Rent, Fuel  Controlled
Consumer  Building  Minimum  E  Power  Rents of
Price Index  Costs  Wage  Index  1 room in
Year  (Urban)(1)  Index(2)  Index(3)  (Urban)(4)  Sandcrete(5)
1970  176  123  154  113  100
1971  - 129  154  - 100
1972  - 151  154  - 100
1973  260  177  154  119  110
1974  313  238  199  119  110
1975  431  331  308  119  110
1976  649  360  308  119  110
1977  1,370  502  615  382  110
1978  2,350  782  615  530  110
1979  3,520  1,210  615  677  338
1980  4,970  1,810  615  1,020  338
1981  11,000  3,200  1,850  1,830  338
1982  13,400  3,730  1,850  2,530  507
1983  28,800  4,780  3,850  3,900  507
1984  40,600  - 5,380  6,620  507
1985  46,200 (June)  - 10,800  8,700  507
1986  - - 13,800  - 5,070
Notes:
1.  From World Bank  (1984) and Ghana Statistical Nevsletter No.12t85  (1985).
2.  From  Ghana Quarterly  Digest of Statistics (1981) and Stattstical Newsletter
No.16/83 (1983).
3.  To 1974 from Issifu Ali Committee (Ghana 1974)1 1975 - 1981 own datal  1982 - 1985
Bentsi-Enchlll  (1986): 1986 own data.
4.  Before 1577 the index is just for rent.  Sources, see 1 above.
5.  C6.50  in 1973 (NRCD 158), C20 in 1979 (AFRCD 5), C30 in 1982 (PNDCL 5) and C300 In
1986 (PNDCL 138 and LI 1318).REFERENCES
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